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Introduction
Money  is  an  enigma,  a  complex  metaphor  that  requires  careful  thought  for  its 
comprehension. Countless studies have been dedicated to the solution of this enigma: a 
never-ending  search  for  the  Philosopher’s  Stone,  the  ‘secret’ at  the  origin  of  money. 
However,  only a few have been concerned with comprehending and accepting its very 
‘mystery’, and namely why money is so important – so significant – to us. Admittedly, it is 
impossible  ‘to  comprehend  a  mystery’,  which  is  by  definition  elusive,  inexplicable, 
unknown, incomprehensible. And yet, the wonder of language is that we can speak of the 
inexplicable,  the  unknown,  the  indefinite,  the  undetermined:  we  can  even  speak  of 
‘nothing’ and give it a  form that would make it understandable in some sense within a 
discourse, meaningful in context. What are indeed languages if not living testimonies of the 
truth that all possible things always come ‘with a text’ (cum textus)? That is, in order to 
exist all things ought to be spoken in context and joined together by meaningful relations 
articulating a discourse, a  logos.  There lies rationality: neither in subjectivity or agency, 
nor in objectivity or structure, but in contextual relations and relations of relations. 
Money, too, is first of all a word whose existence is to be ascribed to the logos, for we 
cannot  think  of  money  and,  reciprocally,  money  cannot  be,  outside  of  the  discursive 
dimension  of  language.  The  word  has  a  meaning  that  necessarily  comes  with  a  text  
(incidentally, this is why  money  is not the same as  moneta,  argent, geld,  nomisma, and 
“Charon’s obol, Judas’ thirty shekels, and the inexhaustible penny of Isaac Laquedem”). 
But then, as it is often the case, hallucinated by the sound and the soundness of the word – 
as  if  the  vibes  were not  travelling indefinitely  through the  time and space of  a  larger 
context, but were resonating entirely within our minds – we lose touch with its meaning, 
and forget its (hi)story. It thus comes as no surprise that history is routinely forgotten by 
men possessed  of  logos.  Historical  plots  of  social  relations,  “indefinite  skeins  of 
interminable referrals” are systematically entrusted to the word, carved into its sign which 
is thus  instituted.  We are, in relation to one another as parts of a greater (social) whole, 
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because of this institution. The mystery of money is precisely the mystery of the institution 
or, if you like, the mystery of the verb made flesh. 
‘The verb is made flesh’ means that we, in constructing our subjectivity whilst relating 
to one another, constantly objectify, or rationalise, the creations of the logos (which, it will 
be  argued  in  chapter  5,  does  not  simply  stand  for  ‘word’,  ‘speech-thought’,  ‘reason’, 
‘ground’,  ‘discourse’,  but  also and most  importantly  for ‘relation’).  That  is  to  say,  we 
alienate figures of speech-thought,  reify relations,  objectify signs and, in the process of 
doing  so,  we  institute  reality  as  such.  Yet,  provided  that  the  ‘objects’ of  reality  are 
ultimately ‘speaking words’ – ideas crystallised into institutional forms, eidei that speak to 
us, emblems that engrave meaning upon us (despite the fact that we originally created and 
spoke them first) – we cannot hope to comprehend them unless we make sense of their 
significance as linguistic-discursive figures with the ability to designate, convey action, 
signify human relations and institute reality in some sense.  And so, to properly deal with 
the question of money, we ought to comprehend the significance of its institution before we 
pass judgment on its nature.
As it will be argued in chapters 4 and 5, the significance of money is in the last instance 
a political significance, not only because behind the genesis of a money is always a story 
of conflicts, particular interests and power relations, but also because its very institution 
enables the actuation of political projects in a society. Again, the problem is: we tend to 
forget. And so, forgetful of the mysterious, ontological aspect of ‘money as verb’, scholars 
generally strive to reveal the secret of its flesh, that is, the allegedly universal nature of its 
substance, showing little or no regard for the word and its (contextual-historical) meaning. 
Accordingly, most studies subordinate the question of ‘why money’, the what (ought to be)  
for,  to  the  issue  of  ‘how  money’,  the  what  is,  in  the  crudest  act  of  reification,  or 
hypostatization, of something which is not really a real thing in the same way as a chair, a 
statue, a teaspoon and an umbrella are. For money, it will be argued in this work, is not 
‘real’ and it is not even ‘nominal’, as heterodox economics posits: if anything, money is 
‘virtual’1, that is, nearly real and yet fundamentally illusory and deceiving. 
Functionalist  or  essentialist  definitions  of  money,  as  the  ones  found  in  economic 
1 The term ‘virtual’,  says Legendre (2005: 190), refers to the immensity of forms:  virtus est immensitas  
virium. Virtual is the place where the unlimited, the infinite, the phantasmagorical, find their own course 
through words as if in a vivid dream. But the dream itself is a text where nomina ossibus inhaerent – where 
the word adheres to the bones, and the verb is made flesh. The virtual is what sets a limit to the unlimited.
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textbooks, are of little help in this respect (see chapter 4). For instance, economists say that 
money is a ‘measure of value’ and yet in no way have they been able to measure  with 
precision  its quantity (see chapter 5); in fact, even though money  measures  exchanges, 
monetary transactions are able to grow out of proportions to the point that no measure will 
be  enough  to  limit  financial  speculation.  When  this  happens,  the  pecuniary  values  of 
financial  assets allegedly ‘deviate from their  fundamentals’, blown up by a bubble: the 
animal spirits are unleashed (see chapter 3). However, the frantic increase of speculative 
transactions  can  lead  to  a  halt,  a  ‘credit  crunch’,  a  sudden  draining  of  liquidity: 
paradoxically,  the  ‘medium  of  exchange’ may  stop  mediating  at  once  because  it  was 
circulating beyond measure.  
We fool ourselves into believing that money is just a unit and standard of account, a 
means of payment, and a medium of exchange. And in a sense that’s what money normally  
does. However, as post-Keynesians often claims (though they probably give their words a 
different meaning), money is not what money does. So what is money or, better, why does it 
exist? The point will be made in chapter 5 that money is instituted to satisfy a  need or, 
better,  to  remind  us  all  of  an  absence (a  lack).  This  need/lack  materialises  in  the 
articulation of a  normativity, that is, the institution of a norm, or ‘constitutive rule’, that 
sets the terms for a game but at the same time does not specify what the game is about. In 
particular, it will be argued that the game of money is one in which we can create powers 
and negotiate them (i.e. trade them). Whilst doing so, we do not understand, nor do we care 
about, the greater purpose (telos) of the game (provided that there is one). Our interests are 
indeed manifold and our projects may grandly differ, so that eventually everyone is going 
her own way. In the end the game is so compelling, and we are so into it, that we just play 
in the heat of the moment. 
Our  experience  of  money  is  accordingly  schizophrenic  for  the  most,  as  we  indeed 
perceive it at once as a universal and a particular power: the One and the Many, as it will 
be suggested in chapter 4. The same applies to our intellectual reflection on money which, 
it  will  be argued in part  I (especially chapter 1),  is  generally split  into an ontology of 
money as a universal means (or instrumentality) irreconcilable with an analysis of money 
as a particular end (or finality). To be sure, most of us dogmatically accept the ‘universal’ 
as a revelation from above; consequently not only do they tend to encompass the particular 
into the universal, but they also pretend they can infer the former (reduced to a matter of 
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detail) from the latter. This is for instance the case of neo-chartalist economists, who argue 
that money is a promise that the government is able to impose on the general population 
because  of  an  undisputed  sovereignty,  and  yet  who  don’t  explain  how  and  why  this 
sovereignty is historically constructed (see chapter 2). 
To be sure, we cannot infer the particular from the universal, or vice versa. What we can 
do,  however,  is  to  seek  in  our  common  sense  the  logos/relation that  holds  this  two 
complementary aspects of the institution together. The basic idea underlying this work is 
that  what  makes  money  an  institution,  and  hence  a  quintessential  sociological 
phenomenon, is not that it serves as a measure and medium of value, but that it is pursued 
for its own sake, as a value in itself. This quality of money as value is partially captured by 
the much under-theorised notion of store of value. Keynes was among the first economists 
to openly recognise the economic as well as political significance of the store of value with 
his ‘liquidity preference’ hypothesis (see chapters 2 and 3). As a store of value, the purpose 
of money is not to circulate per se but to be strategically withdrawn from circulation. Also, 
money is not just a measure of value but is pursued as a most liquid financial asset, a 
bearer of options about how to spend and invest one’s own purchasing power. As it will be 
argued throughout part I, in no way can we make sense of modern money and finance 
unless we consider its fundamental role as a store of value and a most liquid financial 
asset.  
This said, there is more about the store of value than meets the eye, enough to set up a 
complex philosophical problematic. Indeed, money as value, or else the being of value of 
money, defines the  singularity  of its phenomenon (as it will be termed in chapter 4), a 
puzzling ‘what is this’ that identifies at once a universal (i.e. ‘what is’) and a particular (i.e. 
‘this’) form which, crucially, is indeterminate and indeterminable. A good way to think of 
the money-form is precisely to figure it as a trope (perhaps a verb metaphor): like the latter 
the form of money is never fixed, determined, in the same way as a photographic picture 
is, but is at any point in time open to the creation of (potentially interminable) referrals 
starting from and surrounding its texture. Put crudely, at any point in time (and provided 
that we share the same political space) we are in the condition to negotiate potentially 
anything with the purchasing power we hold. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the 
Greek word tropos is related to the root of the verb trepein, meaning ‘to turn’, ‘to direct’, 
‘to change’, ‘to alter’. Like a trope, money’s essence (or ‘being’) is to drive change (or 
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‘becoming’). 
This is why it will be argued in chapter 4 that the form of money is changing (mutable, 
protean)  and  is  indeed changing ‘here and now’,  producing social  change and  making 
history by giving purpose (and sense) to social relations. This purpose, again, is primarily 
political, and only in the second place economic. In fact, the need/lack of which money is 
emblem is not dictated by an economic rationality (i.e. structure), nor is it expression of a 
‘will of power’ (i.e. agency), so to speak. Instead, it will be argued in particular in chapter 
5,  this  need/lack  materialises  in  the  institution  of  a  peculiar  power  relation:  a 
proportionality (analogia) among men assuming the semblances of ‘equality in exchange’ 
(see chapter 5).  In virtue of equality in exchange men no longer need to physically exert 
violence in order to establish their worth (honour), nor do they need to make war to each 
other as enemies, but they can finally claim their propriety (now vested as private property) 
by legal-rational means (i.e. by nomos) and, especially, make war to each other as friends: 
i.e. persons formally ‘affiliated’ to the same political association of equals and participating 
in the same collective enterprise (see chapter 5 and 6). 
Crucially, money and the law are constitutive of the same normality (status quo). In 
effect, under any circumstances men are equal before money in the same fashion as they 
are equal before the law: namely, in a ‘fictional’ way (de iure but not de facto). Within the 
same polity there are indeed proprietors and proprietors, citizens and citizens. This is in a 
sense why Aristotle said that  nomisma is not by  physis  but of the same kind as  nomos: 
because, like the law, money is not the expression of a natural, arithmetical (market-like) 
equality that can be set among the products of men, but is the manifestation of a fictional 
equality among men’s worth which, in turn, is symptomatic of a justice of a political kind 
(see  chapter  5).  Yet,  we  must  be  particularly  wary  of  this  sort  of  dichotomic 
categorisations: as it will be suggested in chapter 6, both physis and nomos of money do 
matter for our understanding of the phenomenon, but none of them can be posited as an 
ontological foundation for it. Put crudely, this means that though money is certainly not a 
natural product of the economy (by physis), it is not even a creature of the ‘civil’ society 
(by nomos). On the contrary, money is the historical making of politics and a creation of 
the  logos:  it  is that which let the economy and the civil society – in fact, the  political  
economy – begin. 
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To be sure,  the political  economy,  it  will  be shown in part  I,  is  not  what  orthodox 
economists  think and say it is.  In the monetary economy exchanges are not barter-like 
inter-actions  but  contractual  trans-actions  producing  first  of  all  property  rights  and 
obligations. Here the economy is not about economising, or optimising the exploitation of 
resources. Rather, ‘economy’, as the Greek word oikonomia indicates, is pure and simply 
the  law  of  private  property (please  note,  by  oikos  the  ancient  Greeks  did  not  mean 
‘household’ but the basic domain of property that a Greek man ought to command to be 
formally recognised as a member of the political association of equals holding power in the 
polis). Significantly, this law is not primarily concerned with norms of production but with 
processes of participation and (re)distribution (see chapter 5 and 6, but also chapter 3 about 
speculative finance). This economy of powers is expression of money’s normativity in its  
making: it is the ongoing equalisation of all things, the systematic liquefaction of social 
bonds and their commodification, the thriving illusion that all can be in one glittering coin, 
a  current  value  shared by the collectivity at  large and hence capable of cutting across 
political hierarchies (see chapter 6).
Such a key-performance of money in the making of history, however, doesn’t make it an 
‘autonomous’ entity  – i.e.  an  auto-nomos  with a rationality  or logic of its  own, as the 
positivist  mentality  would  suggest.  Money  remains  ultimately  a  creation  of  social 
(property) relations and, in this respect, Aristotle’s lesson must not go unheeded:  it is in  
our power to change it and make it useless. 
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PART I
10
CHAPTER 1
The problematic nature of money 
Or how alternative thinking has learned to stop worrying about  value and love the 
measure
“Money, it  is  well  known, serves two principal  purposes.  By acting as a money of account it  facilitates  
exchanges without its being necessary that it should ever itself come into the picture as a substantive object.  
In this respect it is a convenience which is devoid of significance or real influence. In the second place, it is a 
store of wealth. So we are told, without a smile on the face. But in the world of the classical economy, what 
an insane use to which to put it! For it is a recognised characteristic of money as a store of wealth that it is  
barren; whereas practically every other form of storing wealth yields some interest or profit. Why should 
anyone outside a lunatic asylum wish to use money as a store of wealth?” (Keynes, quoted in Frankel, 1977:  
59).
Of the many works published in recent  years on the subject  of money,  The Nature of  
Money  by Geoffrey Ingham stands out as the single most  important contribution,  as it 
manages to synthesise in a comprehensive sociological theory the many heterodox motives 
that animate the current debate, de facto setting the standard for a critical discussion of 
orthodox monetary theory. At the basis of Ingham’s sociology is the key-idea that money is 
not a mere instrument for the exchange of goods and services but an anonymous, readily 
transferable promise: accordingly, money is always fiduciary to an extent, that is, based on 
trust,  and this  is  what makes it  a quintessential  sociological phenomenon. The greatest 
originality of Ingham’s work, however, is not to be found in his sociological understanding 
of money per se (the idea that money is a token of trust has indeed a long history) but in 
the methodological project that underpins it; the latter indeed reveals a remarkable attempt 
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to  overcome  the  methodological  limits  of  both  agency-based  approaches  (i.e. 
methodological individualism) and structure-based ones (i.e. methodological collectivism) 
by resorting to an analysis of ‘money as a social relation’. As Ingham (2004: 16) points out 
in this respect, modern theorems of orthodox economics are in fact based on either object-
object relations, and namely structurally-determined exchange ratios between commodities 
(what he calls the ‘production function’), or agent-object relations, that is, volitional acts of 
calculation (what  he calls  the ‘utility function’).  That  is  to say,  mainstream economics 
excludes from its model-making the  agent-agent relation, i.e. the  social relation proper  
which, by contrast, wants to be the privileged object of his work. 
Admittedly, to say that money is (the product of) a social relation, in itself, is not really 
a new thing and it is certainly not enough to mark a progress in our understanding of the 
phenomenon;  many  scholars  before  Ingham  have  looked  at  money  from  a  more 
philosophical,  sociological,  and historical  point  of  view and have  long concluded  that 
money is the product of some type of sociality. Regrettably, with only this in mind one 
doesn’t go too far from the insidious consideration that money is the product of ‘social 
relations of exchange’ and, eventually, a creature of the market. This is precisely what the 
orthodox position  maintains  in  a  rather  dogmatic  fashion,  that  is,  without  providing  a 
specification of the historical character of the exchange of which money is assumed to be 
object/subject  (see  Hodgson,  2001).  Contra  mainstream  economics  and  alike  naïve 
approaches, Ingham points out that by ‘money as a social relation’ he intends “more than 
the self-evident assertion that money is produced socially, is accepted by convention, is 
underpinned by trust, has definite social and cultural consequences and so on” (Ingham, 
2004: 12). More exactly,
 
[m]oney  is  itself  a  social  relation;  that  is  to  say,  money  is  a  ‘claim’ or  ‘credit’ that  is 
constituted by social relations that  exist independently of the production and exchange of  
commodities.  Regardless  of  any  form  it  might  take,  money  is  essentially  a  provisional 
‘promise’ to pay, whose ‘moneyness’, as an ‘institutional fact’, is assigned by a description 
conferred by an abstract money of account. Money is a social relation of credit and debt  
denominated in a money of account. In the most basic sense, the possessor of money is owed 
goods. But money also represents a claim or credit against the issuer – monarch, state, bank 
and so on. Money has to be ‘issued’. And something can only be issued  as money  if it is 
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capable of cancelling any debt incurred by the issuer.
 
Ingham (2004: 15-37) is thus adamant in rejecting in their entirety the “meta-theoretical 
foundations of orthodox monetary analysis”, rooted in the notion of commodity-money and 
placing a strong emphasis on the role of the market, in favour of alternative fundamentals 
that he draws both on the classics of heterodox theory (in particular Knapp, Mitchell-Innes 
and the early Keynes) and on contemporary approaches stemming from the post-Keynesian 
tradition  and  including,  in  particular,  neo-chartalism.  He  thus  summarises  his  general 
understanding of money in four basic points, or themes (visibly in contrast with the main 
tenets  of orthodox theory):  first,  money is  essentially an abstract measure of value (or 
money of account), not a medium of exchange; second, money consists substantially in a 
claim (a credit,  a promise),  not a commodity; third,  money is  a  creature of the (state) 
authority,  not a product of the market;  finally,  money is  performative,  that is,  it  is not 
neutral in the economic process (Ingham, 2004: 56). 
If we exclude the third point – money is a creature of the authority – which still divides 
the heterodox tradition between those who support the primacy of the state (in particular, 
the neochartalist supporters of the notion that state taxation drives money) and those who 
sustain the primacy of the market (in fact, the endogenist advocates of the idea that the 
money supply is function of the market-driven endogenous demand for credit), these points 
can be taken as the ‘meta-theoretical’ foundations of an emerging Grand Theory – a new 
paradigm or cosmology encompassing the whole of  social  sciences  – that  wants  to  be 
radically  alternative  to  the  common sense  currently  upheld  by  mainstream economics. 
However, as it is often the case, intellectual positions that negate each other may share the 
same mentality and it is not unusual to witness how, paradoxically, one becomes what one 
fights. Indeed, as I will argue in what follows, Ingham – and with him the entire heterodox 
tradition – does not provide a real alternative to mainstream economics, but rather shares 
similar  theoretical  deficiencies  with  it,  because  of  two  interrelated  reasons:  first,  an 
inability to outline a radical ontological problematisation of money as a social power and, 
hence, an unwillingness to shed light on what lies in the shadow of the overly-economic 
notion of ‘purchasing power’; second, a failure to set up a proper ‘relational’ methodology 
capable of  overcoming the limits  of  structure-based ‘macro’ and agency-based ‘micro’ 
approaches. In particular, by resorting to a either ‘systemic’ or ‘individual’ rationality to 
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determine the origins  and the purposes  of money,  both approaches  indistinctly  tend to 
underestimate, or even neglect, the political dimension of the money phenomenon – how 
rationality is in fact constructed in the human praxis of socially relating. 
In the next section I will focus on the ontology of money, as outlined by Ingham and 
endorsed by virtually all contemporary heterodox theorists, and show how the idea that 
money  is  essentially a  money  of  account  and  substantially a  claim  gives  rise  to  an 
ambiguous discourse incapable of resolving the contradiction – in fact, the epistemological 
hiatus – between money as measure of value and money as value in itself and, hence, the 
contemporary  enigma  of  ‘fiat  money’:  the  promise  of  payment  serving  as  means  of 
payment.  
The essence of money
The nature of the money described by Ingham escapes unitary definitions. In fact, money 
is dogmatically assumed by the British scholar to be dual  (Ingham, 2004: 4): namely, an 
infrastructural power that provides the basis “for the progressive rationalization of social 
life” as well  as a  despotic power that “expands human society’s capacity to get things 
done” and that “can be appropriated by particular interests”. That is to say, money is at 
once an abstract unit, proxy of an (infrastructural) universal instrumentality that cannot be 
appropriated by anyone, and an abstract claim, proxy of a (despotic) particular finality that 
can and must be pursued (and appropriated) by specific individuals (or else it would not be 
despotic). 
This duality is transposed in Ingham’s definition of ‘what money does’: it  measures 
value as well as transporting & storing such a value for final payment or settlement of debt 
(Ingham, 2004: 70). ‘Measure of value’ and ‘means of payment’ are thus considered as the 
most important attributes of money2, while the ‘medium of exchange’ is downgraded to the 
rank  of  secondary,  derived  function  and  the  ‘store  of  value’ becomes  “money’s  least 
specific  attribute”  (Ingham,  1996:  525).  In  particular,  adds  Ingham,  “the  very  idea  of 
2 As I will argue later, the ‘store of value’ function and, hence, the themes of the value of money and of 
‘money as value’, are not really taken into account by Ingham who, instead of explaining why money does  
have a value to begin with, tries to derive the value of money from formal properties that can be attached to  
the money of account or the means of payment.   
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money  […]  is  logically  prior  and  historically  anterior  to  market  exchange”  (Ingham, 
2004: 25). The ‘idea’ of money hence corresponds to the concept of “abstract accounting 
for value” (Ingham, 2004: 25), and namely the money of account, “the primary concept for 
a theory of money” (Keynes, 1930: 3). This position, sometimes referred to as ‘monetary 
nominalism’ (Ingham, 2004: 57), can be traced back to the ideas of the early Keynes; as 
Ingham explains, “the ontological specificity of money derives from what Keynes referred 
to as the ‘description’ of money by a money of account” (Ingham, 2006: 261). 
Notably, his  Treatise on money  (1931) Keynes distinguished between a (real) money-
proper  and  a  (nominal)  money-of-account,  arguing  that  “the  money-of-account  is  the 
description  or  title  and  the  money  [money-proper]  is  the  thing  which  answers  to  the 
description” (Keynes, 1930: 3-4).
A Money-of-Account  comes  into  existence  along  with  Debts,  which  are  contracts  for 
deferred payments, and Price-Lists, which are offers of contracts for sale or purchase. Such 
Debts and Price-Lists, whether they are recorded by word of mouth or by book entry on 
baked bricks or paper documents,  can only be expressed in terms of a Money-of-Account 
(Keynes, 1930: 3, my italic).
The reason for endorsing the ontological primacy of the money of account seems very 
straightforward: if we don’t  name it, we cannot  own it; that is to say, if we do not agree 
first upon a metrological standard of account, we will not be able to express prices and 
arrange  contracts  with  each  other.  This,  however,  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the 
definition of the standard and the choice of the means that will eventually settle a contract 
ought to be separate in time and space, with the former taking place logically as well as 
historically  first,  and  the  latter  following  somehow  in  its  footprint.  And  yet,  such  a 
disputable ‘signifier-signified’ semantics of money, whereby a logically and historically 
prior ‘nominal’ signifier  appears  as  engraving  meaning  on a  logically  and historically 
posterior ‘real’ signified  (thus  asserting  its  ontological  primacy over  it),  can  be  found 
across the entire post-Keynesian tradition. Please note that here the signified does not stand 
for  the physical  ‘money-stuff’ or  ‘money-thing’ (the particular  entity,  such as  precious 
metal, paper or bookkeeping entry, serving as actual medium) but refers to the ‘money-
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proper’ which, according to Keynes (1930: 5), is that the “delivery of which will discharge 
the contract or the debt” – that is to say, the means of payment. 
The  ontological  primacy  of  the  money  of  account  is  preserved  in  Ingham’s 
conceptualisation of the history of money and, in particular, in Ingham’s depiction of the 
alleged “developmental sequence of the social structure of monetary practice” (Ingham, 
2000: 27). The developmental sequence starts with the institution of a money of account 
(lost in the mists of time), followed by the authoritative establishment of “standards of 
value based upon quantitative relations between commodities expressed in a  money of 
account”,  which  took  place  for  the  first  time  in  third-millennium  BC  Mesopotamia 
(Ingham,  2000:  27).  Subsequent  to  it,  we  witness  the  authority-driven  institution  of 
“standardized means of payment/stores of value” in the broader ancient Near East of the 
second  millennium  BC  (ibid.)  and,  eventually,  the  constitution  of  a  totalising  money 
system rooted in a generalised means of payment and exchange, coinage, starting from 600 
BC in ancient Greece. 
Notably, in such a developmental sequence the function of money progressively and 
inexorably moves away from its quintessential essence, as a measure of value, as money 
evolves  towards  the  universal  medium of  exchange.  Also,  the  historical  gap  occurring 
between  the  initial  institutionalisation  of  monies  of  account  and  the  subsequent 
institutionalisation of a generalised medium of exchange (coinage) is enormous:  whereas 
metrological standards of value were first established in the third millennium BC by the 
temple and palatial authorities of the ancient Near East, the final stage of the sequence only 
took place in the Classical Greco-Roman world, with the consolidation of the coinage-
based Roman monetary order (Ingham, 2000: 27; 2004: 89-106). But if so, what, then, can 
explain  the  historical  gap  between  the  institution  of  ‘commensurability’ and  that  of 
‘exchangeability’?  Are  we sure  we can  infer  links  of  causality  and,  perhaps,  derive  a 
‘developmental sequence’ of monetary practice, moving from the single assumption that 
money is essentially a measure of value, as Ingham does? In other words, can the money of 
account alone explain  the institution of all other monetary functions?
To be sure, Ingham does not provide any clear mechanism of causation as a rationale for 
the sequence money of account – means of payment/store of value – medium of exchange. 
However, he claims that in each of these sequential steps the authority plays a crucial role. 
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In  effect,  Ingham’s  ontological  primacy  of  the  money  of  account  is  always  implicitly 
complemented by an ontogenetic primacy of the authority, which is said to be necessary to 
the  development  of  all  monetary  functions  starting  from the  measure  of  value.  As  he 
himself  points  out,  “moneyness  is  conferred  by  money  of  account,  which  cannot  be 
produced by the free interplay of economic interests in the market; it must be introduced 
by  an  ‘authority’”  (Ingham,  2004:  49);  also,  money  “always  has  an  authoritative 
foundation” (Ingham, 2006: 271). In fact, the ‘development’ of money is always connected 
to  the  social  construction  of  sovereignty  –  “money  entails  sovereignty”,  says  Ingham 
(2006: 261). In particular, in Ingham’s account of monetary history, the teleological series 
that  goes  from  money  of  account  to  medium  of  exchange  seems  to  take  place  in 
conjunction with the rise and fall of ‘world orders’3. 
Indeed,  following  the  disintegration  of  the  Roman  empire  and  coinage,  the 
developmental sequence got started again from scratch with the re-institution of myriad 
standards  of  account  corresponding  to  equally  numerous  sovereign  spaces  in  Europe. 
These  monetary  standards  were  then  incorporated  under  the  Carolingian  rule  of 
Charlemagne in a transnational metrological system, also known as the regime of moneta 
immaginera4. With the consolidation of  moneta immaginera  something unique and of a 
crucial  importance  for  the  subsequent  constitution  of  the  capitalist  monetary  order  (of 
course,  with the wisdom of hindsight)  happened:  the  dissociation  or de-linking5 of  the 
money of account and the means of payment (Ingham, 2000: 28; 2004: 107-112). As a 
result of the de-linking, “by the late Middle Ages, when people priced things, they had in 
mind not coins, but commodities and obligations denominated in money of account...The 
décrochement  of the money of account from the means of payment firmly re-established 
the abstract monetary calculation that had been practiced in ancient Babylon” (Ingham, 
2004: 110). Again, money was assumingly re-constituted around its original  idea  as the 
money of account.
The reconstitution of the quintessential idea of money, however, did not involve a mere 
repetition  of  things,  but  an  actual  evolution towards  “the  pure  capitalist  credit-money 
system” (Ingham, 2004: 78). As Ingham’s story goes, during the Middle Ages new ways of 
thinking  about  money  as  a  dematerialised,  imaginary  construction  began  to  evolve  in 
3 For the notion of ‘world order’, see Cox (1987).
4 On the significance of moneta immaginera, see in particular Amato, 2008.
5 Marc Bloch (1981) originally called it décrochement, that is, discontinuity.
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concomitance with the customary use of old monetary technologies (i.e.  money-stuffs), 
remnants of the previous monetary order. We can assume in this respect that the de-linking 
of measure of value and means of payment, coupled with a ‘parcellisation of sovereignty’ 
throughout Europe (see Teschke, 2003), made monetary relations extremely complex since 
monetary policy could now rely on the manipulation of both the ‘nominal’ side of money 
(by crying up or down the coinage) and the ‘real’ side of it (by sophisticating the weight 
and  the  fineness  of  coins).  The  instruments  for  the  political  government  of  money-
mediated social relations thus changed dramatically, de facto opening up possibilities for 
experimenting new forms of credit arrangements and establishing altogether new ‘things 
that answered to the description’. As a result, new credit-based means of payment began to 
circulate in private financial networks along with the traditional money-form of coinage 
(Ingham, 2004: 113). In time, the de-linking led to the gradual development of modern 
monetary institutions, and in particular to the emergence of banks of deposits and public 
banks,  the  diffusion  of  the  bill  of  exchange and,  finally,  the  depersonalisation  of  debt 
leading to the emergence of the promissory note (i.e. promise of payment) as a means of 
payment. Finally, in seventeenth-century England these institutional changes culminated in 
the emergence of a central bank, the institution of a public debt and the hybridization of 
private bank credit and public sovereign currency into the modern capitalist money: credit-
money (see Ingham, 2004: 114-123). 
Now, this is no place to debate Ingham’s reconstruction of the history of modern money 
(I will nonetheless discuss it in the next chapters), but it is nonetheless interesting to note 
the type of ‘philosophy of history’ underpinning it. From Ingham’s perspective the entire 
history of money can be seen, in an ideal-typical fashion, as the story of “successive, but 
overlapping,  modes of  monetary production”6 (Ingham, 2004:  78):  that  is,  the story of 
structures of  monetised  social  relations  “underpinned  and  constituted  by”  historically-
specific  forms  of  authority  qua  sovereignty  (Ingham,  2004:  12).  To be  sure,  a  similar 
‘understanding’  focusing  on  ‘structures’  and  championing  a  vaguely  dialectical 
evolutionism that  goes  from abstract  measure  (ancient  monies  of  account)  to  concrete 
means (coinage) to abstract means ‘out of all  measure’ (modern credit-money),  can be 
6 These modes of money production are essentially four: 1) money accounting according to a standard of  
value, without transferable tokens (earliest known case: Mesopotamia, third millennium BC); 2) precious 
metal coinage systems (Asia Minor, circa 700 BC to early twentieth century AD); 3) dual system of precious  
metal  coinage and credit-money (fifteenth to early twenties century);  4)  the pure capitalist  credit-money 
system (mid-twentieth century onwards) (Ingham, 2004: 78).
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inferred from other relevant heterodox accounts of the history of money (see for instance 
Tymoigne and Wray, 2006). Arguably, this attention to the ‘structure’, the ‘authority’, the 
‘nominal’ goes in the direction of an epistemology (and a metaphysics) close to the ‘macro’ 
tradition of economics but in collision with the ‘micro’ foundations of a methodological 
project rooted in the notion that money is the empirical product of a social relation.   
Again, the ontological primacy of the money of account and the epistemological hiatus  
(rather than historical delinking) between the nominal character of money (as a measure of 
value) and its  real  counterpart (as a means for transporting and storing such a value) are 
supported by no more than the logical tautology that without a prior (infrastructural) unit of 
account, there can be no (despotic) means of payment, medium of exchange and store of 
value whatsoever7. This tautology, however, rests on a metaphysical ground. In fact, the 
alleged dialectic of measure of value (qua signifier) and means of payment (qua signified) 
is only apparently expression of an effective dialectic,  and semantics, of ‘nominal’ and 
‘real’ aspects of the money phenomenon. That is to say, no evidence is provided by Ingham 
of an actual interplay of ideal ‘essence’ and material ‘substance’ in the making of money; 
on the contrary, the relationship between signifier and signified is entirely played out at an 
abstract, idealistic level of essences-functions – a naïve ontological level that never affects 
the  analysis  of  ‘money-proper’.  Indeed,  the  means  of  payment  is  only  the  formal  
expression of that ‘which answers to the description’: to say that the measure of value is 
the ‘description’ and the means of payment ‘that which answers to the description’ is to 
merely put  form against  form. It is like saying that the ‘word’ is the description and the 
‘speech’ that which answer to the description; however, we can never hear the sound of the 
speech and understand what is said unless the word is spoken in a context. And so, in order 
to understand how the money-word sounds in reality, we ought to necessarily focus on the 
context of social  relations in which money-proper is actually spoken out. According to 
Ingham and the heterodox tradition at large, this context is provided by debt relations. 
The substance of money
The analysis of money as debt is what really distinguishes the heterodox tradition from its 
7 This tautology, in turn, would be corroborated by Ingham’s (far from persuading) demonstration that the  
process of exchange cannot produce the measure (Ingham, 2004: 15-37; 2006: 261). 
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orthodox  counterpart  and,  correspondingly,  what  makes  Ingham’s  sociology  so 
methodologically  interesting  and  potentially  relevant.  The  moment  debt  is  taken  into 
account, it becomes evident that “money is not merely a useful technique, comparable to 
weights and measures; it also consists in social relations that are inherently relations of 
inequality and power” (Ingham, 2004: 36-7). As Ingham points out (2004: 72, 75), “[a]ll 
money is constituted by credit-debit relations”, and “[m]oney cannot be created without the 
simultaneous creation of debt”, for “money is always issued as a debt, or liability”. But 
what is more important, “it is the existence of a debt that gives the money value” (Ingham, 
2004: 75, italic in the original). In other words, debt is the substance from which money 
gets its value. 
The sense of the relationship between money’s value and debt, however, is not easy to 
grasp. The value of money is indeed function of a systematic social bargain over prices, 
inflation,  interest  rates and all  those variables  that provoke “changes in  the balance of 
power between capital  and labour,  and between producers and consumers, [and which] 
affects the purchasing power of money” (Ingham, 2004: 82). Of these many social conflicts 
that shape money, “the pivotal struggle is between creditors and debtors” (Ingham, 2004: 
82).  The  terms  of  the  struggle  between  creditors  and  debtors,  however,  are  not  that 
straightforward, as we shall see.
Although  it  represents  the  “most  ‘economic’ of  problems”8 (Ingham,  1996:  525), 
Ingham considers the theme of the ‘value of money’ of primary importance for a sociology 
of money and indeed laments that “there is no consistent distinctively heterodox answer to 
the question of how money gets its value” (Ingham, 2004: 56). Yet, critically, it must be 
said that Ingham himself never bothers to explain in analytical details what he means by 
the ‘value of money’ but opts to leave this notion in an aura of metaphysical ambiguity, 
where in  a  looser fashion he can trace its  significance back to  the ‘measure of  value’ 
function (see Ingham, 2006: 261). This is for instance the case when he argues that “within 
a sovereign monetary space, issuers of money have the authority to change the value of 
money by manipulating the money of account” (Ingham, 2004: 83). I will return to this 
point later. 
According to Ingham (2004: 57), 
8 Contra Ingham, I will argue throughout my work that the value of money constitutes the most ‘political’ of 
problems about money. 
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the  value of  money does  not  derive  either  directly  or  indirectly,  as  a  symbol,  from the 
commodity  that  comprises  the  money-stuff,  or  from a  commodity  standard  that  money 
expresses. Rather, money is held to be a claim against goods; it is abstract purchasing power.
In short, concrete indebtedness gives value to money in the first instance, and then this 
value  is  expressed  by abstract  purchasing  power,  which  in  effect  serves  as  an  ex-post 
measure (please note, purchasing power does not serve as an ex-ante unit of value) of the 
pecuniary value of underlying debt. To be sure, the purchasing power described by Ingham 
is truly abstract, and indeed abstruse. In fact, it corresponds (quoting Simmel) to “the value 
of things without the things themselves” (Ingham, 2004: 64, 71; 2006: 261), or “the value 
of things in pure abstraction” (Ingham, 2004: 71). Also, purchasing power (qua ‘value of 
money’) “at  any point  in time is  the result  of the economic ‘battle of man with man’ 
[quoting Weber] in which money is a weapon (Ingham, 2004: 71), or else it is “the enacted 
outcome  of  social  and  political  conflicts  between  the  main  interests  in  the  economy” 
(Ingham, 2004: 81). 
Interestingly, to his own admission, Ingham’s understanding of purchasing power hinges 
upon Weber’s notion of ‘substantive value’ (see Ingham, 2000: 29; 2004: 71). Notably, by 
the  latter  Weber  explicitly  referred  to  the  price  of  a  monetary  asset  when  serving  as 
medium of  exchange9.  In  particular,  by  introducing  the  notion  of  substantive  validity, 
Weber  aimed  to  criticise  Knapp’s  idea  that  the  validity  of  money  could  be  entirely 
conferred by the legal authority of the state10 (see Knapp, 1924). On the contrary, argued 
9 Weber (1978: 75-6) writes: “A material object offered in exchange will be called a ‘medium of exchange’ so 
far as it is typically accepted primarily by virtue of the fact that the recipients estimate that they will, within  
the relevant time horizon, be able to utilize it in another exchange to procure other goods at an acceptable  
exchange ratio, regardless of whether it is exchangeable for all other goods or only for specific goods. The 
probability that the medium of exchange will be accepted at a given rate for specific other goods will be 
called its  ‘substantive validity’ (materiale Geltung) in relation to these.  The use itself will  be called the 
‘formal validity’ (formale Geltung)”. Substantive validity, in other words, is the price of money, whereas 
formal validity corresponds to its legal tender status, as conferred by the authority.
10 In fact, says Weber (1978: 178-9), “[i]t is true that by law and administrative action a state can today insure 
the formal validity of a type of money as a standard in its own are of power [sovereignty], provided it remain 
itself in a position to make payments in this money. […] But naturally this formal power implies nothing as 
to  the  substantive  validity  of  money;  that  is,  the  rate  at  which  it  will  be  accepted  in  exchange  for 
commodities. Nor does it yield any knowledge of whether and to what extent the monetary authorities can 
influence its substantive validity. Experience shows that it is possible for the political authority to attain, by  
such measures as the rationing of consumption, the control of production, and the enforcement of maximum 
and minimum prices, a high degree of control of this substantive validity, at least with respect to goods or 
services which are present or produced within its own territory. It is equally demonstrable from experience, 
however, that there are exceedingly important limits to the effectiveness of this kind of control, which will be 
discussed elsewhere. But in any case, such measures obviously do not belong in the category of monetary 
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Weber, the type of validity bestowed by the state, which he termed formal, implied nothing 
as to the ‘exchange value’ (substantive value) of money. Indeed, from Weber’s perspective, 
the value of  money was expression of a substance (which the heterodox tradition will 
identify with debt)  that was  already commodified,  priced,  and turned into a negotiable 
asset that could be readily bought and sold in the market. According to Weber, and pace 
Ingham, substantive value sticks to the medium of exchange, not to the measure of value 
(e.g. purchasing power is not a characteristic of the American dollar as such but a property 
of the one-dollar bill).
This, however, did not seem to baffle Ingham’s crusade against commodity money and 
the orthodox cosmology built around it, for “[n]ot only is money’s formal validity (as a 
means of payment) established by fiat,  its exchange value (substantive validity) is also 
irreducibly fiduciary, and here the ‘state or community’ (Keynes, 1930: 4) also plays an 
important role in producing the ‘promise of last resort’” (Ingham, 2000: 29). ‘Fiduciarity’ 
and ‘promise’ are two major hubs of Ingham’s sociology. As he claims, “[m]oney is  a 
promise, and the production of promise involves trust” (Ingham, 2004: 74); this is why “all 
money  has  a  fiduciary  character”  (Ingham,  2004:  85).  More  specifically,  “[m]oney  is 
assignable trust” (Ingham, 2004: 85), that is, trust that can be negotiated and transferred, 
alas, in the same way as a commodity. However, the reason why people put their faith in 
the value of the money-promise does not depend on the material (commodity) aspect of its 
token  per  se  but,  again,  on  the  authority,  since  “[e]stablishing  the  promise  requires 
‘authority’ which ultimately rests on coercion” (Ingham, 2004: 76). 
As  for  the  ‘value  of  money’,  Ingham’s  notion  of  ‘authority’  too  wriggles  on  a 
metaphysical ground. At first, the authority appears as a deus ex machina, an ontogenetic 
entity that establishes ex ante the money of account and, in turn, underpins and supersedes 
all other monetary functions. Also, in the vest of the ‘third party’ that guarantees the value 
of the money-promises made by all agents (creditors and debtors) participating in the same 
administration. The rational type of modern monetary policy has, on the contrary, had quite a different aim. 
The tendency has been to attempt to influence the substantive valuation of domestic currency in terms of  
foreign currency, that is, the market price of the home currency expressed in units of foreign currencies,  
usually  to  maintain  stability  or  in  some  cases  to  attain  the  highest  possible  ratio.  Among the  interests 
determining such policy are those of prestige and political power. But on the economic side, the decisive ones 
are financial interests, with particular reference to future foreign loans, and other very powerful business 
interests, notably of importers and of industries which have to use raw materials from abroad. Finally, the 
interests as consumers of those elements in the population which purchase imported goods are involved”.  
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monetary  (sovereign)  space,  the  authority  appears  as  an  exogenous or,  better, 
heteronomous force,  exerting a  power over the social  structure of  debt  relations ‘from 
above’11. This, however, is not the case; as a matter of fact, the ‘third party’ authority that 
ought to bear the burden of all promises is also the ‘pledgor of last resort’, that is, the 
agency that issues money; clearly, such an authority can never be super partes with respect 
to  the  monetary  praxis.  In  fact,  far  from  resembling  the  ‘night  watchman’ state  of 
mainstream (and minarchist) accounts, Ingham’s authority is properly speaking an author – 
more specifically, the Original Agent/Author that claims “the right not only to enforce the 
dictionary but also to write the dictionary” (Keynes, 1930: 5). The authority qua state is 
indeed said to establish the money of account as well as the formal validity (i.e. the legal 
tender status) of money-proper; but more significantly, it also determines the substantive 
value  of  money  (i.e.  its  purchasing  power)  “by  influencing  what  must  be  done  in  an 
economy to earn the income to pay the tax” (Ingham, 2004: 84) – that is, by exerting the 
prerogative power to impose a debt on its subjects. 
All in all, it would appear that, rather than ‘money entailing sovereignty’, ‘sovereignty 
entails money’. In fact, the idea that the value of money is basically conferred by state 
acceptation of the money-promise for tax settlement is the central tenet of the heterodox 
school  of  neo-chartalism (see  Wray,  1998;  2012b;  Tcherneva,  2006),  which  is  greatly 
inspired by Knapp’s classical ‘state theory of money’ (Knapp, 1924). Briefly (but I will 
devote a consistent part of the next chapter to this theme), according to neo-chartalists, in  
principle ‘taxes drive money’ (Wray,  1998);  in  practice,  deficit  spending by sovereign 
states  does  it12.  Ingham  argues  substantially  the  same:  the  state  produces  via  deficit 
spending the ‘promise of last resort’ that will underpin and guarantee all other promises 
made  by  the  economic  agents  transacting  within  the  jurisdictional  boundaries  of  its 
sovereign space. This is true today, under a regime of floating fiat currencies, as it was true 
back in the day under the gold standard, for “even under a gold standard, it  is not the 
11 Notably, at times the authority even appears as a Foucauldian capillary power, so to speak, that operates  
through  individuals  in  the  form  of  a  ‘collective  intentionality’.  Ingham,  in  particular,  states  that  the 
‘description’ of money by a money of  account “is assigned by what the philosopher Searle  refers to as 
‘collective intentionality’” (Ingham, 2006: 261). He thus argues on second thought that “money is produced 
by an authority in an act of sovereignty in which what is to count as money and how its myriad forms and 
media  are  to  be  recognized  as  belonging  to  the  same class  of  phenomena  is  established  by  ‘collective 
intentionality’” (Ingham, 2006: 265). For the notion of ‘collective intentionality’ see Searle (1995; 2005). For 
a critique of Searle’s philosophy see Rust (2006). 
12 Please note, the taxes-drive-money principle is valid only if the state is effectively sovereign and therefore 
in the condition to impose its own IOU on its people. 
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commodity but the government’s obligation that produces the money” (Ingham, 2004: 75). 
Significantly, as a result of making payments upon the systematic issue of government 
bonds (i.e.  IOUs),  the state becomes  in practice  the biggest creditor  and  debtor in the 
economy, hence “the single largest economic agency” (Ingham, 2004: 84). That is to say, 
the state is not just some authority that stands ‘above’ the economy, but an  endogenous 
participant and a most powerful one. This arises an important question: if the state is in fact 
an economic agency, it could be accordingly argued that “state acceptance [of its own IOU 
for tax settlement] is important for the identity [and value] of money only as a result of the 
size of the state as a transactor” (Dodd, 1994: 29). If so, and that seems indeed to be the 
case as I am going to show in the next section, “[t]he state’s importance with regard to the 
identity of money would cease to be a question of trust or administrative competence and 
become instead an issue of economic obligation” (Dodd, 1994: 29)13. The state authority 
and its political power to tax, in other words, would become by-products of an economic 
rationality  subject  to  the  whims  of  a  market  economy,  pretty  much  in  line  with  the 
orthodox paradigm.  This  becomes particularly  evident  at  the  ‘global  level’,  as  already 
evidenced by Weber (see note). Ingham himself suggests on more than one occasion that at 
this level money behaves like a commodity.
In open capitalist economies under a floating exchange regime, the attempt to manipulate a  
currency’s external exchange rate is a more prevalent means of altering the domestic value 
(purchasing power) of money. This may be pursued by the central banks’ buying and selling 
on the foreign exchange markets, or by base interest rate changes to attract or deter buyers of  
currency.  In this regard, the value of money is affected by its status as a commodity and,  
consequently, it can largely be explained in terms of supply and demand (Ingham, 2004: 83, 
my italic). 
After ‘moneyness’ has been established by the issuer’s money of account and embodied in a 
particular form (metal, paper, electronic, impulse, etc.), only then does it take on the status of  
a commodity that may be bought and sold, for example, in foreign exchange markets. In 
other words, once money has been produced, then economic analysis is applicable; but it is 
essential to understand that it cannot explain the existence of money (Ingham, 2004: 198, my 
13 Dodd in this case was criticising Knapp, not Ingham (see Dodd, 1994: 26-30).
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italic).     
In short,  “[o]nce  constructed  as  an  institutional  fact,  money is,  of  course,  traded as  a 
commodity” (Ingham, 2004: 80). Put crudely, once the value of money has been justified 
(not explained) by the sovereign power of the authority – so that, in effect, sovereignty 
entails money and not vice versa – it can be approached in the same way as an economist 
normally  analyses  the  value  of  a  commodity  (or,  better,  the  value  of  capital):  that  is, 
without taking into account the political dimension of the money phenomenon as a whole, 
but by turning the sociological problematic of the value of money into a technical question 
of the  price of money. As I am going to show in the next section, what is presented by 
Ingham as  alternative  to  the mainstream common sense  shows significant  elements  of 
continuity with it. 
The value of money
In two articles published between 1913 and 1914 (largely based on the seminal though 
forgotten  work  of  nineteenth-century  political  economist  Henry  Dunning  MacLeod), 
Alfred Mitchell-Innes sustained against the orthodox tradition that there was “no such a 
thing as the medium of exchange”, and that the monetary unit was “an abstract standard for 
the measurement of credit and debt” (Innes, 1914: 76). According to his ‘primitive law of 
commerce’, “a sale is not the exchange of a commodity for an intermediate commodity 
called the ‘medium of exchange’, but the exchange of a commodity for a credit” (Innes, 
1913:  30).  For  Innes,  money  is  credit  and  credit  alone  (Innes,  1913:  31).  Ingham 
substantially subscribes the view that sees money as an abstract claim or credit (Ingham, 
2006: 260) but pinpoints a crucial aspect overlooked by Mitchell-Innes: even if all money 
is credit, not all credit is money (Ingham, 2004: 72). That is to say, to properly serve as 
money,  debt  must  be “assignable –  or transferable,  or  negotiable” (Ingham, 2004:  72; 
2006: 267). In other words, either the claim is marketable and readily exchangeable or it is 
not money (qua ‘capitalist credit-money’).
Ingham’s history and analysis of money (Part II of  The Nature of Money) presents a 
picture that at any rate seems to clash with his conceptual framework; here, in fact, Ingham 
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suggests that what truly defines the ‘historical specificity’ of modern money – what makes 
a promise money-proper – is not the money of account and therefore commensurability per 
se, but the commercial practice of buying and selling debts and, hence, exchangeability, as 
defined by the degree of liquidity of monetary instruments. As he claims, “[t]he essence of 
capitalism lies in the elastic creation of money by means of readily transferrable debt” 
(Ingham, 2004: 108). More specifically, 
[t]he capitalist monetary system’s distinctiveness is that it contains a  social mechanism by 
which privately contracted debtor-creditor relations – for example, bank loans, credit card 
contracts – are routinely monetized. Private debt in its various forms (cheques, credit cards, 
promissory notes and so on) are [sic] converted into the most sought-after ‘promise to pay’ at 
the top of the hierarchy of promises (Ingham, 2004: 134-5).
Ingham’s  notion  of  ‘hierarchy  of  money’  comes  from  the  neo-chartalist  (but  also 
Minskyan)  tradition,  and  “can be  though of  as  a  multi-tiered  pyramid where  the  tiers 
represent  promises  with  differing  degrees  of  acceptability.  At  the  apex  is  the  most 
acceptable  or  ‘ultimate’  promise”  (Bell,  2001:  158).  This  promise,  representing  the 
‘decisive’ money of the system (Knapp, 1924: 95), is normally carried by state money (i.e. 
central bank, high-powered currency) as well as bank money (i.e. private bank deposits), as 
long as both IOUs are accepted at state pay-offices for tax settlement (Bell, 2001: 159; 
Wray,  1998).  This  said,  state  money  and  bank  money  remain  inherently  unequal  and 
always coexist as a part of a hierarchy. Indeed, 
[a]lthough bank money is part of the ‘decisive’ money of the system, its acceptance at state 
pay-offices really requires its conversion to state money (i.e. bank reserves). That is, bank 
money is converted to bank reserves so that (ultimately) the state actually accepts only its 
own liabilities in payment to itself (Bell, 2001: 160). 
And so, according to neo-chartalism, the degree of acceptability of promises (IOUs) within 
a  sovereign  economy is  ultimately  function  of  the  state  power  to  impose  a  tax  on its 
subjects. The higher the acceptability of these IOUs at state pay-offices, the higher their 
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capacity  to  be  converted  into  decisive  –  readily  acceptable  for  debt  settlement  and, 
therefore,  liquid – money. Clearly, from this perspective, the state authority remains the 
decisive  factor  in  the  transformation  of  private  debts  into  liquid  securities  readily 
convertible into high-powered currency. However, the moneyness of these promises, and 
hence their (substantive) value, no longer seems to be ascribable to the money of account 
per se, but appears as being conferred by their (state-engendered) liquidity14, i.e. by their 
capacity  to  be  readily  exchanged  in  the  market.  All  in  all,  this  would  call  for  a  
reconsideration of the role of the market in forging the value of modern money.
Ingham  openly  recognises  the  centrality  of  the  market  in  the  process  “by  which 
privately contracted debtor-creditor relationship are routinely monetized”, to the point of 
even reinstating the co-participation of the market, along with the state, in the institution of 
money. Indeed, as he argues, the monetisation of private debts   
is achieved by complex linkages between the banking and financial system and the state and,  
in turn, between the state and its own creditors (bond-holders) and debtors (taxpayers). These 
relations are mediated by a central bank when it accommodates the banking system’s private 
promises  to  pay  by accepting –  that  is,  buying  – them with  sovereign  money (Ingham,  
2004:135).
In practice, instead of the state’s  naked power to write and enforce the dictionary, at the 
basis  of  modern  money  there  is  a  “structural  relationship”  (Ingham,  2004:  48)  of 
indebtedness occurring between the state and the banking and financial system (and hence 
the market), as mediated by the institution of the central bank (notably, here money is no 
longer conceptualised as the product of a proper agent-agent relation, but as the outcome of 
a ‘structural’ relationship). As a matter of fact, says Ingham, “[t]he state and the market 
share in the production of capitalist credit-money, and, as I have stressed, it is the balance 
of power between these two major participants in the capitalist process that produces stable  
money” (Ingham, 2004:  144).  Contra  neo-chartalism,  Ingham thus sustains  that  central 
bank’s  interest  rate  policies  as  well  as  state  spending  and  taxation  are  not  merely  an 
emanation of state sovereignty (see Ingham, 2004: 141-4, see also next chapter), but “a 
14 For a discussion of the meanings of ‘liquidity’, see Nesvetailova (2010; 2007). 
27
matter of an implicit settlement between the state, capitalist ‘rentiers’ and the tax-paying 
capitalist producers and workers” (Ingham, 2004: 143) – that is, the product of a “complex 
triangular power struggle” (Ingham, 2000: 33). Significantly, “the political balance of these 
economic interests that the state [in fact, the central bank] is able to forge is concerned with 
checking its  arbitrary  power [i.e.  the  arbitrary  power  of  the  state]  and establishing  its 
creditworthiness, that is, its ability to pay its debts” (Ingham, 2004: 143, my italic). 
The notion of ‘state creditworthiness’ once again reasserts the (rather orthodox) truth 
that the state is essentially an economic agency which, like all other agents participating in 
the  (global)  economy,  has  to  demonstrate  the  value  (and  validity)  of  its  economic 
obligations in order to finance and, hence, ‘reproduce’ itself.  In particular, says Ingham 
(2008: 77)
The state’s creditors have to be satisfied, first, that state debt and the subsequent supply of  
money will not produce inflation and thereby erode the value of the fixed-interest investment 
in state bonds. Second, creditors have to be convinced that state revenue (taxation, customs 
duties,  etc.)  will  be  adequate  for  the  service  of  interest  payments.  Consequently, 
governments attempt to establish their creditworthiness by conventions of ‘sound finance’ in 
order to secure the sale of their debt. 
Hence, from a ‘global’ or ‘systemic’ perspective, the state’s formal power to impose a tax 
and ‘deficit spend’, de facto conferring the highest degree of acceptability qua liquidity to 
its IOUs within its sovereign domain, can only be understood as dependent upon the state’s 
substantial ability to honour its ‘high-powered’ promises held not only by its citizens via 
bank intermediation, but especially by transnational capitalist ‘rentiers’ (Polanyi’s Haute 
Finance) and foreign powers via financial and money markets. As a matter of fact, “the 
money market”, not the government, “is the ‘headquarters’ of capitalism” (Ingham, 2004: 
202). 
But does this mean that the orthodox were right all along, and namely that the value of 
money  is  delivered  ultimately  by  the  market?  Ingham ingeniously  dodges  this  critical 
question by redirecting the attention towards the key-role played by ‘monetary authorities’ 
in the international management/governance of the money structure (Ingham, 2004: 144-
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150).  It  must  be pointed  out  in  this  respect  that  the  hierarchy of  money described by 
Ingham is not a structure of liabilities ‘internal’ to the sovereign jurisdiction of the state, 
but an ‘international’ network of debt relations that cuts across states; here access to money 
by  all  economic  agents  (including  states)  “is  determined  by  an  assessment  of 
creditworthiness […] that includes a calculation of the degree of risk of default” (Ingham, 
2004: 137). 
[T]he credibility of money is now based  exclusively  on the credibility of promises to pay. 
The institutional fact of money is now no more than this credibility, as it is established by the 
rules and conventions [i.e.  the governance by the ‘monetary authorities’]  that  frame and 
legitimize  the  acts  of  borrowing  and  lending  by  all  the  agents  in  the  monetary  system 
(Ingham, 2004: 136).
The subtle shift of focus from the ‘acceptability’ to the ‘credibility’ of the money-promise 
operated by Ingham is of paramount importance for the purpose of upholding the primacy 
of both the state and the money account vis-à-vis the market and the medium of exchange, 
and is therefore essential to preserve the ideological coherence of Ingham’s theory at large. 
In fact, credibility is conferred by the accountability of the monetary authorities and, in 
particular, by the governance of the monetary standard. However, the focus on credibility 
also  puts  on  a  disgraceful  path  of  conceptual  (epistemological  and  methodological) 
inconsistency Ingham’s sociology as a whole. 
To begin with, the shift from acceptability to credibility mirrors a drift of sovereignty 
away from the state and in the direction of the ‘monetary authorities’, i.e. central banks 
(which are not really state agencies). Indeed, “[i]t is the role of the central bank to establish 
credibility  in an invariant monetary standard in relation to the  creditworthiness  of [state] 
fiscal policy and practice” (Ingham, 2004: 145). Central banks, in particular, are said to be 
responsible for maintaining money’s credibility – what Ingham (2004: 144; 2008: 78) calls 
(quoting Mirowski)  “the  working fiction of  an invariant  monetary standard  of  abstract 
value” – by controlling its socially and politically constructed ‘scarcity’ (Ingham, 2004: 
198)  via  (long-term)  interest  rate  management  and  inflation-targeting  ‘sound  money’ 
policies. That is to say, together with states, central banks 
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must  establish  credible  inflation  credentials  in  order  to  sustain  the  creditworthiness  that 
enables  them to  raise  finance  for  spending  by  selling  government  bonds  to  the  money 
market. In other words, the government must convince holders of this government debt that 
the value of their investment will not be eroded by inflation (Ingham, 2008: 78).
 
Notably, the governance of the monetary standard by the monetary authorities does not 
involve any manipulation of the money of account per se (e.g. the Dollar unit of account) 
but the management of money’s purchasing power (e.g. what a one dollar note can buy). 
What is at stake here is not to measure value(s) but to scale prices, and namely set the 
effort against which all other efforts ought to be priced in a solid,  predictable,  ‘sound’ 
fashion. And this, of course, applies principally to economic obligations.
Economic theory, in particular, plays a crucial, performative role (Ingham, 2004: 198) in 
the construction of the working fiction of  stable  money. Indeed, in the effort to ensure 
credibility,  what  contemporary  central  banks  actually  do  is  “attempting  to  establish  a 
transparent procedural correctness that is assessed according to the agreed organizational 
arrangements and the current macro-economic thinking” (Ingham, 2004: 148). The basic 
aim of this ‘transparent procedural correctness’ is to depoliticize monetary policy (Ingham, 
2004: 146): that is, to turn pro-rentier politics of inflation targeting into normal monetary 
policies and, possibly, let them appear as a natural condition of monetary governance. To 
this  purpose,  monetary  authorities  “are  engaged  in  the  creation  of  an  ‘epistemic 
community’ of  understanding  based  on  theoretical  economic  knowledge  and  routine 
practice” (Ingham, 2004: 146), committed to convincing the markets as well as persuading 
the public about the desirability and rightness of central bank politics and, hence, about the 
credibility/stability of the value of the monetary standard (Ingham, 2004: 148-9).
Of  course  other  agencies  are  involved  in  the  ‘impression  management’  of  the 
performance  of  stable  money  (Ingham,  2004:  148):  such  is  the  case  of  credit  rating 
agencies  (Ingham,  2008:  79).  Yet,  at  any  rate  the  central  bank  remains  the  principal 
infrastructural fulcrum upon which the class struggle over the value of money is fought. 
However, pace Ingham, this struggle seems to be no longer compatible with the Weberian 
‘battle of man with man’; quite the contrary, the argument that money’s credibility is a 
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matter of faith (qua persuasion)  ultimately  performed  by authority-sponsored economic 
theory (via epistemic communities of academics, policy-makers and financial practitioners) 
invites us to think of the value of money as the product of a ‘battle of ideas’. This is not the 
place to begin a critique of the ‘performativity’ approach in social sciences (as for instance 
in Muniesa, 2010; Henriksen, 2009); however, I will limit  myself to suggesting,  in the 
wake of Konings (2010b), that arguments based on the ‘performance’ metaphor tend to be 
overly-deterministic as “actors appear to be largely unreflective, primarily motivated by 
discursive structures or impulses and performing meanings in whose emergence they had 
little ‘agency’” (Konings, 2010b: 63). 
In Ingham’s case, in particular, the performance metaphor is employed to re-state once 
again the primacy of the authority (this  time the  monetary  authority in the vest of the 
‘independent’ central bank) in the establishment of the measure of value (this  time the 
invariant monetary standard rather than the money of account) and, in turn, to uphold the 
primacy of the measure of value vis-à-vis all other monetary functions in the construction 
of the ‘stable’ value of money. However, on a closer look, we can see how the value of 
money is not actually conferred by state sovereignty (via taxation), or by the central bank’s 
‘procedural  correctness’  for  that  matter,  but  is  a  function  of  debtor 
credibility/creditworthiness before the market (actually, before the syndicate of creditors). 
As a matter of fact, the ‘authority’ that is supposed to write and enforce the dictionary must 
persuade  the  market  (which  more  and  more  looks  like  the  real  authority)  to  trust  its 
promises in order to be able to finance itself and survive in a global world whose needs and 
desires  ‘can  largely  be  explained in  terms  of  supply  and demand’.  Acceptation  of  the 
promise, rather than credibility per se, remains a key to understand how money gets its 
value; however, who or what is to accept the promise in the last instance, de facto setting 
the standard – i.e. the price – for the effort all other agents must endure in order to acquire 
the scarce good ‘money’, is not the state or the government, as Ingham holds, but ‘market 
investors’,  ‘international  creditors’,  ‘financial  rentiers’:  that  is,  all  those  agents  who 
actually issue the money – i.e.  produce claims ‘against all  the world’ – upon the state 
‘security’ that governments will (literally) service their interest.
31
Conclusions
Ingham’s sociology is torn between an ideology (rather than a proper ontology) of money 
as the measure of value and an underlying understanding of money as value (qua claim). 
These two contrasting conceptualisations of the phenomenon are forced to co-exist in a 
fragile  epistemological  arrangement  (of  a  constructivist-structuralist  type)  whereby  the 
discontinuity between the nominal and the real side of money is ultimately filled by the 
metaphysical agencies of the authority, the collective intentionality, and last but not least, 
‘performativity’.  This  evidently  goes  to  the  detriment  of  Ingham’s  professed 
methodological project of money as a social relation. 
In particular, we can evince the failure of Ingham’s relational methodology by simply 
looking at  the emphasis  he places  on the structural  relationship occurring between the 
metaphysical agencies of state,  market and central  bank – as if these entities were not 
institutional infrastructures but actual agents. The reification of monetary institutions into 
some “infrastructural social power” (Ingham, 2004: 132) is symptomatic of an underlying 
positivist  understanding  of  the  phenomenon  as  a  whole.  Money  is  indeed  said  to  be 
autonomous (Ingham, 2000: 34), a ‘norm that obeys the norm it itself represents’ (Ingham, 
2004:  74),  hence  autoréférentielle  (Ingham,  2004:  64;  2006:  269),  based  on  a  ‘social 
mechanism’ that enables a ‘self-generating process’ (Ingham, 2004: 134; 2008: 71) – all in 
all, an institution possessed of an ‘infrastructural’ (systemic) rationality of its own. 
It is perhaps not a coincidence that Ingham has chosen to call ‘the nature of money’ his 
major  work  on  the  subject. The  obsession  with  the  ‘nature’ of  things  is  typical  of 
positivism and, particularly in the field of social sciences, it often leads to the formulation 
of empty semantics – in this case, a (pseudo-ontological) semantics of money’s functions 
whose best example, pace Ingham, is possibly still Polanyi’s (1980: 170-198) – that are not 
complemented by any relevant semiotics of the thing-sign in question – in this case, a 
study of why and how people practically get to value a promise of payment as a means to 
store and transport value and, above all, as an icon of social power (see Konings, 2011b). 
The positivism of Ingham’s sociology clearly emerges the moment he tries to address the 
problem of the value of money. As a matter of fact, Ingham is unable to explain why and 
how concretely people experience money as a social power; rather, what he actually does is 
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to  justify the  existence  of  such  a  power  by  resorting  to  the  ad  hoc  agency  of  some 
heteronomous force. That is to say, we find in Ingham no ontological problematisation of 
‘money as value’ but only the sketch of a discourse on the ‘value of money’ that implicitly 
legitimises the mainstream overly-economic view that such a value corresponds in fact to 
the  value  of  money’s  purchasing  power,  i.e.  its  price,  as  given/determined in  the  last 
instance by the rather opaque rationality of market actors.
Perhaps Ingham should have paid more attention to the much underestimated ‘store of 
value’ function, instead of obsessively focusing on the money of account and the means of 
payment. In fact, as he himself admits, it is in the vest of the store of value that money 
“makes possible the reproduction and continuity of economic life  in a complex, actually 
existing capitalist economy. In this role, money is anything but neutral” (Ingham, 2000: 
21). In effect, as Keynes pointed out with his ‘liquidity preference’ hypothesis, it is the 
store of value and, hence, the possibility not just to commensurate and/or exchange things 
and services, but to withdraw purchasing power from the sphere of commercial circulation 
and productive investments to channel it in speculative qua redistributive operations, what 
truly characterises modern money and the capitalist system15. Significantly, this property of 
money “as a temporal transporter of abstract value” cannot be incorporated “into orthodox 
microeconomic analysis” (Ingham, 2000: 21). The great limit of orthodox monetary theory, 
in other words, consists in its incapacity to “specify why money, as opposed to any other 
functionally alternative asset,  performs as  an  intergenerational  store of value  (Ingham, 
2000: 21, my italic). Ingham’s own explanation of the store of value, however, is largely 
defective; allegedly, money is a store of value because the state issues it by fiat and then 
accepts it for tax settlement; secondarily, the ‘stable’ value of money (that we may take as a 
proxy  of  the  store  of  value  function)  is  the  product  of  an  authority-engendered 
performance,  a  working  fiction  contrived  by  the  agencies  concerned  with  the 
governance/regulation of money’s production. But why is it, in practice, that money is able 
to  carry  value  through  space  and  time,  and  hence  connect  present  and  future  in  a 
meaningful way that, quoting Keynes, “lulls our disquietude” (Ingham, 2004: 72)?
15 In different ways, American ‘old institutionalist’ thinkers John Commons and Thorstein Veblen reached 
similar  conclusions.  For  Commons  (1924)  the  specificity  of  capitalism  consisted  in  the  institution  of 
intangible property, that is, property that can be withdrawn from others to serve as a lever of control and 
redistribution of resources by financial means. Similarly, Veblen (1921) argued that sabotage (i.e. the exercise 
of the power not to produce) is the actual business of modern captains of finance and engineers of the price  
system.
33
Calculation, says Ingham, is a key to understand the nature of modern money, and this 
was clear to Weber. “In a Weberian social theory of value, calculability in money terms 
(stable money) of the capitalist economy is the result of the underlying predictability of the 
clash of interests in which money is a weapon” (Ingham, 2004: 203); that is to say, “the 
complex struggles  between  and  within  and  across  the two sectors of the economy [i.e. 
creditors and debtors] determine the production of money  and its value” (Ingham, 2004: 
202-3). However, the type of calculability described by Ingham is rather different from the 
one  hinted  at  by  Weber.  For  Ingham calculability  is  synonym with  ‘countability’ and 
‘money of account’: “commodities, such as precious metals, became money because they 
were ‘counted’ by those who ‘counted’” (Ingham, 2000: 22); “[i]t is rather ‘countability’ 
that  transforms  the  ‘commodity’  (qua  convenient  medium  of  exchange)  into 
‘money’”(Ingham, 2000: 25). However, if we are to agree with Weber that “‘[t]he most 
important fact of all’ about money ‘is the possibility of monetary calculation’” (Ingham, 
2006: 270), then it is important that we make clear that such a calculability has nothing to 
do with abstract  accounting. On the contrary, the type of calculation by means of which 
debts are monetised in a capitalist economy is bank discounting.
The fundamental difference between accounting and discounting is that the former has 
to do with enumerating (via  synchronic commensuration) the total  quantity  of existing 
assets and thus denominating their exchange ratios in relation to each other; the latter, on 
the contrary, is concerned with assessing the price of present assets in ‘diachronic’ relation 
to  their  prospective,  future  value  (see  Nitzan  and Bichler,  2009;  Amato  and  Fantacci, 
2012). In other words,  discounting assesses the potential value of an asset and produces  
the price that accounting will account for. Discounting is the reason why money lulls our 
disquietude; why it is “a social technology for connecting present and future” (Ingham, 
2004: 72). Most importantly, bank discounting is why the modern capitalist system appears 
as a self-generating, relatively autonomous process (Ingham, 2004: 108; 2008: 71) based 
on (quoting  Bloch)  “delaying payments  and settlements  and consistently  making these 
deferrals overlap one another” (Ingham, 2004: 140) – eventually, why capitalism is (again, 
quoting Bloch) “a regime that would collapse if everyone paid his debts” (Ingham, 2004: 
108). Bank discounting in fact entails the indefinite substitutability of promises of payment 
by instituting a relation of  liquidity between credit (qua capital) and money (qua capital) 
via  interest  (rate).  This  is  why a  debt,  in  a  regime of  bank discounting,  may become 
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“purchasing power, or rather purchasing potential that can remain indefinitely in the state 
of potentiality” (Amato and Fantacci,  2012: 37,  my italic)  – why, in turn,  modern fiat 
money is able to serve as a store of value. 
Crucially, under a regime of bank discounting, the phenomenon of liquidity becomes the 
primary locus for understanding processes of monetisation, because it is in virtue of market 
liquidity  that  modern  monetary  systems  are  able  to  ensure  the  “unconditional 
transformability of money into  credit or, if you prefer, of money into capital.  And vice 
versa” (Amato and Fantacci, 2012: 40). It is because of liquidity that “all forms of money 
are  social relations and consequently, for example, the conventional textbook distinction 
between ‘money’ and ‘credit’ is not merely anachronistic, but is based on a conceptual 
confusion” (Ingham, 1996: 510). 
The  moment  we  take  into  considerations  liquidity-engendering  processes  of 
monetisation (based on bank discounting),  
‘capitalism’ begins to take shape not as a slightly antiquated synonym for ‘market economy’,  
but as that particular form of market economy in which even money is a commodity. This 
entails a change not only in the meaning of ‘money’ – which ceases to be a simple means of  
payment at the service of exchange and lending – but also in the meaning of ‘commodity’ 
and ‘market’ (Amato and Fantacci, 2012: 40).
Admittedly, Ingham’s ideological discourse on the primacy of both money of account and 
authority in the making of modern money wants to offset the orthodox predominant dogma 
that money is a product of the market finalised to the optimisation of exchange, and show 
that on the contrary money is the product of a political struggle, a vehicle of sovereignty 
and an instrument of governance of social relations. This said, it is important to recognise 
for the sake of our understanding of money that ‘commodity’, ‘market’, ‘liquidity’ are key-
notions, much more than the ‘money of account’ (which at any rate appears more and more 
conceptually  indistinguishable  from  the  Walrasian  numéraire so  dear  to  mainstream 
economics). Instead of underestimating their significance, we must politicise these notions, 
and show for instance how commodity-money is in fact ‘capital’ and hence a ‘productive 
factor’; how the market is not where demand and supply freely meet but a “network of 
mutual coercion” (Fried, 1998: 50); how liquidity requires market making, and in particular 
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the  coordinated  promotion  by  financial  operators  of  secondary  markets  (see  Konings, 
2011a).
The ontological primacy of the money of account is in fact a spectacular case of  post  
hoc ergo propter hoc  fallacy. If we apply Aristotle’s ‘four causes’, we can see how the 
money of account (commensurability) will only be an efficient cause of money, that is, an 
institutional  factor  external  to  money which  allows the process  of  monetisation  to  get 
under way (we can call it a ‘precondition’). However, it is not abstract accounting but bank 
discounting what practically enables the monetisation of social relations. Bank discounting 
will accordingly be the formal cause, i.e. the forming activity which is the internal cause of 
the development,  of money (see Bohm, 1980: 15-7). Debt or, more specifically,  social  
property relations (hence power struggles) will constitute the material cause of money. 
We  are  left  with  the  final  cause.  According  to  both  the  orthodox  and  heterodox 
traditions indistinctly,  the  end of  money is to be a  means for the commensuration and 
exchange of goods and services and for the payment of debts. However, the theoretically 
neglected  store  of  value  function  shows that  money  can  purposely  fail  to  apply  these 
‘functions’ and be withdrawn for reasons of pure speculation, redistribution, power.  As a 
norm, those who actually produce money (via debt discounting), and namely banks, are in 
fact concerned with profit, and namely with getting more money by charging debtors with 
a supplementary fee, called interest. In other words, they have an interest in making money. 
In the course of this research work, I will thus try to explain why the final cause of money 
is neither commensurability (the measure of value), nor exchangeability (the medium of 
exchange) or redeemability (the means of payment), but money itself. That is, I will show 
that money is by design (by telos) ‘that which is worth pursuing in itself’, and accordingly 
outline a comprehensive discourse of money as value. 
36
CHAPTER 2
Another dogma is (not) possible: money and the state
Heterodox economics I 
“The idea that a debtor, and particularly the State or Government finding itself in that position, could claim to 
discharge a debt by merely declaring what should be regarded as discharging it is surely very odd. A debt 
has not been discharged by a declaration that it has been paid – it can only be discharged by paying it. If the 
State or others have “discharged” it  by legal fiction it has not been paid – it  has been abrogated. It is a  
peculiar use of language – a form of double-talk – to suggest that a promise can be kept by another promise  
to  keep  it  at  a  later  date  in  an  infinite  progress  of  promises:  such  promises  have  not  been  kept.  Their 
fulfilment has only been postponed. If a promise to repay a debt is postponed, the debt remains undischarged 
for the time being. It is true that a further debt may be voluntarily accepted, in lieu of the repayment of the 
original debt, but this is not the fulfilment of a contract but the making of a new one. If this is brought about 
by compulsion, we are back to the position that the debt has, in effect, not been honoured” (Frankel, 1977:  
45-6).
[R]ight from the inception of money, from ancient down to modern times, the state has a powerful, though 
not omnipotent, role to play in the development of money. Yet neither ancient money nor, despite Sir Stafford  
Crisp’s view, to the contrary, even the Bank of England, is a mere creature of the state (Davies, 2002 [1994]:  
26).     
‘Heterodoxy’ in the field of monetary studies is to all intents and purposes post-Keynesian 
economics (pace  neo-Keynesianism and the ‘new neoclassical synthesis’,  sic). Like any 
receptacle  of  heresies  worthy  of  its  name,  post-Keynesian  economics  is  source  of 
heterogeneous and even contradictory theories and approaches, such as endogenous theory 
(split  between  a  structuralist  approach  and  an  accommodationist-horizontalist  one), 
circuitism  (with  its  Italian,  French,  Canadian  branches),  and  neo-chartalism  (with  its 
emerging sub-schools).  Each of  these  theories  blends together  in  a  unique  fashion the 
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thoughts of radical thinkers such as Marx (see Graziani, 2003; de Brunhoff and Foley, 
2006;  Realfonso;  2006),  Knapp  (Tcherneva,  2006;  Wray,  1998),  Kalecki  (Arestis  and 
Sawyer, 2006), but also Schumpeter and Schmitt (Rossi, 2006; Gnos, 2006). Significantly, 
despite their diverging theoretical outcomes and policy implications, all these approaches 
share a similar epistemological attitude, legacy of Keynes: the understanding of money as a 
non-neutral,  i.e.  performative, factor in the economic process. Such an epistemology is 
often referred to as monetary nominalism or monetary analysis  (see previous chapter), in 
contrast to the real analysis of orthodox theory (see Lau and Smithin, 2002: 6). 
The difference between these two conflicting traditions is that, unlike nominalism, real 
analysis excludes money from the analysis of the ‘productive’ factors of the economy and 
thus relegates it to the ‘unproductive’ (speculative) epiphenomenal dimension of a finance 
that merely ‘reflects’, perhaps in a distorted fashion, ‘the real economy’16. And so, whereas 
the orthodox moves its analysis from an ab origine negation of the role played by money to 
finally dismiss the performative character of finance-based redistributive processes (money 
is here simply the medium), the heterodox starts with money to end with finance (here ‘the 
medium is the message’, that is, the  claim). In this respect, heterodox economics can be 
rightly said to be the science of money whereas mainstream economics does everything to 
debunk  the  significance  and  the  power  of  money.  This  said,  not  only  mainstream 
economics but also heterodox economics poses serious limits to a thorough understanding 
of the money phenomenon (though I convene that heterodox economics certainly marks an 
important step ahead). Both remain indeed highly dogmatic, abstract, unable to account for 
the historical specificity, the social contextuality and, especially, the political dimension of 
the money phenomenon (i.e. why money is a social power). In a nutshell, they are both 
illustrative of a positivist understanding of money that fails to recognise the significance of 
money as value.  
I will begin my critical account of money and heterodox economics by focusing first on 
neo-chartalism. This for two interrelated reasons: first, because neo-chartalism has exerted 
the  largest  influence  on  Ingham’s  understanding  of  money  as  debt,  and  accordingly 
represents  a  major  source  of  insights  for  critical  sociological  perspectives  on  the 
phenomenon; second, because among the several schools of post-Keynesian economics, 
neo-chartalism is the only one which more directly engages with the question of money in 
16 On the epistemological (and political) significance of the real-nominal dichotomy see Nitzan and Bichler  
(2009).
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relation to sovereignty, de facto opening a room for debating the political dimension of the 
phenomenon  at  large.  Hopefully,  in  the  course  of  my  argumentation  I  will  able  to 
underscore the fundamental  contradictions underpinning the neo-chartalist  discourse on 
money, and how it misses its significance. 
(Neo-)chartalism, or else ‘taxes drive money’
The central ideas of chartalism are associated with the thought of the German historian and 
political economist Georg Friedrich Knapp. Knapp’s fundamental work,  The state theory  
of  money (1924;  original  German  edition,  1905),  provided  a  powerful  critique  of 
metallism, the dominant monetary doctrine of his time. According to the metallist view, 
money  was  essentially  a  precious-metal  commodity  with  a  market-determined  value 
serving  as  medium  of  exchange17.  By  contrast,  Knapp  sustained  that  the  differentia  
specifica of a monetary economy lied in the fact that under such a regime debts could be 
discharged by ‘engraved pieces’ – either  coins  or  notes  – whose value or,  to  be more 
precise, validity in units of value, was not determined by the market but conferred by law, 
as exerted by the state authority. He thus defined money as a chartal means of payment: a 
ticket  or  token (from the  Latin  word  charta)  whose validity  as  a  means  of  final  debt 
settlement was proclaimed by the state (Knapp, 1924: 34-35). 
In particular,  Knapp made clear  on many an occasion that  the validity  of money is 
always independent from the content of the pieces; it “is not bound to any material. It can 
occur with the most precious or the basest metals” (Knapp, 1924: 30). Instead, the validity 
of money “rests on a certain relation to the laws” (Knapp, 1924: 34). This, however, “is not 
to  be  interpreted  in  the  narrower  sense  that  [money’s  validity]  is  a  creation  of 
jurisprudence”, i.e. of legal tender laws, “but in the larger sense that it is a creation of the 
legislative activity of the state, a creation of legislative policy” (Knapp, 1924: 40). 
By “legislative activity of the state”, Knapp practically meant fiscal policy and, thus, the 
state’s sovereign power to tax its subjects. Crucially, he also added in this respect that “[i]t 
is not the issue, but the  acceptation,  as we call  it,  which is decisive.  State acceptation 
delimits the monetary system. By the expression ‘State-acceptation’ is to be understood 
17 Metallism was in effect an ideological derivation of the ‘catallactic’ theory of money – i.e. “money is a  
creature of the market” – provided by classical, Marxian and neo-classical political economy (see Lau and 
Smithin, 2002: 6). 
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only the acceptance at State pay offices where the State is the recipient” (Knapp, 1924: 95). 
In other words, for Knapp ‘state money’ was not necessarily what the state issued de iure 
but corresponded to what the state accepted de facto for final tax settlements.
One of the early advocates of chartalism was John Maynard Keynes (Ingham, 2004: 
50). In his Treatise on Money (1930), the British economist pointed out that it was the state 
or the community, not the market, what was responsible for establishing the unit of value – 
called money-of-account – as well as the thing that served as means of payment – termed 
money-proper (see previous chapter). As later proponents of neo-chartalism are often eager 
to quote, according to Keynes (1930: 5), the state
comes in first of all as the authority of law which enforces the payment of the thing which 
corresponds to the name or description of the contract.  But it  comes in doubly when, in  
addition, it claims the right to determine, and declare what thing corresponds to the name,  
and to vary its declaration from time to time – when, that is to say, it claims the right to re-
edit the dictionary. This right is claimed by all modern States and has been so claimed for  
some four thousand years at least. It is when this stage of the evolution of Money has been  
reached that Knapp’s Chartalism – the doctrine that money is peculiarly a creation of the 
State – is fully realised. […] [T]he Age of Chartalist or State Money was reached when the  
State claimed the right to declare what thing should answer as money to the current money-
of-account – when it claimed the right not only to enforce the dictionary but also to write the  
dictionary. To-day, all civilized money is, beyond the possibility of dispute, chartalist.
On the wake of Keynes, many heterodox theorists have come to recognise the importance 
of  the  state  authority  in  the  institution  of  money.  Minsky,  for  instance,  argued  that 
“everyone can create money [but] the problem is to get it accepted” (Bell, 2001: 150), and 
held that “in an economy where government debt is a major asset on the books of the 
deposit-issuing banks, the fact that taxes need to be paid gives value to the money of the 
economy”18 (Wray,  1998:  35).  Similarly,  advocates  of  the  ‘horizontalist  endogenous 
approach’ have acknowledged that even though the state cannot control the money supply, 
it nevertheless retains the ability to define it by exogenously setting the interest rate (see 
next chapter). Circuitist theorists, building on Schumpeter’s views, are said to have reached 
18 To be sure, Minsky (1977: 141) understood money “as an asset, with a particular yield, carrying costs, and 
liquidity characteristics”. In other words, what was central to his notion of money was not state acceptability 
for  tax  payment  (i.e.  money  as  a  state-enforced  debt),  but  liquidity  (i.e.  money  as  a  market-driven 
commodity). 
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similar conclusions (Wray, 1998: 34).
A theory of the sovereign currency
The basic idea of chartalism is that the state drives money by exerting its sovereign power  
to tax.  This belief is today upheld by the neo-chartalist school, also dubbed ‘tax-driven 
money  approach’ or  ‘modern  money  theory’ (MMT)  (see  Tcherneva,  2006:  70;  Wray, 
2012b). Notably, neo-chartalism is not a theory of money but a theory of the  sovereign 
currency (which, I shall argue in the course of my work, is not the same as money). Indeed 
neo-chartalist  analyses  generally  focus  on  the  operations  of  contemporary  sovereign 
currencies inconvertible into gold or any foreign currency through fixed exchange rates 
(Wray, 1998; Tcherneva, 2006) – namely, post-Bretton Woods currencies operating “on the 
basis of high-powered money (HPM) systems” and floating exchange rates (Tcherneva, 
2006: 77). 
High-powered  money,  also  known  in  mainstream jargon  as  base  money,  is  a  non-
convertible, non-interest-earning promise (IOU) made by the state: it is the promise that 
the state will acknowledge the validity of its own promise (indeed a rather self-referential 
promise) and therefore accept it back at state pay offices for final tax settlement. Such a 
self-redemptive  promise,  made  at  will  by  the  government,  corresponds  to  what  most 
economists today call ‘fiat money’, that is, money issued by decree, ‘out of nothing’, ‘out 
of thin air’, ‘with a keystroke’. Fiat money in fact seems to be ‘backed’ by nothing more 
than sheer state power,  and in  this  sense the making of such a promise seems to cost 
nothing  to  the  government  (this  appears  to  be  even  truer  since  the  breakdown of  the 
Bretton Woods regime and the rise of inconvertible currencies in the 1970s). Quite simply, 
the government decides to sign a bill in which it is written I Owe You This Much and This  
Much is  what  you actually  get:  magically,  the  promise of payment made by the issuer 
becomes means of payment for the bearer. The citizens are thus  appeased by the mere 
promise of redemption, and nothing more. 
Technically, fiat money is the same as the ‘currency’ for it includes cash (coins and 
banknotes) and, preponderantly, bank reserves (private bank accounts at the central bank). 
Notably, in the contemporary money systems, the currency is normally  withdrawn from 
circulation proper, and only serves as a reserve of capital – the ultimate security, or store of 
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value held by the banking system as a whole –  transferable in the last instance for intra-
bank settlements.  By contrast,  in  the  everyday economy private  agents  carry  out  their 
transactions with bank money, which consequently dominates the money supply; and yet, 
we shall see, bank money is only a leverage of the currency. That is to say, banks are today 
in the exclusive position to thesaurise and handle high-powered money and thus enjoy the 
privilege to  act as intermediaries of purchasing power between the ‘public sector’ (the 
state) and the ‘private sector’ (everybody else). 
Now, argue neo-chartalists, though as a matter of fact all contracts carried by private 
parties other than banks are routinely settled with bank money (which at present constitutes 
the great bulk of the money supply of any economy whatsoever), state money remains the 
decisive money of the system, because bank money ought to be ultimately converted into 
bank reserves for final tax settlement. This is why neo-chartalists claim that fiat money is 
‘high-powered’;  that its “value stems from the powers of the money-issuing authority” 
(Tcherneva,  2006:  75-77;  Bell,  2001:  151-4);  that  “money  cannot  exist  until  [state] 
acceptance has occurred” (Bell, 2001: 151): because the state has the power to choose ‘that 
which is necessary to pay taxes’ (Wray, 1998: 4). 
In particular, this “power to impose a tax debt on its subjects” (Wray and Timoigne, 
2006: 9) is a conditio sine qua non for money’s existence because it provides a rationale 
not only for its formal validity (from now on ‘Knappian validity’ or, simply, ‘validity’), i.e. 
its  de facto and,  normally,  also  de iure legal  tender  status,  but also for its  substantive  
validity, i.e. its price (see previous chapter). Indeed, “by imposing a tax liability […] the 
government can, if it chooses to do so, dictate the terms on which currency can be obtained 
(that  is,  the effort  required  to  obtain  it)  (Wray,  1998:  4).  And so,  in  virtue  of  the tax 
prerogative,  the  government  enjoys  an  exclusive  economic  power  vis-à-vis  the  private 
sector: it can indeed finance its institutional reproduction in its own pecuniary terms. Here 
lies the magic or, perhaps, the illusion of the promise of payment serving as means of final 
payment:  a  debt  appears  as  being  discharged  by the  state  declaration  that  it  has  been 
effectively redeemed via tax settlement, even though such a debt is never really paid off, 
nor are people ever redeemed once and for all, because the state holds the power to set up 
an “infinite progress” of promises (see Frankel, 1977: 45-6) that indefinitely procrastinate 
the day of reckoning and final redemption (‘the rendering of accounts’). Such a state of 
affairs  has been formally sanctioned in  1971 when the US dollar  was finally  declared 
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inconvertible,  de  facto  entailing  a  passage  to  an  international  ‘floating  exchange  rate 
regime’ with no promise of final redemption (Wray, 2012b: 150).
Therefore,  beside  its  formal (Knappian)  power  to  set  the  pecuniary  terms  for  all 
economic transactions – i.e. to name what counts as a means of final payment, or else to 
establish the de facto legal tender – taxation is especially significant because it  creates a  
demand for (fiat) money in the economy. That is, taxation determines the substantive value 
qua price of money. As Tcherneva (2006: 77-78) sums up, “[t]axation today functions to 
create demand for state currencies in order for the money-issuing authority to purchase 
requisite  goods  and  services  from the  private  sector”.  Significantly,  the  private  sector 
needs the state money because otherwise it would not be able to earn an income and hence 
save,  spend, and,  especially,  pay the taxes.  “For  the private  sector,  spending is  indeed 
restricted by its capacity to earn revenue or to borrow” (Tcherneva, 2006: 78). The same, 
however, cannot be said of the state (qua public sector) which, we have seen, can finance 
its expenditures in its own money (Tcherneva, 2006: 78).  
As a result, “[t]he government does not ‘need’ the ‘public’s money’ [i.e. private sector’s 
money] in order to spend; rather, the public [i.e. private sector] needs the ‘government’s 
money’ in order to pay taxes” (Wray, 1998: ix). This is very important because it means 
that  technically  “there  are  no  financial  constraints  to  government  spending...If  the 
government wants to spend more, it can do so by creating more money and then absorbing 
that money by raising taxes. Alternatively, and equivalently, it can leave nominal taxes and 
money creation alone and lower the price it offers for the goods it buys” (Mehrling, 2000: 
399,  my italic).  Spending and taxes  are,  literally,  two sides  of  the  same coin,  for  the 
government spends by crediting bank reserves and taxes by debiting bank reserves with the 
same fiat money (Wray, 2012b: 111). 
The proposition that “there are no financial constraints to government deficit spending” 
is possibly the key-tenet of neo-chartalism (Mehrling, 2000: 399). According to this thesis, 
the state is alpha and omega, the source of the flux (via spending) and reflux (via taxation) 
of money. Crucially, “[o]nce this is understood, it  becomes clear that neither taxes nor 
government  bonds  ‘finance’  government  spending”  (Wray,  1998:  ix)  because  the 
government  is  in  the  unique  condition  to  ‘self-redeem’ itself,  so  to  speak,  by  simply  
drawing a check on itself. Accordingly, the government does not need to tax or borrow 
from the private  sector to  get the money.  “Instead, taxes are  required to give value to 
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money, while bond sales are a part of monetary or interest rate policy” (Wray, 1998: ix). As 
I  will  explain  later  in  detail,  neo-chartalists  conceptualise  both  taxes  and  bonds  as 
instruments  of  monetary  governance  that  is  intended  to  set  the  price/effort  that  all 
economic agents (other than the state) must endure to obtain money.
The puzzle of deficit spending
Admittedly,  the  neo-chartalist  notion  of  ‘deficit  spending’ may  throw  the  reader  into 
confusion.  In fact,  by deficit  spending one normally understands state  ‘debt  financing’ 
carried through the systematic sale of bonds, which does imply the financial constraint of 
creditors’ willingness to buy bonds. Even governments are often deluded to “believe that 
they must sell bonds to borrow the funds necessary to financing spending. However, this is 
an illusion, as  the spending must come first” (Wray, 1998: 85, my italic). That is to say, 
deficit spending is logically prior and historically anterior to bond sales. In particular, say 
neo-chartalists, in order to ‘deficit spend’, the state ought to simply credit bank reserves 
‘by fiat’ with its  self-redeeming, non-interest-earning IOU. What’s more important,  the 
issue of such a financial liability by the state, computed as Public Debt (or National Debt),  
involves  uno actu  the creation of  net financial  wealth for society.  Put crudely,  deficits  
create financial wealth or, as Wray says, “it takes two to tango”, meaning that “[n]o matter 
how much others might want to accumulate financial wealth, they will not be able to do so 
unless someone is willing to deficit spend” (Wray, 2012b: 9). 
And so,  from the  neo-chartalist  perspective,  fiat  money remains  intrinsically  Janus-
faced because it represents at once a debt for the state and a financial asset for society as a 
whole. To those who might reply to this point that the state does not really oppose society 
in the same way as assets juxtapose liabilities in a bookkeeping entry,  but is rather an 
emanation of it, so that liabilities of the state (qua public sector) are in effect liabilities of 
its aggregate taxpayers (qua private sector), neo-chartalists will answer that as a matter of 
fact the Public Debt doesn’t really matter since deficit spending is fully discretionary, and 
the state is  always in  the condition to self-redeem itself,  that is,  roll  over its  debts  by 
making more promises, new promises ad infinitum. And so, why care about a debt that is 
not meant to be actually paid but is only supposed to remind us, as a sword of Damocles,  
that we are all forever indebted with the authority that provides the means of our social and 
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institutional reproduction? 
Leaving aside the logical fallacy of ‘infinite regress’ underlying the idea of an ‘infinite 
progress’  of  promises,  we  face  another  conundrum.  Though  bond  sales  and  deficit 
spending equally go to build up the Public Debt, they tell completely different stories. First 
of all,  unlike fiat  money, bonds are not required,  nor do they aim, to gather the funds 
necessary to finance the institutional reproduction of the state. Quite the contrary, bond 
sales  are  the  par  excellence instrument  of  a  monetary  governance that  through the 
conscious  management  of  the  public  debt  is  able  to  substitute  “an  interest-earning 
government liability for non-interest-earning government fiat money” (Wray, 1998: 86). 
By doing so, the government (via the treasury or the central bank) is able to drain excess 
reserves and allow “the central bank to hit its interest rate target” (Wray, 1998: 2; 86), so as 
to set the proper price of fiat money. Put crudely, bond sales are necessary to manage the 
price of fiat  money in a bank-based money system, but  are  not  required to  create  fiat 
money in the first instance (because money creation is accomplished via deficit spending). 
And so,  whereas  deficit  spending is  assumed to be  part  of  a  fully  discretionary fiscal 
policy, bond sales are seen as integral to a largely non-discretionary monetary policy that 
aims at  accommodating the banking system’s demand(s) for fiat  money (I will  discuss 
these issues in detail in the next chapter). 
Now, this analytical distinction between deficit spending and bond sales calls for some 
basic questions: to begin with, if both fiat money and government bonds are computed in 
the numbers of the Public Debt, as it seems to be the case, then what actually differentiates  
them in analytical terms? Is fiat money merely a debt that pays no interest and, vice versa, 
is the government bond simply money that pays interest? If so, can the government bond 
be leveraged like a currency by the banking system and hence progressively substitute fiat 
money as a bank reserve of capital, in a peculiar version of Gresham’s law whereby ‘bad’ 
interest-bearing  money  drives  out  (from  bank  reserves  at  large)  ‘good’ interest-free 
currency? In this case, what would be left of state discretion in fiscal policy once bank 
reserves  of  fiat  money  have  been  so  shrunk  –  i.e.  once  fiat  money  has  been  largely 
substituted by interest-earning debt in a process of securitisation – that in fact the money 
supply is no longer based on the security of fiat money but on that, more profitable, of 
treasury bonds? Also, if fiat money is essentially an obligation, does it mean that it can be 
normally  bought  and  sold,  and  exchanged  with  other  IOUs,  like  any  other  financial 
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commodity? Again, in what consists the difference between (fiat) money and (public) debt? 
If it’s only a matter of interest, how does such an interest come about in the first place?
We know that according to the entire post-Keynesian tradition ‘money’ and ‘debt’ enjoy 
a distinction of degree but not one of kind, since both entities are held together in a relation 
of liquidity. Accordingly, it is analytically hard (and possibly useless) to set boundaries 
between currency, money, public debt and private credit, and it is equally impossible to 
carry on an ontology of any of these notions per se. In this respect, for instance, Anderson 
(1917: 460) pointed out that “[c]redit is really a part of the system of economic value 
relations not easily marked off in economic nature from the rest. Its clearest differentiae are 
juridical rather than economic”. That is to say, although from a formal point of view bonds 
are liabilities  while  stocks  are  assets,  substantially,  “as  an economic  matter,  they  both 
represent  the alienation of  control”  (Anderson, 1917:  460).  In  other  words,  stocks  and 
bonds equally represent ownership of legal rights. To be sure, the same can be said of 
money, for in the vest of purchasing power it serves as a right against all the world (see 
Fox, 2008). What is truly at stake is therefore not to simply define money, but to make 
sense of what holds modern money together with all other financial entities: namely, what 
institutes money in relation to the ownership of debts and credits. 
This quid, I contend, can be grasped only by making sense of the modern institution of 
liquidity. Regrettably, by conflating the notion of money with that of debt – money is debt, 
they say – neo-chartalists seem to have missed the significance of the relation of liquidity  
that holds together, and at the same time differentiates, modern money, debt and credit. 
This  notwithstanding,  we  can  get  a  clue  of  the  genesis  of  this  relation  from  neo-
chartalism’s very own account of the fiscal origin of money. 
The logic of the fiscal origin of money
Wray (2012a) argues that the heterodox tradition of economics, and hence neo-chartalists, 
reject the type of formalist methodology adopted by orthodox economists which focuses on 
abstract  individual  (utility-maximising)  rationality  and critically  relies  “on an approach 
identified as ‘hypothetical, logical’” (Wray, 2012a: 5). Yet, ironically, Wray’s own story of 
the fiscal origin of money is based on “a simple, hypothetical ‘model’ [that is meant] to 
demonstrate the logical basis” (Wray, 1998: 155) of his theory. The model assumes at the 
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beginning “a very simple economy in which household are self-sufficient, using neither 
markets, nor money” (Wray, 1998: 155). At any rate, the story of the fiscal origin of money 
begins with a  deus ex machina – in the beginning was the State, and the State was with  
Taxation – whose authority (qua taxing power) is conferred by a heretonomous (perhaps 
foreign) entity (Mehrling, 2000). 
A government  is  formed which  would like  to  undertake  several  needed projects  for  the 
benefit of the population. This requires that the government obtain labour services and raw 
materials from the population, so it imposes a per capita tax of $1 per week. It realizes, of 
course, that the population has no dollars with which to pay the tax, so it must at the same 
time define what is to be done to obtain dollars, and ensure that the dollars become available. 
The  government  prints  a  fiat  (dollar)  money,  used  to  buy  goods  and  services  from the  
population, thereby providing the dollars required to pay taxes. It is clear to the government 
that the tax liability induces the population to provide goods and services in exchange for the 
dollars; the population needs the money provided by the government in order to pay taxes,  
while the government does not need the tax revenue in order to spend. Thus the government 
uses taxes only to draw forth a supply of goods and services (Wray, 1998: 155-6).
Initially, it is assumed that the government plans to run a balanced budget, since “[a]t the 
aggregate level, the maximum the government can hope to collect in the form of taxes is 
exactly  equal  to  its  purchases  of  goods  and  services.  In  other  words,  the  ‘best’ the 
government can plan to do is to run a balanced budget; there is no hope of running a 
surplus  because  the  government  cannot  possibly  collect  more  than  the  income  it  has 
created as it paid out dollars” (Wray, 1998: 156). 
However, the government soon finds “that some individuals who have been recipient of 
government spending in excess of their own individual tax liabilities have hoarded some 
extra dollars; the government also finds that some of the dollars are simply unaccounted 
for, and presumably have been lost” (Wray, 1998: 156). As a consequence, the government 
is obliged to run a deficit to cover all ‘leakages’ of dollars (hoarding plus loss) so that in 
the end “a persistent deficit is the expected norm...Indeed, the deficit could merely be seen  
as a measure of the population’s desire to ‘net nominal save’ in the form of money” (Wray, 
1998: 156, my italic). 
As it has been already pointed out, deficit spending enables income. But now we learn 
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that  deficit  spending  is  arithmetically  and  conceptually  equivalent  to  savings (see 
Mehrling, 2000: 399), and this for a simple reason: “[g]overnment spending supplies high-
powered money to the population. If the private sector wishes to hoard some of it – a 
normal condition of the system – deficits necessarily result as a matter of accounting logic” 
(Tcherneva,  2006:  78).  As  a  result,  a chronic  public  deficit  will  represent  the  normal  
condition of the monetary economy as long as fiat money will be hoarded (as a store of  
value) in excess of the tax liability.  Critically,  it  must be pointed out that a  substantial 
deficit spending can only be sustained in consequence of the population’s desire to hoard 
and/or hide (perhaps offshore?) the currency for reasons other than the mere imperative to 
discharge  a  tax  obligation,  because  otherwise  the  population  would  find  little  or  no 
incentives to save in excess of their liability to the state.
This is precisely what the model implies. In fact, assuming that people do hoard (or 
hide, lose) fiat money for accidental reasons, each year the government must spend a bit 
more than it taxes, to allow the hoarding as well as the dispersal of some dollars without 
consequences  for  the  stability  of  its  financial  operations.  Now,  as  it  has  been  already 
stressed, according to neo-chartalism there are no financial constraints to deficit spending, 
i.e. the government is always free to spend. However, it is crucial to bear in mind in this 
respect that the choice of how much to spend in relation to the level of taxation is never 
accidental but always pondered. Indeed, “[g]iven a tax liability, if the government tries to 
increase spending ‘too much’, then it might find that beyond some point the public refuses 
to supply goods and services in exchange for dollars. That is, after paying taxes, losing 
some dollars, and accumulating as many dollars as desired in hoards, the public would 
refuse to accept any more dollars” (Wray, 1998: 158). In other words, though there are no 
financial  constraints,  there  exists  nonetheless  a  real  constraint  to  deficit  spending,  as 
exemplified  by  the  presence  of  a  “saturation  point”  (Wray,  1998:  158)  determined by 
supply and demand: “[b]efore that point [is] reached, the government would find queues of 
individuals showing up to offer goods and services to obtain dollars; beyond that point, the 
government would find no queue” (Wray, 1998: 158). The existence of a saturation point 
means one thing: it is not the state that decides the volume of deficit spending (the quantity 
of fiat money issued) but, on the contrary, the market-driven demand for fiat money to 
determine its supply via deficit spending.
This  real  constraint  to  fiscal  policy,  however,  is  allegedly  neutralised  by  the  state 
48
capacity to set the effort required to obtain the currency. “If”, for instance, “the government 
holds the tax liability constant, but announces it will pay twice as many units of currency 
to obtain the same amount of goods, services and assets, it should not be surprised to find 
that its money has become ‘less valuable’” Wray, 1998: 5). In short, though there exists a 
saturation point, the government is always in the condition to outflank this real constraint 
and manage supply and demand by setting the  price of money. In a final analysis, it is 
always taxes that ought to drive money and hence the market, and not vice versa.
In this respect, it is worth noting that despite the emphasis on the primacy of the state,  
neo-chartalists argue that their model possesses a catallactic character: that is, it is able to 
account for a theory of market exchange (Peacock, 2004). First, the model assumes that 
taxes make money universally acceptable as a general medium of exchange, even for those 
who are exempt from tax payment, because taxpayers will still offer goods and services in 
the effort to obtain dollars and discharge their obligation with the state (Wray, 1998: 162). 
Second, it argues that households with insufficient income to meet the tax obligation are 
compelled to “engage in private market activity to try to earn the needed fiat money to pay 
taxes” (Wray, 1998: 162); that is to say, they are bound to become subject to the imperative  
to capitalise their property, including the property of their own labour power, in order to 
sell it in the market.
Now, it must be said that, given these premises, the catallaxy of neo-chartalism remains 
quite limited. In fact, according to the model, the size of a hypothetical private market will 
be directly proportionate to the number of surplus households willing to cede their idle 
money – i.e. savings – in exchange for produce and services from deficit households: the 
greater  the  number  of  households  with  excess  income,  the  greater  the  possibility  for 
extending the scope of a market for private transactions and, also, for the emergence of 
forms  of  bank  intermediation.  However,  to  be  considerable,  the  catallactic  momentum 
ought  to  be  propelled  by the  private  sector’s  desire  to  hoard money (which,  it’s  been 
argued, gets structurally saturated once the tax liability is met). Neo-chartalists underscore 
this aspect, and seem to take for granted the population’s desire to save money; for them, 
the  fact  that  fiat  money  may  serve  as  a  store  of  value  is  merely  a  by-product  of  its 
Knappian  validity  for  final  tax  settlements.  Yet,  as  Wray’s  model  suggests,  once 
households have acquired enough fiat money to pay their taxes and a saturation point is 
reached, their demand for it (hence, their willingness to make an effort to obtain it) will  
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start to drop drastically; as a result of this real constraint, at the aggregate level we cannot 
expect a volume of savings sufficient to establish a considerable private market, because 
no one will find ‘real’ incentives to seek money in excess of the tax liability . This means 
that  in order to stimulate savings (and hence the use of fiat money as a store of value),  
something other than the mere imperative to pay taxes must be in place, or else the market  
would stay in the germinal state of a very small retail and labour market at the margin of  
an elephantiac state economy. 
What then creates a ‘structural’ incentive to store money in excess of the tax liability? 
What  can be taken to  make sense of the modern capitalist  economy (and its  financial 
markets) that is not accounted for by the mere logic of taxes-drive-money (-and-hence-the-
market)? A way to tackle this issue is to look at how interest-earning lending comes about 
in  the  neo-chartalist  account.  Wray  suggests  that  the  institution  of  interest  can  be 
introduced in its model in at least three ways. First, “the government might offer to lend 
dollars at interest to households that are temporarily short of them in order that they might 
meet  tax  liabilities”  (Wray,  1998:  160);  in  fact,  adds  Wray  (without  providing  much 
evidence), “the first loans seem to have been public loans to provide deficient households 
with the means to pay taxes” (Wray, 1998: 163). Second, “households with excess dollars 
might lend them to deficient households to pay taxes, and charge interest” (Wray, 1998: 
162). This practice would be at the basis of private banking. Third, “the government may 
wish to encourage saving through payment of interest on savings” (Wray, 1998: 163) by 
issuing government bonds.
Regrettably,  Wray  does  not  really  explore  the  first  way –  the  emergence  of  public 
lending –  and considers the second one – the emergence of (intra)private lending – as 
temporally and, somehow, logically subsequent to the issue of government bonds, de facto 
opting for  the third  way – the emergence  of  the interest-bearing Public  Debt  –  as  his 
preferred hypothesis for the origin of interest-bearing lending. Hence he suggests that the 
government  begins  to  sell  bonds that  pay interest  to  households  with  dollar  hoards  to  
encourage savings or, perhaps, because people may prefer to buy bonds rather than paying 
taxes (Merhling, 2000). This seem to solve the puzzle of what actually drives the ‘store of 
value’ function, for now it can be consistently argued that people may wish to save money  
in excess of the tax liability in order to buy bonds. 
Notably,  bonds should be seen  as  “nothing more than  an interest-earning currency” 
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(Wray, 1998: 167). Significantly, as for the price of fiat money, the price of such a peculiar 
currency too is fully discretionary and depends on what the government wants to achieve 
with it:
The higher the interest rate offered by the government, the more bonds it might be able to 
sell (all else equal) by inducing households to part with dollars. On the other hand, a low 
interest rate might convince households to hold more dollars and fewer bonds. Note that the 
government does not have to pay higher interest rates to finance its deficit, rather, it chooses 
exogenously what interest rate to offer – households will prefer any positive interest rate 
over the zero interest rate on dollars, but higher rates might encourage households to convert  
more dollars to bonds.  In any case, bond sales are not required to finance a deficit, but  
rather are the means through which the government provides an interest-earning asset to the  
public, and thus more dollar income to the public (Wray, 1998: 161, my italic).  
 
This is consonant with the neo-chartalist thesis that the (interest-bearing) Public Debt does 
not arise out of the state’s fiscal necessity, nor is it imposed at any rate by the market, but is 
entirely contingent upon the agency of the state in monetary affairs: “[t]he market cannot 
dictate to the government what interest rate it should pay; the market will be happy to 
obtain any positive interest rate – but even if the market doesn’t want interest,  this is no 
problem as the government does not need to sell  bonds” (Wray, 1998: 161, my italic). 
However, the very fact that bond sales are not necessary to finance the state’s deficit but 
are, at least initially, a discretionary policy aimed at stimulating savings and hence, aimed 
at empowering the state power to deficit spend, strongly suggest that either taxes alone are 
not enough to drive money (via deficit spending), or the institution of the government bond 
is an accidental historical development whose rationale is not fully ascribable to the taxes-
drive-money logic but lies somewhere else. 
The neglected significance of the government bond
Something  doesn’t  add  up  in  the  above  account  of  the  origins  and  purposes  of  the 
government bond. According to Ingham (2004: 143), neo-chartalists have indeed missed 
the  political significance of the institution of the government bond, because they see the 
latter in functional terms, as an instrument of monetary governance (it is not a coincidence 
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that neo-chartalists champion Lerner’s ‘functional finance’ approach), and do not seem to 
realise that state spending, taxes and bond sales are the product of political struggles that 
are  fought  through  the  state,  not  by  the  state  and  its  representatives.  In  this  session, 
however, I will argue more radically that not only have neo-chartalists missed the political  
significance  of  the  government  bond,  but  they  have  also  misunderstood  its  economic 
significance. In fact, the institution of the government bond drastically changes the ‘nature’ 
of both money and the economy in ways that are not accounted for by their model (even 
though we can infer some of these modalities from it). Let’s see why. 
Before the emergence of Interests on the Public Debt (that is, before bond sales), the 
type of fiat money issued by the state is effectively a chartal means of payment, consonant 
with  the  basic  tenets  of  the  theory:  it  is  a  token  denominated  in  the  authoritatively 
established money of account, good for tax discharge, generally demanded also in private 
debt settlements, and possibly catallactic (to a limited degree). Once again, it is important 
to emphasize that people do not seek fiat money as a store of value per se, but only to meet 
their tax liability, and even if the currency circulates in private (market) transactions, the 
population’s  demand for it  is  bound to drop as soon as  the tax liability  is  met  by the 
aggregate private  sector.  Things,  however,  drastically  change after  the consolidation of 
bond sales, to the extent that fiat money turns into something radically different from, and 
possibly in opposition to, the chartal means of payment. Indeed we witness a shift from 
money  as  a  public  means to  money  as  a  private  end.  In  particular,  the  moment  the 
government decides to issue interest-earning securities to encourage savings, it implicitly 
begins promoting the use of money as a store of value, and namely as a thing that not 
necessarily ought to be circulated and spent for the sake of the public good, but which can 
be  hoarded  (deposited  in  banks,  and/or  invested  in  securities  easily  convertible  into 
interest-earning currency) for the sake of one’s own profitability. In other words, following 
the possibly accidental and unnecessary emergence of the government bond the currency 
finally shows its  modern features as a  financial asset (rather than a chartal liability) and, 
hence, as a commodity. 
Crucially,  the  possibility  for  money-holders  to  substitute  their  interest-free  currency 
with an interest-earning currency entails the institution of a  relation of liquidity between 
fiat money and the government bond which is applicable in principle to all IOUs, including 
private  ones  (see  previous  chapter).  In  other  words,  in  virtue  of  this  instituted 
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substitutability, money looses its peculiar status (granted by fiat) as the exclusive means of 
final redemption and becomes part (apex) of a  hierarchy of negotiable debts that can be 
more or less readily converted into decisive money for final tax settlement. Eventually, 
since it can be now inter-changed (via discounting) with all other (public as well as private) 
promises with varying degrees of credibility (and maturity), fiat money starts circulating 
widely, and even wildly, but this time it is no longer the means (the ‘wheel’) of commerce, 
but the very aim of trade, causing the rise of credit and financial markets. In other words, 
following the consolidation of bond sales and the institution of liquidity, circulation (and 
hence catallaxy) is no longer motivated by reasons of collective redeemability (i.e. to pay 
taxes), nor does it directly serve the empowerment of the state and, possibly, of society as a 
whole; on the contrary, circulation acquires a speculative character, as money transactions 
can  be  now  carried  out  –  literally  –  in  view  of  one’s  own  interest,  as  against  the 
background of available market opportunities for interest-earning securities. 
Pace neo-chartalism, it is this type of circulation whereby money becomes the  end of 
exchange and thus a commodity, and not the one in which money is the means of payment, 
what truly characterises the modern (capitalist) monetary economy. This casts a substantial 
doubt on the neo-chartalist understanding of money, according to which three propositions 
are always true: first, “money buys goods [i.e. commodities] and goods buy money, but 
goods do not buy goods”; second, “money is always debt; it cannot be a commodity from 
the first proposition because if it were that would mean that a particular good is buying 
goods”; third, “default on debt is possible, which means that creditworthiness matters. Not 
all money things are created equal” (Wray, 2012b: 264; 2010). And yet, we have seen that 
once a relation of liquidity is established between interest-free money and interest-bearing 
debt, things get mixed up, so that money buys debt and debt buys money in the same way 
as  commodities  are  exchanged  for  commodities.  In  effect,  if  money  is  debt,  as  neo-
chartalists argue, then, following the institution of interest-bearing obligations, debt  is  a 
commodity, and so is money. 
Notably,  the speculative motif  driving this  growing commerce of  debts  is  enhanced 
upon the possibility to withdraw money from circulation for an indefinite time (with the 
purpose to invest it  in securities or hold it in bank deposit).  It is only now – once the 
ownership  of  money  has  been  made  exclusive and  unavailable  at  a  systemic  level  by 
surplus  households  (i.e.  aggregate  creditors)  unless  deficit  households  (i.e.  aggregate 
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debtors) are ready to pay a fee (i.e. an interest) on top of the tax liability for its use & 
enjoyment; once, in short, money has assumed the intangible character of private property 
qua financial asset that can and must be withdrawn from circulations for profitable reasons 
– that money can finally serve as ‘purchasing power’ or, better, purchasing potential (see 
previous chapter). In particular, the private sector now holds the power to choose whether 
to  spend  or  save,  and  subsequently  commands  the  options  to  either  invest  money  in 
securities or keep it liquid. These new possibilities de facto compromise the autonomy of 
fiscal policy, because now the government has to deal with a ‘structural’ accumulation of 
the currency by the private sector – in the form of a pool of liquidity – occurring for  
reasons that go beyond the imperative to pay taxes.  And so,  we shall  see below, quite 
paradoxically, as the unintended consequence of the institution of liquidity (as driven by 
bond sales), the government soon finds itself in the troublesome condition to be forced to 
accommodate the reasons/demands coming from the private sector, de facto parting with 
much of its autonomy in monetary affairs in favour of the banking system. 
In this respect, it is worth noting that Wray himself suggests that the government bond 
is possibly the major factor in the stabilisation of (bank-intermediated) private lending, 
which is in turn at the origins of the state (momentary) loss of control over liquidity vis-à-
vis the market (according to neo-chartalists a form of state control is indeed regained when 
the central  bank is  established).  He thus argues that private lending arises when “[t]he 
deficient household...issue[s] a liability denominated in the fiat-money-of-account to be 
held by the household with excessive income in return for a loan of dollars used to meet 
the tax liability of the deficient household” (Wray, 1998: 163), and he also adds that “[t]he 
interest  rate  on  this  loan  will  be  some  mark-up  over  the  government’s  bond  rate to 
compensate  the  private  lender  for  the  change  of  default  by  the  borrower  and  also  to 
compensate the lender for the ‘insecurity’ of parting with dollars” (Wray, 1998: 163, my 
italic). This means that, though the practice of private lending might have existed before 
the  institutionalisation  of  bond  sales,  the  consolidation  of  a  (banking)  system  of 
intermediation was strongly favoured by the presence of the institutional mark-up of the 
bond’s interest rate: indeed, by anchoring the price of its private credit to the government 
prime rate of interest, the household with a large hoard of currency was able to assess with 
more certainty the credit risk – i.e. it was able to securitize its credit risk by discounting the 
debtor’s IOU on the stable basis of the bond rate – and it could consequently specialize in 
54
private lending. 
Notably,  the  neo-chartalist  account  of  the  origins  of  private  banking  does  not 
substantially differ from the goldsmith parable of mainstream textbooks, “except that it is 
government-issued currency rather than gold that people deposit  in the bank to get the 
thing started” (Mehrling, 2000: 400). As the story tells, once private lending is established, 
soon  enough  bank  IOUs  start  circulating  alongside  government  fiat  money  in  private 
markets upon the promise that they will be converted on demand in fiat money for tax final 
settlements (Wray, 1998: 163-4). At some point, banks learn how to accurately  leverage 
fiat money in credit transactions and thus begin operating under a fractional reserve system 
(but in reality under a fractional reserve regime the currency is not leveraged at all, see 
chapter 3). 
Let’s  open  a  parenthesis  here.  It  is  important  to  point  out  that  the  peculiarity  of 
fractional  reserve  banking  lies  in  the  asymmetrical  time-structure  of  the  bank  balance 
sheet: here bank liabilities are indeed to be met in the short run on demand whereas bank 
credits, that is, bank assets, are only disposable in a longer run. In jargon, this means that  
reserves fall short of deposits. As a result, a bank operating on the basis of the fractional 
reserve mechanism is at any point in time inherently bankrupt, that is, illiquid. To be sure, 
structural  illiquidity  does  not  necessarily  prevent  banks  from  being  solvent over  a 
predictable,  ‘ergodic’ time (see Davidson, 2006: 143),  since assets  are bound to match 
liabilities ceteris paribus. However, there is always “a danger that depositors will demand 
more fiat dollars than the banker has on hand” (Wray, 1998: 163). And so, to avoid the risk 
of a generalised bank run and a chain reaction of bank failures, interbank arrangements are 
finally devised by the creditor community.  These arrangements mainly consist  in  bank 
‘giro’ networks, cheque clearing and, especially, the development of an interbank market 
for fiat money reserves (Wray, 1998: 1664). Altogether, these innovations are bound to 
lead sooner or later to the establishment of a clearing house facility and the emergence of a  
modern banking system19. 
19 “Banks could develop an interbank market for fiat money reserves; these would allow reserves to ‘reflux’ 
back to individual banks suffering a clearing drain to other banks in the system. Banks with excess reserves  
could lend them short-term to banks with insufficient reserves, leading to development of a short-term, or 
overnight, lending rate. This rate, in turn, would be determined relative to the rate at which the government 
loaned fiat money, and to the rate paid by government on the bond it issued. Banks could also try to induce  
households to part with hoards of fiat money by offering interest-earning deposits...Eventually, most of the 
reserves of the banks would be nothing more than credits on the books of money centre banks, with actual  
dollars held only by the central clearing bank (except for small reserves of dollars held at individual banks for 
daily withdrawals). These reserves would be ‘pyramided’ on the central clearing bank”  (Wray, 1998: 164-5).
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Significantly, now that banks of deposit cooperate via the central clearing house and 
interbank credit facilities, they are able to stop runs on banks in an organized fashion: the 
solvency risk is thus shifted from the individual bank to the bank community as a whole . 
This, however, obviates neither the danger of insolvency nor, especially, the problem of 
structural illiquidity, because even though the central clearing bank is “able to stop runs on 
individual banks by lending reserves as necessary…its ability to stop a systemic run might 
be constrained by its dollar reserves [i.e. an inherent lack of currency]” (Wray, 1998: 165).  
After all, the central clearing bank can only operate a centralised redistribution of reserves 
so as to rationalise bank requirements, but it is not able to autonomously issue fiat money 
to meet all bank liabilities at once. And so, “[a]fter a number of disruptive crises”, it is 
likely that the government realize that 
one solution would be to take over the functions of the central clearing bank, establishing a 
government central bank that would run the national clearing system, operate as a lender of 
last  resort  to  provide  dollars  as  necessary  to  halt  systemic  runs,  and  perhaps  regulate  
financial practices – for example, it might require some minimum required reserve ratio. In 
addition, the central bank might offer to run a ‘discount window’, lending reserves against 
bank assets (Wray, 1998: 165).
The establishment of a ‘government central bank’ allegedly re-establishes the primacy of 
the state over the banking sector in the creation of money. The government can now supply 
money at will in two ways: “directly through government purchases of bonds from the 
banking  system  or  by  lending  reserves  to  banks,  and  indirectly  through  government 
purchases of goods and services from households, or through government purchases of 
bonds from households” (Wray, 1998: 165). This supremacy in monetary affairs, however, 
is  only  illusory,  for  in  the  age  of  central  banking  the  state  must  adapt  to  the  new 
developments introduced by banking in order to survive. In particular, the state via the 
central  bank must  supply  reserves  on banks’ demand,  de facto  accommodating private 
banks’ capital requirements necessary to underpin the volume of pending liabilities held 
against the private sector (Wray, 1998; Tcherneva, 2006: 80): “The central bank never has 
controlled,  nor could it  ever  control,  the quantity  of money;  neither  it  can control  the 
quantity of reserves in a discretionary manner” (Wray, 1998: 98). In other words, unlike 
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the government’s fiscal prerogative, the central bank’s monetary policy is from the start 
non-autonomous, non-arbitrary, subject to the whims of the credit market. 
And so, neo-chartalists are obliged to recognise that in a modern capitalist economy the 
money supply can no longer  be considered as a  mere function of the  exogenous  state 
agency, as it was in the hypothetical beginning of the ‘simple economy’, but it comes to 
rely on the bank-intermediated endogenous demand for credit. Under such circumstances, 
the government’s capacity to manage monetary aggregates via the central bank will shrink 
to the extent that “it will have no discretionary control over the quantity of reserves held by  
the banking system” (Wray, 1998: 166, my italic). As a result, despite formally remaining 
the  only  ‘net’  supplier  of  fiat  money  (but  this  is  profoundly  incorrect  because  the 
government does not supply fiat money: the central bank does) and retaining the right to 
‘write and enforce the dictionary’ in virtue of its sovereign fiscal prerogative, as soon as it 
begins  promoting the formation of a  market  for liquid securities by selling bonds,  the 
modern state is destined to lose its absolute power over the currency and will necessarily  
end up accommodating the market, that is, promoting monetary policies with a view to 
bank profitability (see Wray, 1998: 104). 
But  what  about  fiscal  policy?  Neo-chartalists  repeat  time  and  again  that  although 
monetary  policy  is  accommodative,  fiscal  policy  remains  at  any  rate  arbitrary  and 
autonomous. Even under a regime of fractional reserve banking, the government can still 
spend (this time via the central bank) in the same way it used to spend before the advent of  
modern banking: that is, by simply drawing a check on itself. This time, however, with an 
important difference: for now when it draws a check it also ought to promise to pay an 
interest to creditors if it wants to retain a lever of control over monetary aggregates in the 
short term, drain excess reserves and hit the interest rate target. Ironically, the state ought 
to sell bonds in order to put a check on the pool of liquidity whose growth bond sales were 
responsible for in the first place. In this respect, neo-chartalists argue that debt service (the 
repayment of Interests on the Public Debt) is not a problem because the government can 
always make new promises to substitute the old ones and, by doing so, it can indefinitely 
reschedule its  debt  repayment.  As Wray (2012b:  70)  put  it  quite  naively,  “government 
spends using keystrokes, or electronic entries, on balance sheets. There is no technical or 
operational limit to its ability to do that. So long as there are keyboard keys to stroke, 
government can stroke them to produce interest payments credited to balance sheets”. 
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However, even if we are to agree on the point that the public debt can be technically or 
operationally  sustainable  ad infinitum, there remains a more important question: is it so 
politically? For here lies the real problem: even though the government can effectively 
make promises ad infinitum to its citizens, what is left of its autonomy if it ought to make 
these promises in order to  accommodate  the banking system’s demands? What if banks 
demand less deficit spending (which may be deemed to be inflationary and pro-debtor) and 
more pro-creditor austerity? What if they want less Public Debt and, by converse, more 
Household and Corporate Debt, whose interests are normally higher than the ones paid on 
government bonds? Finally, there is also a conceptual problem: provided that the public 
debt ought to go to systematically alimenting bank liquidity, so that both deficit spending 
and bond sales become in effect by-products of an all-encompassing credit policy, on what 
ground can we still so confidently distinguish between respectively fiscal and monetary 
policy and sustain that the former is discretionary whereas the latter is not?
Chartal money is not possible
The neo-chartalist understanding of money is very much reminiscent of Ingham’s own: 
both are torn by a dual ontology as they are equally incapable of making sense of the 
contradiction  between  money as  a  means/measure  of  value  and money  as  value.  Like 
Ingham, neo-chartalists also profess the ontological primacy of the money of account (see 
Tcherneva, 2006: 70; Tymoigne and Wray, 2006; Wray, 2012a: 8) but then they mostly 
focus  their  analyses  on  money  as  debt  or,  more  precisely,  on  money  as  a  promise  of 
payment  serving as a chartal  means of payment.  This  focus on the  means goes to the 
detriment  of  an  understanding  of  the  end,  i.e.  the store  of  value.  Significantly,  neo-
chartalists claim that theirs is a theory of the sovereign currency, i.e. a theory of fiat money, 
not simply a credit theory. However, they conflate their notion of fiat money with that of 
debt: in fact, not only is bank money essentially a debt, but also fiat money is understood 
as nothing but a liability of the state. This creates an underlying ambiguity as to whether 
modern money is actually ‘fiat’ or ‘credit’ (see Mehrling, 2000), or perhaps both. 
In this respect, neo-chartalists crucially emphasise that unlike a normal obligation, fiat 
money “costs no real resources to produce and poses no financial  burden because it is 
inconvertible” (Mehrling, 2000: 401). The same is said to be true for the government bond 
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as long as it is payable in fiat money. As a result, modern money is ultimately a  debt-
money by fiat because it is originally created by deficit spending and is finally destroyed by 
taxation and, above all, because the government – differently from all other debtors – can 
always ‘deficit spend’ regardless of the amount of its debt. However, we have seen in this 
chapter that, critically, the institution of a substitutability/liquidity between fiat money and 
the government bond dramatically changes the nature of fiat money and, more generally, of 
debt, as it turns the former into the most liquid of all interest-bearing debts. 
In other words, from being a liability and a token of our symbolic indebtedness to the 
state (it is ‘symbolic’ because allegedly the public debt is never meant to be paid off but 
only to remind us forever and ever of our tax obligation), following the consolidation of 
bond sales money becomes a financial  asset and a  commodity, subject to the whims of 
financial (credit, money) markets. Reciprocally, debts of any sort become an object and a 
primary  objective of a highly speculative commerce, to the point that they can even turn 
into interest-yielding assets against which more money is issued, in a bank-driven process 
of securitisation. And so, following the introduction of bond sales, the entire structure of 
debt-relations  articulating the sovereign economy is  melted up,  liquefied,  turned into a 
boundless (transnational) ocean of financial opportunities possibly flowing offshore, and 
even if at the bottom of this ocean still lies the Leviathan (the state), what actually moves 
the creature of the Abyss is not simply a natural impulse or inclination (a conatus to tax), 
but an insatiable appetite (ultimately, an interest on the public debt). 
Crucially, debts in all forms – and especially fiat money and bank money – are now held 
together in a hierarchy of acceptability/liquidity. The institution of liquidity, however, does 
not merely denote the construction of a sovereign monetary space in which IOUs can be 
synchronically substituted with one another (depending on one’s own liquidity preference); 
more importantly,  liquidity  connotes  the construction of  a historically-specific ‘time of  
redemption’. That is to say, the pyramid/hierarchy of debts is not simply representative of a 
given ‘social  structure’ of credit-debt  relations  (as for Ingham and neo-chartalists)  but, 
more specifically, it is the manifestation of an enormous “time-structure” where the longs 
and shorts of monetised debts are interrelated with each other diachronically, in a way that 
indefinitely procrastinates the closing of all accounts –  the redeeming of the time. Here 
nothing is ‘given’, stable, for everything ought to move in a regime of radical uncertainty 
‘that would collapse if everyone paid its debts’, sentencing everybody to certain death (if 
59
not physical, a social and economic death). 
Yet such a matrix of prospective values is able to “lull our disquietude” because it is 
based on an illusive calculus (bank discounting) which is nonetheless very appealing, as it 
is  made in  view of  particular  interests.  And so,  in  the  modern  money economy,  even 
though men are  not  able  to  assess  the  risks  for  the  entire  collectivity  (and the  future 
generations)  that  would  ensue  from  their  daily  actions,  they  are  nonetheless  in  the 
condition to pursue in a rather predictable fashion their own interest whilst weaving their 
particular plots (stories) of social relations. Crucially, the type of interest that men pursue 
in  such  an  economy  is  very  different  from the  egotistic  and  pre-constituted  (i.e.  pre-
political  and a-historical)  economic  interest  that  moves the  timeless  utility-maximising 
individual  of  orthodox economics.  On the contrary,  this  interest  is  socially  constructed 
within the financial praxis: it is a political interest whose ratio (and rationality) lies neither 
in the individual agency nor in the systemic structure, but in the social property relation (of 
credit-debt). 
And so, after a critical reading of neo-chartalism, it appears that it is not fiat money per 
se, as an emanation of a metaphysical agency, but interest-bearing debt, and therefore the 
social relation proper, what actually provides the material cause for a  history of modern 
money. That is to say, it is interest on the public debt, not the tax liability per se, what 
actually institutes fiat  money  historically as a form of  private property  on the basis of 
which a ‘struggle’ or, more likely, a  negotiation  of purchasing power, can be effectively 
carried out. By contrast, there is nothing to fight about a fiat money – an Original Debt/Sin 
– that is universally  given and  imposed from above. The concept of chartal money – the 
‘inconvertible interest-free currency’ of sovereign economies – is only a mystification of 
what modern money really is and what it does20. Modern money is not designed to serve as 
a means of payment and hence fulfil  final settlements, but is constructed in a way as to 
defer  final  payments  and hold back the end time of  collective redemption through the 
mundane pursuit of one’s own interest. 
However, more fundamentally, the notion of chartal money relies on an even deeper 
20 Curiously, neo-chartalists and, more generally, heterodox economists, keep saying that money is not what  
money does (see Wray, 2012a: 9), and yet what they do all the time is to tell us what money is (that orthodox 
economics has not told us), as if this could alone account for what money actually  does. Or, alternatively, 
they tell us what money  does  but do not bother about explaining what this can reveal about its nature. In 
effect, the statement “money is not what money does”, like a white flag, seems to be waved by heterodox 
economics  to  symbolise  a  truce  between  ontology and  analysis  (methodology)  of  money,  rather  than  a 
reconciliation of these two complementary moments of our understanding of the phenomenon.   
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mystification about what modern states are (with their formal and substantial differences) 
and  what  they  do  and  have  historically  accomplished.  Such  a  mystification  begins  to 
unravel the moment we introduce “real world complications” (Wray, 2003; Tymoigne and 
Wray, 2006: 12) in the neo-chartalist model. These complications, according to Wray, are 
basically two:  “[f]irst,  most payments in  modern economies do not  involve use of fiat 
money; indeed, even taxes are almost exclusively paid using bank money. Second, fiat 
money is not emitted into the economy solely through treasury [i.e. government] purchases 
of goods and services.  In fact,  the central  bank supplies most of our currency” (Wray, 
2003:  91).  According to  Wray,  these  real-world  complications  do  not  compromise  the 
fundamental tenets of neo-chartalism. I dare disagree: pace neo-chartalism, the real world 
shows that money is  autonomously produced not by the government but by the banking 
system (as I will argue in the next chapter, it is supplied by banks regardless of the volume 
of bank indebtedness that this will generate,  as if banks faced no financial constraint to  
their capacity to lend); but most importantly, at the foundations of the sovereign currency 
is not the absolute power of the state to impose a debt on its subjects but a negotiation of  
interests  occurring principally between the government and the banking system,  bound 
together by a fundamental and ongoing relation – a memorable alliance whose (for)bidden 
fruit is  the  government  bond  –  which  is  mediated  by  a  public-private  institutional 
infrastructure  called  ‘central  bank’ (in  this  respect  see  also  Gnos  and  Rochon,  2002; 
Rochon and Vernengo, 2003). I will discuss these issues in more detail in the next chapter, 
when  I  will  introduce  the  reader  to  the  post-Keynesian  problematic  of  money’s 
endogeneity.
In conclusion, the neo-chartalist model of taxes-drive-money shows a highly abstract 
and over-simplifying character; in particular, all its propositions are dependent upon the ad 
hoc  premise  that  the  state  holds  the  undisputed  (and  unproblematised)  power  to  tax. 
Sovereignty is hence taken for granted, whereas what is truly at stake is to understand how 
sovereignty gets constructed as from the financial praxis. Also, the model oversimplifies 
the theme of catallaxy, as it does not account for the emergence of financial and money 
markets  –  the  headquarters  of  capitalism,  according to  Schumpeter  –  but  only  for  the 
development of a marginal retail and labour market. Finally, the model is applicable only 
to  sovereign  economies,  but  we  are  not  given  to  know  the  analytical  basis  for 
distinguishing between who or what is sovereign and who or what is not. At best, we are 
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told in  a tautological fashion that  if  the government  is  able  to impose an  unavoidable 
liability and name its own pecuniary terms – i.e. what counts as the means of final tax 
settlement – then it is a sovereign government. 
Critically, neo-chartalism completely misses the significance of the relationship between 
sovereign economy and offshore finance (see Palan,  1998; 2002;  Burn,  1999): modern 
money  is  not  simply  ‘that  which  is  good  for  paying  taxes’ but  relies  on  a  series  of 
institutional arrangements that altogether entail the systematic evasion of taxes  for ‘those 
who count’ – those who actually hold (purchasing) power – who are indeed able to hoard 
& hide  their  abnormal21,  illegal  and  unearned  incomes  in  the  bottomless  sinks  of  the 
offshore.  More generally, neo-chartalism manifests the methodological limits of a naïve 
nationalism: the state is here conceptualised as the bearer of a unitary rationality, rather 
than as  the institutional  locus  of  a  negotiation of  powers  by actual  human agents  (via 
political associations of any kind). In addition, the model presents a strong bias towards the 
U.S. case which, as neo-chartalists themselves admit, is quite an exceptional one since the 
United States are a ‘sovereign’ nation with an internationalised economy. And yet, though 
the U.S. exceptional case provides the main outlook for the neo-chartalist perspective, the 
international dimension of the monetised economy is merely added on top of an analysis 
which  remains  fundamentally  state-centric.  In  particular,  there  is  no  reflection  on  the 
possibility that the institution of money could evolve in parallel with an  imperial, rather 
than state-centric, economy (see for instance Hudson, 2003; Panitch and Konings, 2008). 
Perhaps, in order to grasp the international and, especially, transnational dimensions of the 
money phenomenon, it  would be necessary to turn the attention on the role played by 
banking and, especially, by speculative finance (which is genetically transnational) in the 
making of modern money.
21 The adjective ‘abnormal’ comes from the Latin word abnormis meaning ‘deviating from the law’.
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CHAPTER 3
Of truth and revelations: money, banking and finance
Heterodox economics II
I reflected that there is nothing less material than money, since any coin whatsoever (let us say a coin worth  
twenty centavos) is, strictly speaking, a repertory of possible futures. Money is abstract, I repeated, money is  
the future tense. It can be an evening in the suburbs, or music by Brahms; it can be maps, or chess, or coffee;  
it can be the words of Epictetus teaching us to despise gold; it is a Proteus more versatile than the one on the  
isle of Pharos (Borges, The Zahir)  
What is a bank, and what it does? Any serious attempt to explain the money phenomenon 
should be able to provide also a sensible answer to this question. After all, leaving aside for 
a moment the question of who or what creates money in the first instance, no one can deny 
the fact that,  once created,  money is routinely managed not by the government but by 
banks (among which stands the central bank as a primus inter pares). Perhaps one of the 
best definitions of what a bank does is provided by the long-forgotten Scottish political 
economist Henry Dunning Macleod, who already in the mid-nineteenth century sustained 
that  the  business  of  a  bank was not  to  lend other  people’s  money,  as  it  is  commonly 
believed, but to create its own debts and sell them: “a banker is a trader whose business is 
to buy money and debts by creating other debts” (Macleod, 1883: 321). 
To be sure, this patently goes against the orthodox view of banking. According to the 
latter, a bank doesn’t create any fresh money as it only provides an intermediation function 
between  savings  and  investments:  it  takes  deposits  from those  who have a  surplus  of 
money and lends part of these funds to those who need money to meet their payments 
and/or start  a business. Crucially, the bank lends in exchange for a fee,  called  interest, 
representing a premium the bank accrues for the risk it takes by making the (productive or 
consumptive) loan. From this perspective, the business of banking consists precisely in 
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making a profit from the difference of what is paid to depositor and what is received from 
the borrower by acting as a financial intermediary. 
Notably, intermediation necessarily implies a fractional reserve mechanism, as banks do 
not lend their own funds but part of the money they keep in deposit, whilst retaining a 
sufficient  quantity  of  reserves  to  meet  reasonable  demand.  In  effect,  financial  (bank)  
intermediation  and  fractional  reserve  banking  are  two  ways  to  describe  the  same  
phenomenon. Now, as any textbook of economics will explain, under a regime of fractional 
reserve banking, even though bank liabilities and assets are bound to match each other in  
the end, meanwhile, in the daily economic praxis, the volume of money transactions far 
exceeds total income, and the quicker circulation of money makes it appear as if the total 
quantity of money was multiplied by bank intermediation. If, for instance, bank A keeps a 
10 per cent reserve ratio, it lends the 90 per cent of the money held in deposit – e.g. if total  
deposits are £1000, it lends up to £900. The money lent by bank A will end up being 
deposited in bank B which in turn will keep £90 as reserves and lend £810 which will be 
deposited  in  bank  C,  and  so  on.  As  money  circulates  via  bank  intermediation,  at  the 
aggregate level an initial deposit of £1000 will cause an apparent increase of the money 
supply of a ten-fold magnitude, based on a 10 per cent fractional reserve ratio. 
The wonder of intermediation is that even though no single bank can create money ‘out 
of nothing’, the banking system as a whole is able to stretch the total money supply with its 
intermediation – as economists say, it gives  elasticity  to the money supply. Significantly, 
the  banking  system is  able  to  do  so  without  necessarily  endangering  final  payments, 
provided that it sets a proper reserve ratio in harmony with the growth rate of the economy. 
In effect the banking system is simply keeping the accounts of total assets and liabilities in 
the time-structure of its double-entry balance sheet. If a bank is found ‘short’ in deposits – 
with insufficient funds to meet its reserve requirements – some other bank part of the same 
fractional reserve system will be necessarily ‘long’:  all is needed for fractional reserve 
banking  to  work  smoothly  is  an  interbank  market  for  reserves  in  order  to  overcome 
frictional shortages of cash. And so, in the end bank intermediation increases the efficiency 
of  monetary  circulation  by  facilitating  the  equilibration  of  the  supply  and  demand  of 
money. 
What’s more important, in addition to intermediation (which is in effect a ‘portfolio 
management’),  fractional  reserve  banking  may  also  provide  a  clearing  facility  to 
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economise on cash transactions; the latter may be indeed very costly, especially if by cash 
one means a ‘hard currency’ such as gold bullion and coinage. Fractional reserve banks 
may thus issue banknotes redeemable (in cash) on demand to overcome the costs of cash 
transactions. The possibility to introduce substitutes for cash – with all dangers deriving 
from counterfeiting – represents a major innovation brought about by bank intermediation. 
In this connection, it is not a coincidence that the concept of fractional reserve banking is 
introduced in textbooks of economics to explain the logical passage from metallic money 
(i.e.  ‘commodity  money’)  to  paper  money  (i.e.  ‘fiduciary  money’ or  ‘fiat  money’).  In 
particular, the mainstream account of the origins of modern fiduciary money is based on 
the in-famous story of the greedy London goldsmiths and their ‘fake’ gold certificates. This 
‘parable’ is told over and over and has eventually ascended to the status of legend. 
Briefly,  during  the  English  seventeenth  century,  in  a  time  of  political  turmoil  (that 
included civil wars, military campaigns, international conflicts, flows of colonisations in 
the New World, the overthrowing of the Crown, the constitution of the Commonwealth, the 
Cromwell interregnum, and the Glorious Revolution), the market for luxury jewellery in 
the City of London was particularly sluggish and goldsmiths had to reinvent their business. 
As legend has it, in exchange for a fee, goldsmiths began offering safe-keeping services to 
people fearing for the safety of their valuables. To certify what were essentially bailment 
contracts, goldsmiths issued gold certificates against all gold and valuable coins kept in 
their vaults. These certificates ‘represented’ to their respective bearers the ownership of the 
gold they had deposited.  Now, because of goldsmiths’ credibility  and soundness,  these 
certificates were considered ‘as good as gold’ and thus began circulating widely. In time, 
less and less holders of gold certificates demanded their conversion in gold and certificates 
became redeemable on demand ‘to the bearer’; goldsmiths thus found a strong incentive to 
issue  anonymous  notes  to  the  bearer  in  excess  of  their  deposits:  as  a  result,  all  their 
certificates of gold ownership became de facto promises of payment in gold on demand. In 
other words, goldsmiths began leveraging their gold reserves, and each of their banknotes 
was  nothing  but  a  claim  against  society,  a  subtle  borrowing  from  their  customers. 
Significantly,  though  these  anonymous  IOUs could  not  be  honoured at  once  due  to  a 
structural lack of gold vis-à-vis the amount of claims on it, they kept circulating as a type 
of  ‘fiduciary  money’,  as  far  as  goldsmiths  managed  to  sustain  the  illusion  of  their 
convertibility  by  means  of  a  prudent  management  of  their  assets.  It  was  the  dawn of 
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modern banking. 
Notably, the goldsmith parable is applied by mainstream economics also to explain the 
functioning of  the  contemporary  banking system:  quite  simply,  once  the  state,  via  the 
central  bank, has monopolised the privilege to  issue fiduciary money ‘out  of nothing’, 
based on the illusion of its convertibility in gold, then all other banks, acting in concert, 
can  increase  the  elasticity  of  the  money  supply  on  the  basis  of  a  fractional  reserve 
mechanism, even though none of them is ever allowed to issue money  ex nihilo. To be 
sure, following the abolition of the dollar convertibility into gold and the collapse of the 
Bretton  Woods’s  monetary  order  in  the  1970s,  this  story  has  lost  much of  its  appeal; 
however, its basic logic, and in particular the concept of fractional reserve banking, still 
holds a grip on the contemporary imaginary of finance and banking. This is for instance the 
case of neo-chartalism which, it has been argued in the previous chapter, proposes a history 
of modern money and banking that at any rate follows the script of the orthodox account, 
the only difference being ‘the end’: here the value of modern (fiat) money does not stem 
from the possibility of its convertibility into gold, but is a consequence of state acceptation 
for final tax settlement.
Now, the reader will excuse my harshness, but this entire story of fractional reserve 
banking and the rise of modern money has neither rhyme nor reason: it  is a complete 
mystification  of  what  modern  banking  is  about  and  how  modern  money  is  actually 
created22. If anything, fractional reserve banking is exemplificative of everything modern 
banking and finance is not: namely, a  pre-modern financial praxis. Indeed, as a rule of 
thumb, one should expect the presence of financial intermediation based on the principle of 
fractional  reserve  whenever  in  history  paper  instruments  (including  credits)  have  been 
found to displace some ‘hard currency’ as a means of payment and exchange, and this goes 
perhaps as far as late-third-millennium BC Mesopotamia (see Hudson and van de Mieroop, 
2002).  In  this  connection,  recent  scholarship  has  demonstrated  that  peoples  were 
accustomed to the practice of fractional reserve banking already in classical antiquity (see 
for instance Harris, 2008: 187; Cohen, 1992), and that both financial intermediation and 
complex  clearing  systems  for  credits  and debts  were  already  at  work  well  before  the 
emergence of coinage (see Davies, 1994; Hudson and Wunsch, 2004). Yet, significantly, 
though the story of financial intermediation is likely to go back to the dawn of civilisations, 
22 For a more factually consistent account, see Davies, 1994; Fox, 1996; Werner, 2005; Knafo, 2008; 2013. 
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the  same  cannot  be  said  of  paper  currency,  as  historical  evidences  show  that  the 
institutionalisation of a fiduciary currency only took place in relatively recent times (in this 
respect,  much is  yet  to  be done to  reconstruct  the  history of  far  eastern  finances  and 
monies). 
What I want to say is that financial intermediation per se is not necessarily bound to 
institute a paper currency; nor, especially, is the principle of fractional reserve banking 
enough to engender the creation of fiat money by simply ‘counterfeiting’ notes, as anarcho-
libertarian  accounts  such  as  Rothbard’s  (1983)  and  De  Soto’s  (2006)  suggest.  This  is 
because the leveraging of  real assets (among which a ‘hard currency’) through the  ex-
nihilo issue of fiduciary debt instruments might well degenerate into widespread inflation 
and, more generally, lead to financial instability involving bubbles and bursts. As I am 
going to argue in the following, inexorably, a systematic leveraging of assets creates an 
illusion of liquidity that might even ‘melt down’ the economy, if not carefully handled. In 
this respect it must be also pointed out that, historically, even when the technical means of 
the time made a mass production of paper instruments possible (as from the late fifteenth 
century, following the printing press revolution), the leveraging of a ‘hard currency’ such 
as coinage still remained very hard to accomplish for a number of reasons: to name a most 
significant one, the value of coins was constantly subject to alteration by public authorities 
and private agents, and this made it impossible to calculate with precision solvency and 
liquidity risks stemming from their leveraging. This is why, throughout modern history, 
credit  instruments  have  been  able  to  substitute  currencies  only  in  restricted  ‘giro’ 
communities,  such  as  Renaissance  credit  networks  of  merchants  and  bankers  (Boyer-
Xambeau  et  al,  1991),  but they have never been able to displace ‘hard currency’ as a 
general medium of exchange. This was true up until the mid-seventeenth century, when 
London goldsmiths found a sustainable way to provide liquidity, and thus marked with 
their credit innovations the beginnings of a new era for finance and banking. Their solution 
to the problem of liquidity, however, had nothing to do with fractional reserve banking and 
textbook intermediation. 
The alchemy of modern banking
As  Macleod  clearly  understood  ahead  of  the  times,  modern  bankers  do  not  actually 
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intermediate. That is to say, if, hypothetically, a banker owns deposits for a sum of £10000 
in cash (e.g. gold or specie), he does not retain £1000 to meet demands and lend £9000 at, 
say, a 4 per cent interest. 
It is commonly supposed that when a banker has the £9000 to trade with, he employs it in 
purchasing bills of exchange to that amount: and that he receives a profit only on the £9000: 
but that is a complete misconception of the nature of ‘banking’.  A banker never buys bills  
with money in the first instance: that is the business of a bill discounter, or a bill broker.  The 
way in which a banker trades is this. He sees that £1000 in cash is sufficient to support 
liabilities  of  £10000  in  credit:  consequently,  he  argues  that  £10000  in  cash  will  bear  
liabilities to several times that amount in credit” (Macleod, 1883: 325).
A banker, therefore, does not grant credit on the basis of a fractional reserve mechanism 
but  leverages  the funds it manages by over-issuing claims on them. That is to say, if its 
reserves amount to X, the banker makes loans and borrows others’ capital by issuing IOUs 
for an amount equal to a positive magnitude of X. In short, the banker issues money ‘out of 
nothing’ by lending what he doesn’t  have (yet),  de facto infringing a most  basic  legal 
principle passed on by Roman law:  nemo dat quod non habet  (Fox, 1996: 547). Indeed, 
when we borrow money,  we are  all  acting  as  bona fide  purchasers  for  value  without  
notice23 (see Fox,  1996;  2008:  19).  In  this  respect,  says  Werner  (2005:  175),  the term 
‘lending’ is misleading: “banks do not lend money, they create it”. Leverage is the true 
principle of modern seigneurage. 
Crucially, in order for leverage to be viable, bank reserves must meet two requirements: 
first,  they  must  be obviously  highly liquid,  that  is,  readily marketable titles  of  private 
property; second, they must provide a store of stable value (or else a calculus of sustainable 
leveraging would become impracticable). Now, in the case of London goldsmiths, reserves 
were provided by gold bullions and coins held in deposit24. It must be noted in this respect 
that  goldsmiths  brought  together  a  number  of  different  business  activities:  bailment 
services and money-changing on the one hand (ergo gold deposits) and merchant banking 
23 Briefly, in common law, a bona fide purchaser is someone who paid a full price for a valuable (i.e. money) 
in the belief that the vendor (i.e. the bank) had a right to sell it, an without any suspicious circumstances to 
put him on inquiry. Business as usual.
24 It  must be noted in this respect  that,  for  historical  reasons that  cannot be discussed here,  the English 
monarchies distinguished themselves for a politics of Sound Money that made the English pound the most 
stable currency in Europe, starting from the second half of the twelfth century with Henry II’s reform (see 
Knafo, 2006; 2008; 2013). 
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on the other, the latter being a precursor not really of deposit banking (i.e. savings and loan 
banking),  but  of  investment  banking.  Indeed the  goldsmiths’ financial  praxis  consisted 
essentially in a leveraging of reserves for purposes of investments and loans. The genius of  
goldsmiths, in particular, consisted in leveraging their reserves through the discounting of  
bills of exchange. 
Technically, when a bank discounts a bill of exchange, it offers to buy from a trader in 
need of immediate liquidity a financial asset that has not yet come to maturity in exchange 
for a bank promise of payment, or banknote, which is readily convertible in cash (in the 
case of goldsmiths, it was normally convertible in gold after three months) and is therefore 
deemed to be highly liquid. In exchange for the service, the bank retains a fee, which is 
discounted from the face value of bill. As Macleod (1883: 325) pointed out, the banker
buys the bill, which is debt payable at a future time, by giving his customer a credit in his  
books for the amount of the debt, less the discount: which is a right of action the customer 
has to demand the money if he chooses. That is, he buys a right of action, payable at a future  
time, by creating or issuing a right of action, payable on demand (my italic).
Discounting is essentially a way to construct the present value of an asset by means of a 
calculus of its prospective value that ‘lulls our disquietude’ (see chapter one). Significantly, 
the money created via  discounting is  radically  different  from the hard currency that  it 
leverages:  whereas  the  owner  of  gold coins  or  bullion physically  possesses  a  property 
value,  the  owner  of  money only  bears  a  generic  legal  right  ‘against  all  the  world’ of 
commodities and services. Hence, crucially, what money buys are not commodities and 
services but “legal control over commodities and services” (Commons, 1996: 333), and 
“legal control is future physical control” (Commons, 1996: 435):  it can be an evening in  
the suburbs, or music by Brahms. Or, more prosaically, it can be a greater cash inflow. 
And so, a hypothetical goldsmith banker who manages deposits for a sum of £10000 in 
cash may choose to leverage its assets by discounting bills of exchange for a face value of,  
say, £40000 at a discount rate of 4 per cent: he will thus grant credit payable on demand to 
traders in exchange for bills of exchange (i.e. promises or orders of payment) that will 
come due in the near future, normally three months. Since they are assumed to be self-
liquidating, bills of exchange are automatically ascribed to the asset side of the banker’s 
balance sheet, even though they are still effectively liabilities. By doing so, the goldsmith 
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banker does not gain four per cent on the £9000 in cash (i.e. £360), but four per cent on the 
£40000 (i.e. £1600) of bills he has bought by leveraging its reserves (Macleod, 1883: 326). 
In effect, the banker is lending £38400 to get £40000 in three months. The bank balance 
sheet will thus look as follows: assets corresponding to £10000 in reserves plus £40000 in 
near-to-maturity bills (total assets equal to £50000); liabilities corresponding to £10000 in 
deposit  accounts plus £38400 circulating banknotes issued against bills  (total  liabilities 
equal to £48400); profit equal to £1600, based on an initial deposit of £10000.  Notably,  
through  discounting  the  bank  balance  sheet  gets  constructed  in  a  way  that  not  only  
liabilities  but  also  assets  are  essentially  debts  (with  the  exception  of  ‘hard’ currency 
reserves). Stated differently, discounting turns debts into assets.
This type of banking is based on an ‘asset management’ of the bank’s balance sheet 
structure (which, to be sure, has nothing to do with textbook ‘portfolio management’): in 
short,  a  bank manages  its  assets  (i.e.  deposits  and reserves) and thus  rations  its  credit 
operations  by  discounting  secure  and  self-liquidating  financial  titles.  The  conceptual 
foundation of this type of banking is the ‘real bills’ doctrine: the idea that a bank should 
only discount secure short-term debts arising from ‘real’ commercial transactions, such as 
bills of exchange. The latter are indeed promises or orders to pay a certain sum in exchange 
for goods and services that have been already produced in the past and whose value only 
waits to be  realised. This reduces to a minimum the risks of leveraging insofar as  banks 
will borrow against a future which is bound to happen  when the commercial bills come 
due and the cash (or, alternatively, real assets) flows in the bank vaults. 
Banks, however, may also leverage their reserves by discounting debt instruments that 
are not based on any ‘real’ transaction of goods and services: such is for instance the case 
of ‘accommodation bills’,  commercial  papers guaranteed (endorsed) by a credible third 
party. As Macleod (1883: 308) pointed out, “[t]he essential distinction between real and 
accommodation bills, is that one represents past, and the other future transactions. In a real 
bill goods have been purchased which are to meet the bill: in an accommodation bill goods 
are to be purchased which are to meet the bill”. To be sure, in both cases discounting is still 
about calculating the present value of financial titles based on their prospective value – that 
is  to  say,  at  any  rate  “the  profitable  business  of  banking  consists  in  buying  up,  or 
discounting, as it is technically termed, the present value of future profits” (Macleod, 1883: 
314).  However,  whereas  the  future  profit  yielded  by  bills  of  exchange  is  based  on  a 
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knowledge of their history (as linked to past production) and is thus highly predictable (and 
most likely to be realised), the future profit promised by accommodating bills is based on 
an image of future production – a  projection of the future political economy based on a 
complete  disregard of its past25 – and is consequently radically uncertain26. This makes 
accommodating  bills  and  alike  debt  instruments  inherently  speculative,  as  they  are 
essentially bets, that is, stakes in the future.
According to Macleod, the practice of discounting accommodation bills may be indeed 
very destabilising as it might give rise to a speculative frenzy that could even destroy the 
economy. His argument against accommodation bills and in favour of ‘real bills’ reveals an 
understanding of banking that most of its contemporaries lack:  
It is a very prevalent doctrine among men of business that real bills are essentially safe,  
because they are based upon real transactions, and always represent property. […] The whole 
misconception arises from an error in the meaning of the word ‘represent’. A bill of lading 
does […]  represent  goods;  and whoever has the bill  of  lading has the property in some 
specified goods. But a bill of exchange does not represent any goods at all.  It represents  
nothing but debt; not even any specified money” (Macleod, 1883: 306-7).
However,
As real bills only arise out of the transfers of [actual] property, the number of them must be 
limited in the very nature of things. However bad and worthless they may be individually, 
they cannot be multiplies beyond a certain extent. There is therefore a limit to the calamities 
they cause. But accommodation bills are means devised to extract funds from bankers and 
speculate with; and consequently these speculations may be continued as long as these funds 
can be extracted (Macleod, 1883: 309).
In  short,  unlike  bills  of  exchange,  whose  creation  is  limited  by  the  amount  of  actual 
material  property,  i.e.  ‘property  of  the  past’,  accommodation  bills  may  be  created 
indefinitely and for speculative reasons as ‘checks drawn on the future’, de facto entailing 
25 We cannot but note in this disregard of the past – of history – an analogy between the financial mentalité  
and much of modern technocratic thinking, which is concerned with prescribing our future by producing 
generalising models in complete abstraction from the particular vicissitudes of history.  
26 As Lorenzo il Magnifico of the De Medici banking dynasty once said in a famous canzone, chi vuol esser  
lieto, sia: del domani non v’è certezza.
71
the possibility of a ‘boom and bust’ cycle of credit:
The drawer [of the accommodation bill] may be speculating in trade, and losing money every 
day,  but  his bills  must  be met:  and there is  no other way of doing it  that  by constantly 
creating  fresh  bills  to  meet  the  former  ones.  By these  means  the  customer  may extract 
indefinite sums from his banker, and give him, in exchange, so many pieces of paper. Now 
when discounts are low and times are prosperous, this system may go on for many years. But 
at last a crisis comes. The money market becomes “tight”. Bankers not only raise the rate of 
discount,  but  they refuse to  discount  as freely as before:  they contract  their issues.  The 
accommodation bills are in the bank and must be met. But if the banker refuses to discount  
fresh bills, they must be met in money. But all the property which the speculators may have 
had may have been lost twenty times over: and so, when the crisis comes, they have nothing 
to  convert  into  money.  Then  comes  the  crash.  Directly  the  banker  refuses  to  meet  his 
customer’s bills by means of his own money, he wakes to the pleasant discovery that, in 
return for the money he has paid, he has got so many pieces of paper! (Macleod, 1883: 364)
Notably,  the above-described process  provides  an  archetypical  account  of  a  Minskyian 
cycle of credit (see Minsky, 1977; Nesvetailova, 2007; 2010; Dow, 2006: 41-42). Now, 
according to Macleod, whereas the drawer of the bill is moved by a speculative motive, the 
banker remains pretty much unaware of what is really going on, and discounts the bill in  
good faith – as a bona fide discounter, so to speak. But here lies the stake: irrespective of 
whether  the  bill-drawer  will  use  the  loaned  funds  for  ‘productive’ or  ‘unproductive’ 
purposes,  this  entire  operation  is  speculative from the  moment  the  banker  chooses  to 
discount the accommodation bill (or an alike debt) against a collateral which is not based 
on  a  ‘real’ security  (about  a  profit  to  be  realised  against  past  transactions)  but  on  a 
‘nominal’ security (about a profit that will be realised upon performing future transactions). 
In this respect, it must be pointed out that the endorsement of the bill by a credible third 
party  that  allegedly  disposes  of  ‘own  capital’ (hence  of  a  ‘real’ security  that  can  be 
collateralised by the bank upon lending) might increase the security of the bill but is not in 
itself a necessary element. In discounting an accommodation bill, the bank only needs the 
surety of a collateral, be it real or nominal. To this purpose, the bank can make for instance 
a  ‘margin  loan’,  whereby  upon lending it  collateralises  a  certain  ‘margin’ of  the  total 
amount loaned, which is kept in a margin account as a security for the risk taken. In both 
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cases, by lending against collateral, the bank is primarily reassured by the fact that “[i]f the 
borrower cannot service the loan sufficiently, the bank can ‘call’ the loan by foreclosing on 
the borrower, who may lose the collateral (or more)” (Werner, 2005: 227). This type of 
bank  credit,  also  known  as  ‘asset-collateralising  lending’ is  at  the  basis  of  modern 
speculative finance (see Werner, 2005; Heinsohn and Steiger, 2000; 2006; 2009). 
Now, it is important to point out that speculation in itself is neither an evil nor a good: 
speculation simply is, like a ‘magical mirror’ that reflects the image of a future. What is 
seen in the this mirror is normally in accordance with what those who look in the mirror 
want to see the most – their project – based on what they have drawn on the future from 
their present condition. Not coincidentally, the word ‘speculation’ originates in the Latin 
word speculum, meaning ‘mirror’. To be sure, the magic of the modern financial mirror is 
nothing but an illusion of liquidity created by the banking alchemy. And whenever the 
illusion vanishes, we can finally spot in the mirror what we have actually become without  
knowing  (i.e. from an initial condition of radical uncertainty). Speculation may be thus 
responsible for financial bubbles that might bring the economy to its knees, but it can also 
engender a prodigious flourishing of the industry of a nation. 
But what is more important to understand, speculation is never a ‘nominal’ reflection, or 
perhaps a distortion/refraction, of ‘real’ production. On the contrary, “speculation”, says 
Macleod, “is the mother of production” (Macleod, 1883: 132). Capitalist production is in 
fact a radically uncertain, forward-looking process, not a backward-looking one (Nitzan 
and Bichler, 2000: 81), whereby the Schumpeterian entrepreneur first borrows and then 
sets  up  her  business.  Capitalism  is  about  borrowing  against  the  future,  and  in  plain 
disregard of the past, despite the fact that by looking in the mirror the assumingly all-
seeing eye of capitalism does not really see the future but the Angel of History27. 
Again,  Macleod stands out in this respect for his  insights ahead of the times,  as he 
pointed out how crucial speculative finance had become for the sorts – the future – of 
27 In the ninth thesis of the essay Theses on the Philosophy of History (1940), Walter Benjamin writes: “A 
Klee painting named  Angelus Novus shows an angel looking as though he is about to move away from 
something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is  
how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of  
events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his 
feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is  
blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close 
them. The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris  
before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress”.
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society, and how fundamental bank credit was in projecting the peoples towards a future of 
either wellbeing or crisis. Despite warning about the risks stemming from discounting, he 
did not despise banking per se and was not an advocate of hard currency or 100 per cent 
fractional  reserve bank money, as he saw the beneficial  potential  that modern banking 
could bring for the collectivity.  He was accordingly very eager  to  distinguish between 
credit and credit, and between finance and finance. In particular, he condemned the specific 
speculative motives at  the basis  of English banking whilst  praising the peculiarities of 
Scottish banking. The latter  was indeed responsible  for the institutionalisation of ‘cash 
credits’ (see Macleod, 1883: 341-351), that is, credits granted to entrepreneurs in view of 
future production, often subsidising agriculture and the “formation of public works” (ibid., 
347).  Macleod  considered  cash  credits  legitimate  insofar  as  genuinely  profitable, 
progressive and emancipatory for the entire collectivity28. For him money was primarily – 
ontologically – neither a commodity nor a credit, but a  right,  and accordingly  the use of  
money  was  equitable  and  legitimate  only  when  money  was  granted  as  a  right  for  
production, as with cash credits, and not when it was traded as a commodity in view of  
purely speculative profits at the expenses of others and for purposes of mere control over  
things and, ultimately, over people. 
The issue of money – literally – is inherently connected to a question of social justice 
(which,  as I  am going to  argue in chapter  5,  is  in  turn always a  question of  political  
justice). As Mellor (2010: 27) puts it in very simple terms, “if new money can be created 
out of fresh air, like fresh air it should be seen as a resource available to everyone”. In 
particular,  following Macleod, money is ‘good’ (and is  a  good) only when, after being 
created ‘out of nothing’ for the sake of production and on the pledge of men’s industry, 
honour and credibility, it can finally go back to the nothing where it properly belonged, 
allowing for the final settlements of debts. On the contrary, money becomes a dangerous 
power when it is employed for the buying and selling of debts, de facto alimenting a spiral 
of debts (by means of discounting) – n.b., not a mere  circulation – to the detriment of a 
28 Writes Macleod: “The invention of cash credits had advanced the wealth of Scotland by centuries. Thus we 
have an enormous mass of exchangeable property created out of nothing by the mere will of the banks and its 
customers, which produces all the solid effects of gold and silver; and when it has done its work, it vanishes 
again into nothing, at the will of the same persons who called it into existence” (1883: 351). “[Scotland’s]  
system of banking has been of infinitely greater service to her than mines of gold and silver. Her banking 
system has tended immensely to call forth every manly virtue: mines of the precious metals would, probably,  
have demoralised her people. In the character of her own people, in their steadiness, their industry, their  
honour, Scotland has found wealth infinitely more beneficial to her than all the mines in Mexico and Peru” 
(1883: 350).
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mutual redemption for the members of the collectivity.  
Macleod, to be sure, was not a naïve visionary: he clearly saw the state of affairs of the 
political economy of his times, and recognised the enormity of the power of which bankers 
had become the ultimate attendants. As he wrote in this regard: “at the present time credit, 
in its various forms, is the most gigantic species of property in this country [Great Britain]:  
inferior only, if it be inferior, to the land in magnitude: and the negotiation of debts is, 
beyond all comparison, the most colossal branch of commerce. The merchants who trade in 
debts – namely bankers – are now the rulers and regulators of commerce – they almost 
control the fortunes of states” (Macleod, 1883: 157). But how did bankers practically made 
their successful bid for state power?
The Faustian Pact (aka cash nexus) of modern finance
Why should a bank find it rational to lend upon the surety (i.e. collateral) of a promise (i.e. 
a borrower’s IOU) whose value depends on the realisation of a radically uncertain future? 
In all likelihood no bank, taken singularly, would think of asset-collateralising lending as a 
rational practice, but perhaps a  coalition of banks  might. As explained by Werner (2005: 
228), 
[w]hen banks  engage  in  asset  collateralization,  each  individual  bank  tends  to  assume it 
cannot influence the price of the collateral asset. However, banks suffer from the fallacy of 
composition. If a large proportion of country’s banks engages in increased real estate-related 
lending, the increase in the value of real estate transactions is likely to be reflected largely in 
higher prices...Thus real estate prices will be pushed up by the very action of rising bank 
lending. In the short term, rising asset prices create capital gains for the borrowers and render 
banks’ loan books technically sound, thus further encouraging increased loan extension...A 
real estate ‘bubble’ is the likely result.
A financial bubble is a specific feature of modern speculation, for the type of asset inflation 
it creates is a by-product of bank leverage. The latter indeed implies the production (via 
discounting) of financial claims on private property that far exceeds the total amount of 
private property, so that at any point in time there will be a positive debt-to-equity ratio at  
the aggregate level of the economy as a whole. Now, as far as banks discount commercial 
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bills  and alike  ‘titles  of  property in  the past’,  the  creation  of  financial  claims goes  in 
tandem with, and is progressively reabsorbed by, the growth of the industry and commerce 
of a nation. Here banks are effectively empowering the system of payments. But when, on 
the other  hand,  banks systematically  engage with discounting ‘titles of property in  the 
future’, the creation of financial claims is based on nothing but promises which may or 
may not materialise in real assets. As a norm, some promises will while others will not,  
thus giving shape to a “debt overhang” on the economy bound to lead to some form of debt 
deflation (see Hudson, 2012). A financial bubble (and burst) is precisely the consequences 
of the fact that certain promises, after having been systematically deferred, cannot be kept 
in the end, causing the sudden collapse of the structure of trust that they have worked to 
construct in the first instance. In this case banks do not empower the system of payments, 
but on the contrary put it in a stall. 
Notably, modern speculation is never born by an individual act but is always necessarily 
a collective enterprise. Unlike the traditional practice of arbitrage, whose profits stem from 
the exploitation by individual agents of price differentials among various markets and are 
thus dependent on ‘playing against the market’, the making of a bubble via the inflation of 
asset prices requires that speculators ‘play with the market’ in a concerted fashion so as to 
ingenerate market confidence and sustain the illusion of liquidity of the inflated assets (see 
Knafo, 2009: 132). “As a growing number of people invest in the same assets, prices soar, 
thus increasing the profits of those who resale their assets” (ibid.). Needless to say, among 
those who make a profit by reselling their assets at an inflated price are banks, which have 
been accumulating those assets as collaterals for loans. Now, “there seems to be a virtuous 
circle to these bubbles as everyone appears to win in the process, at least until the crisis 
hits” (ibid.). When this happens, the virtuous circle of money creation reveals itself for 
what it has been all along: a vicious spiral of unpayable debt discounting. The burst of the 
bubble  is  literally  a  ‘rendering  of  accounts’,  as  the  systemic  procrastination  of  final 
payments comes to an end and the redistribution of financial wealth from those who have 
lost to those who have won in the game becomes, alas, palpable. Of course, the ultimate 
winners are those who have initiated the process of coordinated investments to inflate the 
specific asset: i.e. the original asset-collateralising banks and their partnering brokers and 
financial operators.
Crucially,  ‘playing  with  the  market’ requires  a  coordination  of  investments  and  a 
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systematic engagement in market-making activities by ‘those who make money’ in order to 
sustain  the  illusion  of  the  liquidity  of  their  liabilities.  This,  in  turn,  involves  the 
construction  of  a  complex  institutional  infrastructure  as  well  as  a  form  of  financial 
governance to harness speculation and make it altogether viable at a systemic level. In this 
respect, one should better think outside the box and see speculation for what it is: not a 
sign of  irrationality  or  a  dysfunctional  practice bound to  collapse  simply because it  is 
disconnected from production  sensu strictu  (see Knafo, 2012), but a rational and indeed 
sustainable practice.  Notably,  bubbles can sustain themselves for significant periods  of 
time – much more than one would ever expect. 
What is required for a bubble to endure is a financial infrastructure able to indefinitely 
roll over debts and procrastinate final payments. In this respect, it is not a coincidence that 
the first financial bubbles occurred in conjunction with the financing of National Debts by 
the first corporate investment funds (see for instance the South Sea Company’s bubble in 
1720, or the Mississippi Company’s bubble, still in 1720). The modern institution of the 
Public Debt is in effect a monumental evidence of the fact that financial bubbles can last 
indeed very long, as long as nations keep servicing their obligations by getting into more 
debt, thus sustaining the illusion of systemic liquidity. After all, the promise, backed by 
organised violence, that (the majority of) people will pay their taxes constitutes for a bank 
engaging in asset-collateralising lending the most secure of all nominal collaterals, that is, 
the most trustworthy of all promises about values to be realised, and profit to be made, in 
the future. For in the modern world of constitutional states, “nothing can be said to be 
certain, except death and taxes”. In this world – our world – speculation is sovereign. 
To  fully  appreciate  the  last  statement,  and  hence  the  relationship  between  modern 
speculation  and sovereignty,  once  again  we  ought  to  go  through  the  story  of  modern 
banking and focus in particular our attention on the institution of the Bank of England. The 
latter was established in 1694, in the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution. Together with 
the joint institution of a National Debt, the formation of a parliamentary monarchy and the 
rationalisation of the tax excise, the Bank of England was the ‘constitution’ of the modern 
English state. In particular, the Parliament, the Tax Excise, the National Debt and the Bank 
of England formed a kind of institutional “square of power” (Ferguson, 2001: 16), i.e. a 
new regime of governance and a new form of sovereignty (see Teschke,  2003: 252-5) 
based on a ‘memorable alliance’ of a transnational type between state representatives and 
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bankers (Ingham, 2004; 2008; van der Pijl, 1998). Significantly, this alliance – in fact, this 
negotiation of power – was sealed by an “indissoluble bond” (Amato and Fantacci, 2012: 
190), or “cash nexus” (Ferguson, 2001), out of which modern money was born.
According to a popular view, the Bank of England was established with the intent of 
monetizing government debt. Ingham argues in this respect that “the privately owned Bank 
of England transformed the sovereign’s personal debt into a public debt and, eventually, in 
turn,  into  a  public  currency” (Ingham,  2004:  128).  The money that  resulted  from this 
transformation was a hybrid of private credit and public currency, and “[u]nderpinning this 
transformation in the social production of money was the change in the balance of power 
that  was expressed in  the equally ‘hybridized’ concept  of sovereignty of the ‘King-in-
Parliament’” (Ingham, 2004: 128). However, on a closer look, the Bank of England did not 
really  monetise  the government debt, but the private debt of state creditors. As Gardiner 
(2004: 143) has pointed out:
Although it may have had the capability to monetise government debt, its primary action 
seems  to  have  been  the  very  opposite:  it  took  government  debt  out  of  circulation,  for 
government  debts  […] were  replaced  by  a  large  bank loan  secured  on  an  irredeemable 
government annuity. If the structure which was created in 1694 were being founded today, it 
would be described as principally an investment trust of government loans, not as a bank. 
The arrangement the Bank of England made with the government would be described as a 
funding of the government debt, that is the replacing of short-term liabilities for long-term 
ones (my italic).
The Bank of England was in fact a corporate investment trust (Amato, 2008) founded with 
an initial own capital of £1.2 million in gold coins and bullions, gathered by a coalition of 
private investors. This fund was immediately loaned (as a perpetuity paying 8 per cent 
interest  plus  £4,000  annually  in  management  fees)  to  the  government,  and  the  Bank 
obtained  in  exchange  the  following  privileges:  first,  the  exclusive  right  to  hold  all 
government loans, that is, a charter to manage the entire business of state finance; second, 
the exclusive right to lend at interest money to the government, “secured by earmarking 
new taxes” (Broz,  1997:  216);  third,  the exclusive right  to  form a joint-stock banking 
company with limited liability, meaning that all bank shareholders were liable for the debts 
of the bank only to the amount of their  respective initial  investment; finally, and most 
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importantly,  “the right  to  issue  banknotes  backed by government  bonds in  amount  [in 
theory] not exceeding the bank’s capital” but, in practice, “in excess of deposits” (Broz, 
1997: 216-7). In short, this meant that the bank could “issue banknotes, for example by 
commercial  discount operations,  up to the amount of capital deposited by subscribers” 
(Amato and Fantacci, 2012: 187), even though that amount had been already loaned to the 
government. As Galbraith (1975: 32) explains: 
the government’s promise to pay would be the security for a note issue of the same amount. 
The notes so authorised would go out as loans to worthy private borrowers. Interest would be 
earned both on these loans and on loans to the government. Again the wonder of banking.
And so, “exploiting the obscurities of the charter, the bank immediately set about issuing 
banknotes not only against the public debt, but also by discounting trade bills for quite 
considerable sums. In this way it rendered liquid not only the public debt securities, but 
also  private  credits”  (Amato  and Fantacci,  2012:  188).  Absurd  as  it  may  sound,  once 
duplicated  (please  note,  as  in  a  mirror),  the  initial  bank  capital  “would  contemporary 
support, in the form of gold, the sovereign’s military outlay, and, in the form of paper, 
commercial transactions at the private level” (Amato and Fantacci, 2012: 188), de facto 
serving “two masters: the state and the market” (ibid., 187). 
The  primary  action  of  the  Bank  as  a  bank  was  therefore  to  issue  an  amount  of 
banknotes equal to the amount of government debt held: to be sure, it was still another 
debt, yet a liquid one, allegedly redeemable in gold. It is important to emphasise in this 
respect that the Bank of England did not properly leverage any underlying reserve of hard 
currency – indeed its entire initial capital of gold coins and bullion had been loaned to the 
government. That is to say, the Bank owned nothing but government IOUs on its asset side 
and, paradoxically, the gold that the Bank promised with its notes issued upon discounting 
was expected to flow in its vaults precisely from cashing commercial bills. That is to say, 
while merchants and financiers of the City were acquiring liquidity by getting their bills 
discounted,  by the same token the Bank of England was building up its reserves. And by 
the same token the Bank was also allowed to buy government debt with the purpose to 
market it at a profit. The Bank was in other words carrying out a ‘liability management’ 
strategy, rather than an ‘asset management’ one.
The notion of ‘liability management’ is often employed to describe the type of financial 
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banking that emerged in the U.S. during the post-World War II period (see Konings, 2007: 
158, in Assassi et al); however, the same notion can be applied to explain the operations of 
the Bank of England already in the eighteenth century.  As it  has been argued,  a  bank 
pursuing an asset management  strategy is focused on discounting good financial  titles, 
such as bills of exchange, that will build on its asset structure. On the other hand, a bank 
operating a ‘liability management’ is focused on securitising debts hanging on its balance 
sheet (e.g. commercial bonds, promissory notes, loans) and selling them on the financial 
markets. Notably, these two ideal-typical strategies are not in contrast with one another: a 
bank  can  indeed  manage  in  an  active  fashion  both  its  assets  and  liabilities.  The 
institutionalisation of liability management, however, signals a new approach to banking 
which is essential to a stable construction of liquidity: “whereas in the traditional approach 
to banking the money market was a place where banks bought financial assets, in the new 
approach  it  started  to  function  as  a  market  where  banks  sold  obligations  and ‘bought 
money’”  (Konings,  2007:  158).  And  so,  significantly,  liability  management  implies  a 
further  securitization  of  debts  and  the  consolidation  of  secondary  markets,  which  are 
essential to sustain the liquidity of debts.
Briefly,  securitization is  the  process  of  taking an illiquid asset  hanging in  the bank 
balance sheet and, through financial engineering, transforming it into a liquid security to be 
sold to third parties. Notably, the financial innovations introduced by the Bank of England 
consisted essentially in a “securitization  of the public debt” (Amato and Fantacci, 2012: 
188), though initially such a securitisation was rather basic. In the case of the Bank of 
England, the illiquid asset was the much discredited government debt, an accommodation 
bill drawn by the parliamentary monarchy on endorsement of taxpayers. To securitize such 
a debt, at least initially, no financial engineering (i.e. ‘re-packaging’) had to be performed: 
the legal abstruseness of the charter was already enough for this purpose. With the charter, 
the Bank had in  effect  rented  the parliamentary  fiscal  power to  impose a  debt  on the 
subjects of the Crown – in other words, it was as if the Bank had capitalised the collateral 
of the fiscal prerogative of the state, de facto acquiring  pro tem  the power to issue fiat 
money. This prerogative, however, was not sufficient in itself to ensure the stable value, 
broad acceptability and circulation of Bank of England notes. Quite the contrary, in this 
first phase, the ‘securitization by decree’ of the public debt alimented monetary instability. 
This is because it was carried out on the basis of a very hazardous bet – an ‘all in’, a 
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wagering of the Bank’s entire initial stake made on the basis of an original security (the 
government promise) – that was not secure at all: the initial capital of the Bank was indeed 
‘gambled’ for the purpose of assisting the English government in the war with France. The 
only hedge for this securitization was provided by the manu militari of the Crown. 
Such an hazardous securitization seriously endangered a founding principle of banking: 
redeemability.  Indeed,  very  soon  after  the  foundation  of  the  Bank  of  England,  in 
consequence of excessive issue of banknotes, “and while [the Bank] continued to pay their  
notes in specie on demand, [Bank’s] notes fell to 17 per cent discount” (Macleod, 1883: 
482). The ‘markets’ did not trust the Bank’s promise, and some private bankers and money 
dealers  in  the  City  even  attempted  a  run  on  the  Bank  of  England  as  early  as  1696 
(Macleod, 1883: 473).  The basic problem was that note-issuing could not be effectively 
sustained unless these notes were made highly liquid. To be sure, this could not be done by 
decree, even though legislation did help a lot29, but ought to be accomplished by alimenting 
a liquid market for debts and debts alone, with the consequence of sustaining the indefinite 
procrastination of final debt settlements: namely, a secondary discount market for interest-
earning securities (i.e. government bonds of various types). 
Hence, from its foundation, the Bank of England actively worked to the construction of 
a liquid discount market for public securities. Such a market was to grow exponentially as 
from the  mid-eighteenth  century,  when  the  Bank  of  England  began  brokering  British 
Consols, prototypes of the modern government bond. Consols were securitised financial 
instruments,  pretty  much  like  the  infamous  asset-backed  securities  (ABSs)  and 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) that we have learned about as the ‘toxic assets’ 
responsible for precipitating the present global financial crisis: in particular, Consols were 
bundles  of  government  debts  (annuities)  packaged into a  single security  engineered to 
flood the money market (see Davies, 1994: 271). 
However,  as  a  consequence  of  the  progressive  articulation  of  a  growingly  complex 
relation of liquidity between Bank of England notes, private debts, and government debts, 
the  overall  ‘debt  overhang’ grew during  the  eighteenth  century  to  the  extent  that  the 
working fiction of convertibility could not be performed any longer: from 1797 until 1821, 
when the British Gold Standard was finally resumed, convertibility in gold of Bank of 
29 In  particular,  a  1708 Act  of  Parliament  extended  the  bank  privileges  as  it  became unlawful  for  any 
corporate body other than the Bank of England to issue notes within 65 miles of London, the said prohibition 
being valid for any partnership of more than six persons
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England notes was suspended pro tempore. This, however, did not cause the collapse of the 
system of payments, to our amazement. The reason why the economy ‘kept running’ was 
that, quite simply, gold was no longer money. Indeed, by the time gold convertibility was 
suspended, gold had already been withdrawn from circulation, buried in the new temples 
of finance (the nineteenth century, in particular, saw the emergence of joint-stock banking), 
and it  was merely functioning as a  reserve of  real assets  to be leveraged for financial 
purposes. It was not gold that financed the building up of the British Empire, but its Public  
Debt.  The reason for the reintroduction of gold convertibility by the British authorities 
ought to be sought somewhere else, and namely in financial governance: gold was deemed 
to be necessary not to redeem circulating notes, but to restrain and discipline the creation 
of money by banks and, in particular, by country banks (Knafo, 2006; 2008; 2013). 
But if gold was no longer redeeming, then what was that ensured final redemption for 
the community of money believers? Perhaps nothing was. As a matter of fact, the type of 
finance that emerged together with the modern constitutional state was a finance with no  
end (Amato and Fantacci, 2012: 193). At the foundation of such a finance was a Faustian 
Pact – a cash nexus – that made our means of payment servant of two masters: not simply 
the ‘State’ and the ‘Market’, but also ‘use value’ and ‘exchange value’, the ‘good’ (money 
as a measure and medium) and ‘the highest good’ (money as a value to be pursued in 
itself). But as the gospel reminds us, “no one can serve two masters: either you will hate 
the one and love the other, or you will be devoted to the one and despise the other. You 
cannot serve both God and money” (Matthew, 6: 24). And in the end the summum bonum 
of money was not ‘appeasement’ and ‘redemption’ but hunger for a power to be claimed 
‘against all the world’. 
Modern money is an enigmatic absurdity: a promise of payment serving as a means of 
payment, a debt constructed in a way as to indefinitely procrastinate the final settlement of 
debts to the point of even negating the payback. Money is the original sin that does never 
allow for the final deliverance of sins. And yet, even though it is the acknowledgement of a 
debt that cannot be paid (Graeber, 2011), we cannot get out of the monetary contract until 
we have paid the last penny30. It is an eternal purgatory (as we never learn) in which we are 
30 As the gospel teaches (Matthew, 5: 25-26) “Come to terms with your opponent or you will be handed over 
to the judge and thrown into prison. You will not get out until you have paid the last penny”. The opponent – 
‘antidiko’ – is a reference to devil whereas the judge is God that will send us to the purgatory/prison, if we 
have not come to terms with evil and overcome it during our life. Problem is, to ‘come to terms’ often means 
to ‘compromise’ our integrity and be overcome by evil.
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bound to honour a contract that violates the sacrosanct nature of contracts (Amato and 
Fantacci, 2012: 184). But what’s more enigmatic is the fact that money allegedly violates 
also  a  most  basic  law  of  nature  and  its  corresponding  nemo  dat  legal  principle:  the 
principle of conservation. No one can give what he does not own because ex nihilo nihil fit: 
nothing seems to be more reasonable and self-evident than this principle. And yet, modern 
bankers have been able to systematically break this law by lending money ‘out of thin air’. 
Moreover,  by  lending  at  interest,  they  also  infringe  a  corollary  of  the  nemo dat  rule: 
nummus not parit nummos, money does not beget money. 
Significantly, the principle of conservation – the idea that nothing can be created out of 
nothing or be erased from existence, but only be transformed, that is,  change from one 
form to another – is only a special case of the postulate of the  identity of things in time, 
which is in turn at the basis of a most fundamental insight in the history of human thought: 
the  intuition  of  a  relation  of  equivalence  between  forms  (Mirowski,  1989:  5-6). 
Significantly, the postulate of the identity of things in time “is powerful enough to create in 
us illusions that are contrary to evidence; it  makes us accept as substance what in the 
beginning is but a relation between two limited terms” (Meyerson, quoted in Mirowski, 
1989: 6). The same is true for modern money: we fool ourselves into believing that money 
will eventually redeem us because it is based on a relation of equivalence (and, hence, a 
relation of  equality) and we accordingly accept it  in exchange as a substance of value 
although it is in fact only the emblem of a fluid relation of debts, i.e. a relation of relations 
of promises ad infinitum. Like the water of the ocean, this money is here and there, visible 
and yet invisible, boundless, limitless, of unspeakable magnitude, waiting to be conquered 
by adventurous entrepreneurs; and yet it cannot be grasped by one’s hand, nor can it be 
drunk  to  relieve  one’s  thirst.  Money  is  ‘liquidity  personified’,  sought-after  as  a 
philosopher’s stone by the bourgeois and  bought by  (believed by) the government as an 
elixir  to  achieve  immortality,  while  in  the  end  responsible  for  the  desiccation  of  the 
sovereign  powers  of  the  ‘civil  society’ before  the  metaphysical  (financial)  empire  of 
capital. We are all the more dead in the long run.
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Postscript: another dogma of money is still a dogma
Far from being a hybrid of public currency and private credit, the money forged by the 
modern banking alchemy is a claim, a right produced by a bank-mediated negotiation of  
debts with debts, giving rise to a positive debt-to-equity ratio at the systemic level – it is 
indeed an illusion of liquidity, a sparkling ocean of purchasing power at the bottom of 
which lies a vortex of unpayable debts. Notably, this money is ontologically neither a debt 
(a liability) nor an equity (an asset) but  new value. As Heinsohn and Steiger (2000: 86) 
have argued in this respect, “money is created in a credit contract but is not itself a credit” 
or debt31. Instead, money is net worth loaned by banks to the private sector (Heinsohn and 
Steiger, 2006: 498). Crucially, this “net worth is not eliminated again when the loan is paid 
back”  by  the  single  borrower  (ibid.,  498)  because  in  the  meantime  money  has  been 
capitalised in ‘productive’ or ‘unproductive’ ways, thus adding net value to society as a 
whole, whether in the form of ‘real’ or ‘financial’ assets (the latter causing the formation of 
a debt overhang). 
In  this  respect,  it  is  important  that  we understand that  though money is  new value 
created ‘out of thin air’,  or ‘out of nothing’, this must not be intended as the fact that 
money magically pops out of a ‘vacuum’ or ‘oblivion’. Thin air is nothing, but a nothing 
that is and, literally, does matter: it is a solid space, though one whose materials (particles) 
cannot be seen or touched. In thin air lie intangible materials called property (Gray, 1991) 
and,  hence,  historically-specific  relations  of  credit-debt.  Quite  simply,  this  means  that, 
analytically, money-out-of-nothing is nothing but a leverage of property, i.e. a power over 
property relations. This emblematic truth is partially grasped by the heterodox economics’ 
notion  of  ‘endogenous  money’,  possibly  the  major  conceptual  foundation  of  the  post-
Keynesian proposition together with the idea that money is  a non-neutral  factor of the 
economy. In this case, however, the truth of money as power is reified and accepted in a 
dogmatic fashion, as the revelation of a most fundamental onto-logical identity: ‘money is  
credit’. 
At  its  simplest,  the  thesis  of  money’s  endogeneity  states  that  the  money  supply  is  
endogenous to the demand for credit; in other words, the demand for credit  rations and 
hence defines the money supply. Notably, this goes against a major conceptual foundation 
31 Similarly, Dow (2006) argues that money is not credit but arises as a counterpart to credit.
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of orthodox economics: Say’s Law. According to the latter, things go the other way around 
as the supply creates its  own demand, based on “an automatic market mechanism that 
ensures the full employment of available resources in the most efficient manner possible” 
(Davidson, 2006: 140). As a corollary to this rejection of Say’s Law, the thesis of money’s 
endogeneity also objects the orthodox key-notion of money’s  scarcity. In fact, once it is 
assumed that endogenous money is supplied by the banking system on demand, that is, in a 
passive fashion to meet the private sector’s demand for credit, then it goes without saying 
that there can never be a  lack of money. Seen from a different angle, this means that no 
formal (financial)  constraint can be put on the creation of credit  by banks, and indeed 
banks are able to provide credit ‘out of nothing’ as long as people demand it. As the reader 
will recall, this is precisely what neo-chartalists argue with respect to deficit spending (see 
chapter 2) – the only difference being that in this case it is not the government but the 
banking system to actually enjoy the privilege to issue money  ex nihilo  until the private 
sector’s demand is saturated.
The  thesis  of  money’s  endogeneity  or,  simply,  ‘endogenism’,  was  conceptually 
systematised starting from the 1980s (after the collapse of the Bretton Woods’ system), on 
the wake of the works of post-Keynesian economists Kaldor (1982) and Moore (1988). 
Their  basic  arguments  were  constructed  around two key-propositions:  first,  the  money 
supply (including high-powered or fiat money) is  structurally determined by the demand 
for credit  and hence endogenous to the operations  of the economy,  i.e.  market-driven; 
second,  interest  rates  on  money  are  contingently  set  by  the  central  bank  and  are 
accordingly  exogenous  to  the  economic  process,  i.e.  state-driven,  dependent  upon  the 
discretionary  agency of  monetary authorities. As we can see,  from this perspective the 
autonomy of monetary authorities is very limited. First of all,  money is not a creature of  
the government but a creation of banks; more specifically, money is not dropped ‘from 
above’, vertically, by the central bank, but is produced horizontally by the banking system 
to meet the aggregate demand for credit. Second, in the same way as the banking system is 
driven  to  passively  meet  the  general  demand  for  credit  so  central  banks  ought  to 
accommodate the banking system’s demand for reserves of high-powered money. Hence in 
the world of endogenous money causation does not move from the state to the private 
sector and from currency to credit, but the other way around. First, banks provide credit on 
demand, then they seek liquidity in money and financial markets; eventually, if banks are 
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still short of reserves after having gathered funds by selling securities, the government via 
the central bank steps in and accommodates the banks’ demand for currency. That is to say, 
from the endogenist  perspective,  bank credit  is  logically prior to fiat  money (i.e.  bank 
reserves). Put crudely, this means that the government enjoys no discretion in monetary 
policy, nor can it fully control monetary aggregates, but it ought to operate in accordance  
with  what  the  (credit)  market  demands  (or,  better,  commands).  For  these  conceptual 
breakthroughs, Kaldor and Moore’s original version of money’s endogeneity is nowadays 
known as the ‘horizontalist’ or ‘accommodationist’ approach (Lavoie, 2006), in contrast to 
‘verticalist’ approach of mainstream economics that, paradoxically, depicts the central bank 
(and the state) as an almighty monetary authority.
To be sure, one of Kaldor and Moore’s primary aims was to question the validity of 
monetarism,  the  dominant  monetary  policy  of  the  time.  According  to  monetarism,  the 
government can indeed control the growth rate of the money supply (see Blyth,  2002; 
Krippner, 2005). By contrast, endogenism implies very little room for manoeuvre in terms 
of monetary policy: the central bank cannot control the volume of (bank) money, but only 
attempt to stabilize the interest rate on the currency whilst accommodating the demand for 
credit in the institutional vest of lender of last resort, in the effort to curb fluctuation and 
volatility  in  short-term interest  rates  on  credit.  Significantly,  behind  this  technical  and 
anyway theoretical diatribe was (and still is, though in different forms) a historical conflict 
about  how the politics of inflation should be carried out.  Whereas  for monetarism the 
money issued by the central bank was source of inflation so that the  quantity of money 
ought to be controlled by the government in order to curb (pro-debtor) inflation, according 
to endogenism there could never be an  excess of money: if anything, the growth of the 
money supply was not a cause but an effect of inflation (Dow, 2006: 40). In fact, from the 
endogenist perspective, the money supply  coincided with  the credit supply which was in 
turn assumed to be demand-driven (i.e. market-driven): as a result, pace creditors, money 
could neither be issued in overabundance, nor be rationed and made scarce, because its 
endogenous supply was always bound to meet debtors’ needs. The policy implications of 
the theoretical twist given by endogenism are enormous: from this alternative perspective, 
governments  should  not  regard  their  fiscal  policy  as  responsible  for  inflation  and  are 
therefore free to deficit spend. Yet, they still ought to deal with inflation and the dangers 
deriving from an ‘over-heating’ economy, but to this purpose they should not target the 
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quantity  of money but the  price  of money, i.e. the interest  rate on the money they are 
prepared  to  lend to  the  banking system via  the  central  bank.  To be  sure,  interest  rate 
maintenance  operations  would  only  account  as  a  defensive  strategy  to  counter  market 
forces, not as an action able to determine ex ante the general level of prices. 
Today all schools of heterodox thought within the post-Keynesian tradition (including 
neo-chartalism) agree with Kaldor and Moore on the points that (a) money is created by 
banks, and (b) authorities cannot control monetary aggregates (quantities). This said, there 
remain considerable differences among the approaches. In particular, Kaldor and Moore’s 
original version of money’s endogeneity, which is nowadays known as the ‘horizontalist’ 
or  ‘accommodationist’ approach  (Lavoie,  2006),  finds  oppositions  in  the  more  recent 
‘structuralist’ approach (Dow, 2006). The latter promotes a more radical view of money’s 
endogeneity; in particular, it challenges the idea that interest rates can be set exogenously 
by the central bank and, above all, it acknowledges the possibility of an excess or deficient 
money supply32. Also, structuralists are ways more sensitive to the problematic of liquidity 
in  relation  to  speculative  finance.  In  this  variegated  panorama  of  post-Keynesian 
approaches  that,  beside  accommodationism  and  structuralism,  also  includes  the  many 
branches of circuitism (see Gnos,  2006; Realfonso,  2006; Rossi,  2006),  neo-chartalism 
firmly stands with the ‘conservative’ position originally formulated by Kaldor and Moore; 
accordingly, it argues that though the state cannot determine the quantity of money, it can 
still determine its  substantive value or  price,  by setting the prime interest rate. In other 
words, “the supply of money is determined endogenously while the price of money (short-
term interest rate) is determined exogenously as a result of central bank policy” (Wray, 
1998: 111). 
The problem with accommodationism, and therefore with neo-chartalism (see chapter 
2),  is  that  within  this  conceptual  framework  “liquidity  preference  explanations  [are] 
relegated to the sideline” (Lavoie, 2006: 17) precisely because the value (price, purchasing 
power) of money is assumed to be somehow exogenous. This is simply wrong. As a matter 
of fact neither the government nor the central bank – the suppliers – are in the condition to 
control the price of money by simply declaring unilaterally and ab origine its value or by 
setting how much they are willing to pay for the purchase of goods and services (including 
32 They argue in this respect that though it may be incorrect to speak of money’s scarcity, provided that it can  
be created ‘out of thin air’, “there may indeed be scarcity of finance, especially for particular groups of 
borrowers” (Dow, 2006: 45).
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the purchase of bank debts) when they spend ‘by keystroke’; nor, vice versa, is the private 
sector  (the  people)  able  to  set  the  margins  with  its  demands.  Things  are  much  more 
complex: to be able to price the currency the monetary authorities ought to relate to the 
market via bond sales, accommodate its demands and negotiate the manifold interests on  
money accruing to banks. Behind the production of money are indeed privatised interests, 
that  is,  bank  interest-earning  credits, and  “as  far  as  credit  creation  is  concerned,  the 
relevant [interest] rate” is not the central bank prime rate but “the loan rate, which is set by 
the banks themselves” (Dow, 2006: 41). And so,  the central bank’s prime rate or, more 
specifically, the repo rate (the marginal cost of liquidity) is constructed in response to the  
loan rate (i.e. the market rate for credit) as a defensive strategy to counter ‘market forces’, 
not as an action able to determine ex ante the general level of prices. The resulting mark-up 
between repo rate (setting the price of the currency) and loan rate (setting the price of 
credit) gives us a magnitude of what economists call “lender’s risk”. Crucially, this risk is 
determined neither by the monetary authorities nor by the market; in fact, it is inherently 
undetermined and undeterminable,  uncertain, dependent  on banks’ liquidity  preference, 
which is in turn expression of historically-specific property relations in their making. 
In this struggle, far from being passive intermediaries and go-betweens (Gnos, 2006: 
96; Rossi, 2006: 122) that merely supply money on demand, banks ration their credit on 
the basis of collateral values and actively engage in speculative operations (see Heinsohn 
and Steiger, 2000; 2006; 2009; Werner, 2005). Some of these banks have grown to the 
extent that they can no longer be seen as mere banks, as they are “very large, globally 
active  banking  firms  that  operate  via  bank holding  companies  in  numerous  retail  and 
wholesale markets” (Dymski, 2010: 75). The financial operations of these “megabanks” 
(ibid.) involve investments in private equity firms, proprietary trading, leveraged buyouts, 
predatory takeovers, asset stripping, predatory lending, acquisitions & fusions, besides the 
negotiation  of  securitised  debts  and  bets  of  every  sort  that  go  under  the  name  of 
derivatives.  This  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  financial  intermediation  of  savings  and 
investments. These banks are “now the rulers regulators and of commerce, and they almost 
control the fortunes of states”. They are primarily responsible for the current global crisis, 
and yet  they are also the firms that  have benefited the most  from it,  because they are 
allegedly “too big to fail” (Ferguson and Johnson, 2010). In the name of this perverted 
ideology, in the past few years we have witnessed the greatest transfer of wealth from 
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‘public’ to ‘private’ in modern history (see Hudson, 2012), as exemplified by the politics of 
fiscal austerity for the masses and the converse politics of credit largesse for the banks 
(disguised as ‘quantitative easing’). Perhaps not everybody will be dead in the long run. E 
chi vuol esser lieto sia.
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PART II
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CHAPTER 4 
The significance of money: outline of a non-sense
What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of  
human relations which have been rhetorically and poetically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and  
which, after long usage, seem to people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we  
have forgotten are illusions;  they are metaphors that have become worn out  and have been drained of  
sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as  
coins (Nietzsche, On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense, quoted in Sedgwick, 2007: 5).
I reflected that every coin in the world is a symbol of those famous coins which forever glitter in history and  
fable (Borges, The Zahir).
We humans sometimes make mountains out of molehills. But only God and his opposite number can make 
something out of nothing. Maybe alchemists can make gold out of tin, but they cannot make tin out of what  
Poe’s Jupiter calls “no tin”. For us the terrible dictum – that nothin’ will come of nothin’ – seems to hold true. 
Except, that is, in the shadowy realms of aesthetics and monetary policy (Shell, 1982: 14). 
PREMISE. Money is an institution, no one can doubt it. Yet everyone seems to forget it all 
the time, and perhaps with a reason. If truth, as Lacan said, should be conceived as ‘that 
which punches a hole in knowledge’, then the institution should be conceived as that which 
punches a hole in truth, de facto opening it, drawing the memories of our experiences out 
of it and making it hollow, similar to a Platonic chora33, a receptacle of forms, a movable  
33 The Greek term chora  refers to ‘an empty expanse’, but also to ‘the space lying between two places or 
limits’, that is, a hiatus. The hiatus originating in the institution is a ‘third’ symbolic dimension which is at  
once  the  true  locus  of  Nothing  and  the  real  genesis  of  Power  (Power  is  in-between,  ubiquitous).  This 
symbolic hiatus makes truth real, objective,  intelligible, but at the same time it creates a tension between 
‘what is known to be true’ and ‘what is comprehended as real’.  And so, the separation of records – ‘la 
separazione  dei  registri’ –  between truth and  reality  also creates  an unintelligible  abyss  of  alienation,  a 
bottomless gulf, abode of demons and evil spirits, where the diabolic resides (see Panagia, 2001). Whence an 
insurmountable hermeneutical problematic. 
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host of metaphors. For the institution is always the institution of a metaphorical hole that 
makes truth (expressible as) real. But what is more, not only does the institution make truth 
real: it also makes truth illusory (in the same way as money makes the economy both real 
and financial). This is due to the fact that a metaphor entails the production of meaning – 
i.e. it entails significance – but is also “the site of a constant forgetting” (see Panagia, 2001: 
59),  that is,  source of alienation.  The institution is  there,  always there,  immutable and 
familiar, and yet the more we look at it the more it becomes uncanny – unheimlich34 – as 
we realise that the whole thing is intractable and protean: a  non-sense that comes out of  
nothing and has no history. And so, as we gaze into the abyss originating in the institution, 
we discover that the latter makes truth real, but it also makes nothing real. That is to say, 
the institution makes nothing really real, casting everything in the shadow of a doubt and 
under the spell of an illusion – which is also why it makes everything nearly real, that is, 
virtual. 
Virtual is precisely something which is not really real and yet nearly real (i.e. near to, 
contiguous to, real), as it displays the salient qualities of the real – namely the capacity to 
produce a certain, objective, effect – without being a ‘naturally given’, a positive datum, 
but a socially constructed  factum, made by men. The virtual refers to the “immensity of  
forms” (Legendre, 2005: 190): it is where imaginary limits to our imagination are instituted 
and  where  the  social  imaginary  takes  shape  (see  Castoriadis,  1997).  Our  reality  is 
accordingly  one  populated  by  phantasmagorical  entities,  or  forms,  of  which  ‘man’ is 
nothing but one. In this virtual world, man is imaginarily instituted as a finite entity, and 
this is not for banal reasons connected to his mortality, but for philosophical reasons: “man 
is a ‘finite being’ because he can create nothing. […] Man’s finiteness means this and only 
this: that he cannot make an electron exist out of nothing” (Castoriadis, 1997: 199). This 
fundamental truth is captured by the principle of conservation: nothing is created, nothing 
is destroyed, everything is transformed. The problem with this truism is that ‘nothing’ too 
has to be instituted as an imaginary limit of some sort in order to be part of this reality: that  
is, nothing has to be given a form. In fact, man can create nothing, and he does so when he 
creates “institutions, poems, music, tools, languages – or monstrosities” (Castoriadis, 1997: 
34 Das Unheimliche, the Uncanny, is a Freud’s neologism that stands for “the opposite of the familiar”.  It is  
worth noting in this respect that “the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of 
thing in terms of another” (Lakoff, 1980: 5), that is, to make familiar the unfamiliar, knowable the unknown. 
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199). In short, he creates nothing when he creates eidos. This is why in this virtual world 
man is also imaginable as an ‘infinite being’.
An eidos, says Castoriadis (1997: 195), “comes from nothing and out of nowhere”, “it 
does not have a provenance but is an advent”: an eidos is creation of the other (i.e. of the 
new). In Castoriadis’ discourse, an eidos is a “social imaginary signification” by means of 
which we, as a collectivity, are able to give form to our sociality and provide sense to our 
experience. An eidos, properly speaking, represents nothing since it signifies itself: it is in 
other words a reflexive, self-indicating form (an index sui) that institutes a way of doing 
and making in the world. Now, according to Castoriadis, the fundamental property of a 
signification  is  indeterminateness  and  indefiniteness35:  “we  can  describe  it  only  as  an 
indefinite skein of interminable referrals to something other than (than what would appear 
to be stated directly)” (Castoriadis, 1997: 243). In this respect, “a signification is nothing in 
itself;  it  is only a gigantic loan”,  a “quid pro quo” (Castoriadis, 1997: 244; 248): it  is 
something  for something,  ‘that  which  a  party  receives  (or  is  promised)  in  return  for 
something he does or gives or promises’, a permutation ad infinitum. 
A  signification  is  therefore  a  peculiar  sign  –  in  fact,  a  sign-complex  –  whose 
significance cannot be grasped by the naïve dichotomy  signifier-signified. In Saussure’s 
conceptualisation, an act of signification is one “whereby encoded signs are given certain 
meanings depending upon context” (Silverman and Torode, 1980: 256-7). The problem 
with  this  conceptual  framework  is  that  “it  assumes  that  meaning  is  not  processual  or 
emergent but given and determinant. Second, it implies that meaning resides ultimately in 
what the signifiers signifies or, put more directly, that meaning is directed towards the 
signified” (Silverman and Torode, 1980: 257). A signification, on the other hand, does not 
invest with meaning a structure of signified ‘out there’ but is  itself  a “moving play of 
signifiers” (Barthes, quoted in Silverman and Torode, 1980: 257), a continuous emergence 
of meanings without reference to anything signified: it is the structuration from within of a 
symbolic network, a “metaphorical mapping” (see Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). And so, a 
signification (an eidos, an institution) is always essentially tropic36, of the same kind of the 
35 “A signification is indefinitely determinable (and the ‘indefinitely’ is obviously essential) without thereby 
being determined.   It  can  always be  marked  out,  provisionally assigned  as  an  identitary  element  to  an  
identitary  relation  with  another  identitary  element  (this  is  the  case  in  designation),  and  as  such  be  ‘a 
something’ as  the  starting  point  for  an  open  series  of  successive  determinations.  These  determinations, 
however, in principle never exhaust it. What is more, they can, and always do, force us to reconsider the  
initial ‘something’ and lead us to posit it as ‘something else’, turning by this very fact, or in order to bring it 
about, the relations by means of which the initial determination had been made” (Castoriadis, 1997: 346).
36 In this respect, it is interesting to note that the Greek word tropos is related to the root of the verb trepein, 
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metaphor. 
Indeed, “the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in 
terms  of  another”  (Lakoff,  1980:  5).  Through  metaphors  we  do  not  merely  figure  an 
external brute reality, but we construct reality in the first place by instituting  identities – 
‘sign-complexes  for sign-complexes’ –  between  the  contents  of  our  experiences.  The 
outcome of these  semioses  are gestalts,  metaphorically structured concepts (Lakoff and 
Johnson, 1980). The German word Gestalt stands for ‘shape’, or ‘form’, and refers to the 
essence of a form in its wholeness. A gestalt is a ‘whole’ that we experience as more basic 
than  its  parts  (see  Lakoff,  1980:  70).  Crucially,  a  gestalt  specifies  and  deepens  our 
experience of things by articulating a sense of causation among them, thus making us 
perceive them as a whole, and in their wholeness/relatedness. In Hegelian phenomenology, 
a  gestalt  is  precisely  the  synthesis  through  which  subjectivity  is  able  to  overcome 
differences  (i.e.  that  which  negates itself)(see  Knafo,  2002).  This  synthetic  whole, 
however, is not just more (greater) than the sum of its parts, but is other that its parts, that 
is, irreducible to a set of properties, reasons, or building blocks of meaning. A whole is not 
an ensemble: it cannot be reduced to an identitary logic. And yet a whole is always the 
institution of an identity of signification – what an absurdity!  
This preliminary remark will probably sound like a  delirium  to the reader, and with 
good reasons. My aim is indeed to ‘get off the track’ (this is what the Latin word delirium 
means) and try to outline a new discourse on money capable of making sense of its many 
contradictions – indeed a discourse to give form to money’s non-sense. In walking through 
this perilous path, I am heartened by the words of the poet: if the fool would persist in his  
folly he would become wise. Also,  the hours of folly are measured by the clock, but of  
wisdom: no clock can measure37. 
The ontological problematic of the institution
What is an institution? What type of hole does money punch in truth? “Institutions”, writes 
the well-known anthropologist Mary Douglas, “bestow sameness” (quoted in Mirowski, 
1994:  14).  In  the  same  vein,  Castoriadis  states  that  “[t]he  institution  is  always  the 
institution of the norm”, and as such it “brings identity into being, for the first time in the 
meaning ‘to turn’, ‘to direct’, ‘to change’, ‘to alter’.
37 William Blake, The marriage of Heaven and Hell.
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history of the world, by bringing into being the identical as rigorously identical. In this 
sense, ‘full’ identity exists if and only it is instituted” (Castoriadis, 1997: 205). Therefore, 
adds Castoriadis (1997: 205-6), “the institution itself can exist only as a norm of identity, 
the identity of the institution with itself, for it can exist only by being itself what it decrees 
as having to be:  the identity of the norm with itself which is posited by the norm so that  
there  can  be  a  norm of  self-identity”.  Hence  Simmel’s  cryptic  statement:  “[m]oney is 
therefore one of those normative ideas that obey the norm that they themselves represent” 
(Simmel, 1990: 122). 
What does this all mean? Prima facie, a very simple thing: the institution is always the 
institution of an identity that is at once a norm of identity, therefore an identity that is not 
only spatial  but especially temporal,  as it  ought to  stay identical  all  the time,  de facto 
contradicting  the  very  essence  of  time,  i.e.  change.  The  institution  thus  makes  truth 
objective, monolithic, immutable, de facto bending the reality of change by creating a rift  
of time: once instituted  as a whole, ‘money (in space)  is  money (in time)’. This simple 
truth – money is money – connotes a particular reality: not an abstract, onto-logical reality 
but a concrete, historical one that we call normality. This normality is glowing, like a black 
hole, and even dazzling, making us blind. And yet, precisely because it is so radiant and 
magnetising, we are so attracted to it and are so within it that we are in the condition to see 
through it and make it intelligible. That is, we can spot within the brute datum of money’s 
normality the factum of a monetary normativity, the institution of an index sui, of a self-
referential ‘idea’ (eidos) of money. This factum has nothing of the ‘naturally given’ but is 
by definition a men’s product: i.e. a historically-specific and socially-contextual form. 
Now, despite what hardcore inductivists may believe, facts never speak for themselves, 
and are difficult to treat both practically and theoretically, precisely because their apparent 
normality goes in tandem with a subterranean normativity – a historical ‘making-of’ that 
ought  to  be  made  intelligible.  A money-form  makes  no  exception.  Ontologically,  the 
primary  difficulty  in  dealing  with  an  institutional  form  such  as  money  is  rather 
straightforward: when an institution brings  identity into being, by the same token it also 
brings difference into being. In this case, the problem with articulating a discourse on the 
essence of money stems from the fact  that  money institutes at  once a  separating limit 
between what is money and what is not and a  uniforming measure  for combining and 
exchanging the items of these two opposing series (or onto-logical sets). In this respect, 
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says Simmel, money necessarily plays a  dual role, which “consists, on the one hand, in 
measuring the value relations of goods exchanged and, on the other, in being exchanged 
with these goods and thus itself becoming a quantity subject to measurement. Money is 
measured by the goods against which it is exchanged and also by money itself” (Simmel, 
1990: 122).
Thus money stands as  the measure  and means of  exchange above valuable objects;  and 
because  its  services  initially  require  a  valuable  representative  and  give  value  to  their  
representative, money is ranked with those objects and is subsumed under the norms that are 
themselves derived from money (Simmel, 1990: 122).  
Put crudely,  in order to be measure and medium of exchange, money must first  of all 
constitute itself historically and contextually as  value or, to be more specific, as  the sole  
and exclusive form of value – that is,  uniform value. “Money”, adds Simmel, “derives its 
content from its value; it is value turned into a substance [and not vice versa, nb], the value 
of things without the things themselves” (Simmel, 1990: 121). 
“Money”,  says  Simmel  (1990:  121),  “is  simply  ‘that  which  is  valuable’”.  The 
recognition that money is value, however, does not solve the ontological problematic of 
money’s dual role but only complicates it.  Indeed, as a  reification of value (i.e.  ‘value 
turned into substance’), money institutes an identity of uniformity (i.e. true sameness, ‘the 
identical as rigorously identical’) and difference (i.e. true otherness, or radical alterity) by 
bringing together “two mutually independent categories through which our conceptions 
become images of the world” (Simmel, 1990: 59): respectively, ‘being’ and ‘value’. And 
so, as we openly acknowledge the simple truth that ‘money is money’, we are already 
coming to subtly recognise the inner normativity of its ‘being of value’, i.e. the fact that 
‘money is value’. That is to say, we realise that the onto-logical identity ‘money is money’ 
rests  in  fact  on  an  ana-logical  formula,  a  metaphor  that  reads  ‘money  is value’.  This 
introduces us to a more complex duplicity, for we now understand money in terms of value 
and vice versa, and yet precisely because this analogy is based on a social construction, we 
are still able to discern a fundamental diversity between these two domains: as a result, we 
agree that money is value, but we also think that money is not really value, for we know 
that  true value is  something other  than money,  something lying somewhere  else.  This 
duplicity – in fact, this  deceptive  understanding – of money is again the working of the 
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institution, responsible as it were for establishing a norm of identity which sets at once 
‘that which is value’ (uniformity) and ‘that which is other than value’ (difference) (see also 
Dumont, 1986). 
In  this  respect,  it  is  important  to  point  out  that  ‘being  other  than value’  only 
superficially – when taken abstractly in itself – means ‘being not value’; on the contrary, if 
we consider ‘what is other than value’ in its instituted relatedness with ‘what is value’, we 
can clearly see how ‘being other than value’ means to be another value, and possibly new 
value (the reader will recall in this respect that in chapter 3 money has been analytically  
defined as ‘net worth’). That is to say, the possibilities for the existence of both ‘value’ and 
‘another  value’ are  originally  contained together  in  the  very  institution  of  money.  Put 
crudely, money sets up a quid pro quo of values (which is also why money breeds moral  
confusion, see Graeber, 2011). After all,  quid pro quo  is what monetary exchange is all 
about; in the performance of an exchange, money is indeed experienced by subjectivity as 
being insofar as it is becoming something other than itself: money is ex-changing and by 
doing so it is producing social and institutional change. 
For these reasons we say that an institution, such as money, is constraining but also 
enabling, for “the existence of rules implies constraints. However such a constraint can 
open up possibilities: it may enables choices and actions that otherwise would not exist” 
(Hodgson,  2001:  295).  It  is  for  these  reasons  that  institutions  appear  as  being 
“simultaneously  both  objective  structures  ‘out  there’,  and subjective  springs  of  human 
agency ‘in the human head’. Institutions are in this respect like Klein bottles: the subjective 
‘inside’ is simultaneously the objective ‘outside’” (Hodgson, 2001: 296). An institution, 
says Castoriadis (1984: 240), “constitutes, within brute reality, that in relation to which 
nothing can be done, and that in relation to which some kind of making/doing is possible”. 
In other words, in virtue of the institution we can rationalise in a sense our experience of 
the ‘other’ and become able to meaningfully relate with one another, and act socially in the 
world. But crucially, what we can achieve with an institution is always limited to an extent: 
that is to say, not everything becomes possible but only ‘some kind of making/doing’ can 
be done. An institution, in other words, is the  instrumentality of a change that is always 
finalised in a sense. As such, the institution is never merely a means but also ultimately and 
end in  itself.  In  money  this  fundamental  duplicity  is  reflected  in  an  unsolved 
epistemological hiatus that takes on many forms and is reproduced through a stratification 
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of discourses as a tension between: measure of value and value in itself; (state-engendered) 
money of account and (market-driven) medium of exchange, or claim; promise of payment 
(I  Owe You) and means of payment  (I  Don’t Owe You Anymore);  debt  (liability)  and 
commodity (asset); and so on. In most cases scholars do not recognise the existence of 
such an epistemological tension is their discourses: that is, they assume money to be a 
phenomenon of a dual nature without ever realising that its multiple dualities are in fact a 
reflection of their schizophrenic understanding.
As an example, let’s consider Ingham again. As he argues (see chapter 1), money is at 
once an infrastructural power to measure and e despotic power to claim (notably, here the 
claim  stands  for  a  number  of  different  notions,  such  as  ‘credit’,  ‘purchasing  power’, 
‘money-proper’, ‘means of payment’ and, to an extent, also ‘store of value’ and ‘medium 
of exchange’. The money-claim is in effect a politicised version of the orthodox money-
medium whereby “the medium is the message”). However, aside from the assumption of 
an ontological primacy of money of account, Ingham offers no explanation whatsoever of 
how  the  despotic  power  to  claim  ensues  eo  ipso  from  the  infrastructural  power  to 
commensurate.  Rather,  throughout  his  discourse,  we  constantly  witness,  apparently 
insurmountable, a marked logical discontinuity between the measure and the claim: what 
explains one cannot be exploited to explain the other, so that we can never decide once and 
for all whether money is the measure of value hence value, or vice versa. That is to say, we 
are provided no causal  mechanism, no connection,  no argument other than a dogmatic 
assertion of the primacy of the measure to say which of the two comes first. 
Of course, this analytical discontinuity runs much deeper as it invests the very ‘natures’ 
of  the  measure  and  the  claim.  Indeed,  ontologically,  the  measure  presents  itself  as  a 
logically necessary representational sign,  i.e. a sign which is based on an identity of form 
anterior to the content of the social relation it  denominates  (or else denomination cannot 
occur).  In  other  words,  as  a  money  of  account,  money  functions  as  an  ex-ante  sign 
necessary  to  quantify  and  denominate  an  ex-post  price  ratio,  as  in  a  naïve  signifier-
signified semantics. Accordingly, money as measure is subsumable under the category of 
the ‘systemic precondition’, an instrumentality of society at large whose rationality resides 
beyond human agency and cannot be appropriated by the subject. From this perspective, as 
a recent metaphor sums up, money (of account) is “to the economy what the operating 
system is  to  the  computer”  (Cartelier,  2010:  24).  The  claim,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a 
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logically  contingent iconic sign  (see  for  instance  Konings,  2011b) or  emblem  (Amato, 
2010): namely,  it  is  the  embodiment of  a  promise,  a right,  the sign qua signature of a 
contract. In other words, in contrast to the measure, the claim is never a nominal sign but a  
real token, the creation uno actu of an identity between the symbol and the content – it is 
the document of a “reality that really exists” (Foucault, 1966). Most importantly, unlike the 
measure, the claim is also a potential object of monetization, as it can be stored, spent, 
circulated, depending on the guarantee of its capacity to conserve itself (i.e. to store value) 
and demand redemption in the future. In this sense, the claim is a value and as such it is 
never neutral  for it  can and must be appropriated and claimed against the world to be 
properly itself; in short, the claim is not an instrumentality but a finality and a fully-fledged 
power (what economists simplistically conceptualise as ‘purchasing power’). 
In this respect, it comes as no wonder that, despite endorsing ab origine the ontological 
primacy of  the  money of  account,  heterodox economists  concentrate  their  analyses  on 
money as a claim in its many facets (see part I): because the analysis of the money-claim is 
what comes nearest to our experience of money as value, and hence what best elucidates 
money as money (money qua money). This said, it would be nonetheless a great mistake to 
sustain that the notion of claim is more appropriate than the notion of measure for our 
study of money; after all, given the discontinuities between the two notions, we have no 
ground to endorse the primacy of either of the two. Besides, what is truly at stake is not to 
resolve  the  alleged  duality  of  money  (which  is  only  the  mirror  of  a  schizophrenic 
understanding) but to get things straight and look at the reality of money for what it is, 
because however we see it, truth is that ‘money  is money’: an  unitary phenomenon all  
along. 
And so we might not want to choose between measure and claim and, instead, accord 
the  possibility  that  in  the  same way as  grammar  and  speech  are  constitutive  parts  of 
language (despite them pertaining to different levels of ontology), so measure and claim 
may partake of the same phenomenon of ‘money’.  We must  be wary,  however,  not  to 
succumb to the vagaries of a fragmented science that does too easily indulge in ambiguities 
and ad hoc explanations to conceal the many hiatuses that crack its general discourse: as 
Hodgson (2001) claims, we need some sort of “ontological unification”. However, I shall 
add, we also need some sort of epistemological and methodological unification. In fact, our 
purpose should be the recovery of a unity of understanding rather than the mere definition 
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of a unit of analysis. And so, to avoid the risks of an ontological problematisation per se – 
of a dance on the edge of the abyss that might well end with a dramatic, endless, fall – we 
ought to stick to a pragmatic research question, a ratio that will keep us from indulging too 
much in the sublime geometries of the metaphysics at the horizon of our investigation. This 
question or,  better,  interrogation,  should not concern the  nature but  the  significance of 
money, and so we should ask “what money means to us”: for money is and does what we 
make of it, and therefore it is only by making sense of the significance of its institution that 
we can investigate the ‘possibilities’ of money, and namely what we can make with it and 
why we should do so.
The epistemological problem of historical specificity
To include a study of money into a larger discourse on the significance of its phenomenon 
is easier said than done: unlike a discourse on the ‘nature’ of money which, for obvious 
reasons, ‘yearns for infinity’ as it aims to identify its  universal character, a discourse on 
the significance of money ought to take into account the fact that, more mundanely, the 
content-meaning of money is necessarily bound to a certain socio-historical context, and 
thus possesses also a  particular character. Therefore, to begin with, a discourse on the 
significance  of  money  ought  to  call  for  a  reflection  on  the  problem of  the  historical 
specificity of forms of money. Simply stated, this problem “first acknowledges the fact that 
there are different types of socio-economic system, in  historical time and geographical 
space”  (Hodgson,  2001:  23).  Accordingly,  money  would  not  be  always  the  same but, 
depending on the historical context, ‘what it is’ and ‘what it does’ would change, even 
dramatically. 
Now,  it  must  be  pointed  out  that,  if  seriously  handled,  the  problem  of  historical 
specificity does not imply a neglect of general theorising in favour of a strictly inductive 
empiricism  or  historicism;  instead,  it  demands  that  we  devise  a  methodology  for 
comprehending the ‘general’ (the structure) in relation to the ‘particular’ (the agency), as 
occurring in our experience of the phenomenon at stake, in a way as to overcome a naïve 
conceptual opposition of ‘universal’ and ‘particular’ and an equally simplistic approach to 
the philosophical problem of Universals. In this respect, Dodd argues that to “overcome the 
problem of generality in defining money requires establishing criteria which distinguish 
100
money from non-money in different societies” (Dodd, 1994: xxii). “Significantly”, he adds, 
“this distinction arises not from comparison of monetary and non-monetary forms but from 
examination of the network of social relationships integral to each as a type of exchange. 
[…] It follows that to understand what is distinctive about money requires reference to the 
network  of  social  relationships  which  makes  its  transaction  possible,  not  to  object 
exchanged or the exchange relationship itself” (1994: xxiii). According to Dodd, it is thus 
possible  to  provide  an  empirical  study  of  monetary  forms  and produce  an  analysis of 
monetary networks that  would include their  spatial  as well  as temporal  properties.  Put 
simply,  this  would  mean  that,  methodologically,  we could  eventually  know money  by 
taking into account the types of social networks in which its particular forms are embedded 
and,  hence,  by  enlarging the  unit  of  analysis  so  as  to  include  the  historically-specific 
‘political economies’ that these networks articulate. 
Needless to say, this sounds very sensible but, alas, is not immune from epistemological 
critique. In fact, if seriously examined, the problem of historical specificity raises a delicate 
issue about how we can possibly outline a comprehensive theory of money provided that 
our knowledge of it,  too, is historically specific.  To properly handle such an issue, we 
cannot  but reconsider  our studies (qua  analyses)  of both society and its  institutions in 
relation to our knowledge (qua interpretation) of history: in other words, we must think of 
society  (including  our  own society)  as  history.  To  be  sure,  this  requires  a  substantial 
hermeneutical effort since society,  insofar as history,  cannot be merely analysed and/or 
described from the external standpoint of a hypothetically neutral observer, as if it were an 
empirical datum, but ought to be narrated as part of a discourse and, reciprocally, must be 
necessarily  read as an enigmatic text (see Legendre, 2005). In the specific, one must be 
able to produce an ‘archaeology’ of those “systems of simultaneity” or “epistemes” (see 
Foucault, 1966; Mirowski, 1989) articulating cosmologies of knowledge about the world at 
large  and  money  in  the  specific.  This  is  because  money  ‘as  we  know  it’ does  not 
correspond, for instance, to  nomisma as the Greek knew it. Indeed, as von Reden (1995: 
173) has correctly pointed out, the Greek term nomisma is “identical neither with coinage 
nor  with  money”,  but  corresponds  to  a  peculiar  conception  of  ‘currency’ that  can  be 
epitomized as ‘that which is just in distribution’ (see chapters 5 and 6). And so, as a rule of  
thumb, a study of money must necessarily encompass a hermeneutics because depending 
on the historical context people will  valuate things differently and, accordingly, they will 
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develop different categories and give original meanings to their measures and media of 
value. 
Besides, there is a fundamental linguistic issue to consider. When the scholar treats the 
words ‘nomisma’, ‘moneta’, ‘denaro’, ‘argent’ as synonyms with the word ‘money’, and 
hence subsume them under the domain of the latter, she forgets that all these words are in 
fact loci of other (interrelated) semantic domains unfolding constellations of meanings that 
are reminiscent of other contexts and cosmologies. This is why what the Italians mean by 
‘moneta’ does not entirely match what the Anglo-Saxons mean by ‘money’ or what the 
French mean by ‘monnaie’, though all these words share the same etymological roots and 
broadly refer to the same phenomenon. As a matter of fact, these words possess a peculiar 
historical depth that we can only access genealogically, with the benefit of hindsight, with 
the  purpose  to  understand  how  their  different  historical  lineages,  and  the  different 
discourses underpinning them, have brought to their present common sense. That is to say, 
we can understand the differences among money-forms only by elucidating their specific 
meanings in relation to their present common sense38. Clearly, to this purpose ‘analysis’ per 
se  is  meaningless,  since  the  understanding  of  a  word-for-money,  such  as  for  instance 
‘nomisma’, cannot be separated from a hermeneutical  deconstruction and a genealogical 
reconstruction of how and why –  in what sense  – this particular word has grounded the 
past experiences of men in specific ways that have brought to its present meaningfulness. 
Critically, most scholars, oblivious of this crucial epistemological issue, are culpable for 
essentialism,  as  they  tend  to  de-contextualise  (and  de-textualise)  the  many  words  for 
‘money’ and treat them as mere synonyms, historical expressions of what they  make of 
current money on the strength of the idea, irrefutable and irresistible, that all these words 
stick to forms that (despite their  peculiarities) essentially enjoy the same  moneyness:  a 
truth that transcends their historical specificity. This truth is thus placed at the foundation 
of  some  definition  of  money  that  normally  dismisses  the  complex  problematic  of  its 
institution,  and namely how it  brings a unity of (identity and difference of)  value into 
being. On the contrary, the terms of the question are reversed so that a prior identity – and 
namely  an exchange of  equivalent  values  – appears  as  instituting money and not  vice 
versa. Put it simply, value is assumed to be  given, and prior to money. As a result, the 
38 This can be seen as a variant of Benedetto Croce’s famous aphorism: “all history is contemporary history,  
that is to say that people in different times and places look to the past in the light of the problems they  
confront in their present” (quoted in Cox, 2002: 44).
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factum of the institution of money is fixed into the datum of an abstract essence, or nature, 
manifesting  itself  into  a-historical and  pre-political features  of  social  life  (such  as 
exchangeability and commensurability). 
Because of  this  essentialist  fallacy,  ontological  primacy gets  normally assigned to  a 
universal  essence that  identifies at  once a  universal  function and  purpose as  well  as a 
universal substance, giving altogether shape to a universal form of money which is said to 
perform throughout history without exception. Needless to say, under these circumstances 
history is no longer the con-text but a pre-text to legitimise a supreme truth and perennial 
philosophy  of  money.  When  this  happens  we  witness  the  birth  of  a  most  dangerous 
philosophy of history: a ‘historical universalism’ (i.e. the idea that all history is the same), 
often  coupled  with  a  ‘rationalistic  finalism’ (i.e.  the  idea  of  Historical  Necessity,  and 
namely  that  ‘all  that  is  real  is  rational’),  blending  together  the  worst  aspects  of 
structuralism  and  functionalism,  and  namely  their  incapacity,  from  respectively  an 
objectivist-systemic  and  a  subjectivist-behavioural  perspective,  to  make  sense  of  how 
forms historically change. Indeed, under the epistemological arrangements of a structural-
functionalist type a change of forms is never  explained but is at best  justified, often by 
recurring to teleological argumentations about the progressive historical unfolding of the 
‘purest’ type of the form39.   
Admittedly, both the orthodox and heterodox traditions of economics have shown an 
essentialist  attitude and a  positivist  mentality  towards  the money phenomenon (though 
with different degrees). On the one hand, the orthodox envisages in the commodity the true 
form  of  money;  accordingly,  it  identifies  the  substance  of  money  with  merchandise 
(wealth) and its primary function – proxy of its essence – with the medium of exchange. 
Finally, as a corollary, the orthodox sees money as a creature of the market. The heterodox 
position, on the other hand, argues that money is a form of credit/debt, hence a promise of 
payment substantiated by trust. From this alternative perspective, the purpose of money is 
to  measure  the  value  of  debts  so  as  to  enable  the  final  settlement  of  obligations; 
accordingly, money is first of all the money of account (and then the means of payment), a 
function that must be necessarily instituted by an authority (not by the market). 
The major limit of this transversal  modus operandi  is that, by identifying an  essence 
39 See  for  instance  Simmel’s  argument  about  “the  historical  development  of  money  from  substance  to 
function”, that is, from material money to credit money (Simmel, 1990: 168-203), or Ingham’s modes of  
monetary production culminating with the pure capitalist credit-money system (Ingham, 2004: 78).
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with a  function and a  purpose, it paradoxically makes irrelevant both the  finality  of the 
thing whose essence is in question and the finalities of those who happen to handle such a 
thing. The dead end of the essentialist way is precisely ‘technological determinism’ which, 
notably,  might  also  assume  the  more  sophisticated  contours  of  an  ‘institutional 
evolutionism’: either way we face an underlying refusal to question the  propriety  of an 
institution, for the latter is considered as the by-product of transcendental, technical and 
neutral  properties, or the stratification of historical habits, propensities and cultural traits 
which are assumed to be responsible in the last instance for determining the course of 
human ‘agency’ as well as the ‘structure’ of social relations. Critically, by leaving no room 
for discussing the appropriateness and justness of an institution – and namely what should 
be its proper purpose and why – this epistemological stance de facto delegitimizes, or even 
annihilates, political and ethical concerns. This is why most of today’s intellectual battles 
about the nature and purpose of money, to use the wise words of William Faulkner, are not  
even fought, and the field only reveals to man his own folly and despair, and victory is an  
illusion of philosophers and fools.
Now,  provided  that  essentialism,  in  its  many  ramifications,  does no  justice  to  our 
understanding of the money phenomenon, this does mean that we ought to drop each and 
every definition of money and get  away with whatever  notion of  essence.  Even if  we 
would, we couldn’t because “[w]ithout some concept of essence, we are unable to make 
categorizations of sameness and difference that are basic to science” (Hodgson, 2001: 35). 
When we think in terms of essence, we resolve the  becoming  of an institution onto its 
being, which is tantamount to abolishing time and neglecting the historical emergence of 
the Other – in short, we become unable to make a theory of social and institutional change. 
The idea of ‘essence’ is a fetish, an idolised representation of the actual identity of forms 
brought about by the institution, because this identity is in fact a unity of sameness and 
otherness. That is to say, in reality, not only do institutions bestow sameness, but by the 
same token they also bestow otherness. The dark side of institutions, however, is bound to 
remain in a state of negation, a Nothing that nonetheless is instituted and given a form, 
imaginable as other than Everything and Anything. Nothing ought to be instituted in order 
to be omitted, de facto serving as an ellipsis of the Other in the social (con)text. This allows 
us  to  rationalise the  tensions  and  contradictions  that  we  normally  experience,  ground 
ourselves on a stable plane, perpetuate the status quo. 
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Rationalisation, however, is fundamental illusory. To ‘rationalise’ means: to bring into 
accord with reason or cause something to seem reasonable; to attribute (one’s actions) to 
rational  and  creditable  motives  without  analysis  of  true  and  especially  unconscious 
motives; to provide plausible but untrue reasons for conduct.  When we rationalise,  we 
accept sameness as a revelation so to speak but, critically, such an acceptation/preservation 
of the order of things does not really provide a resolution to the contradictions that we 
daily endure in the praxis; on the contrary, it further perpetuates the many hiatuses that we 
experience between what is true and what is real,  among which is the epistemological 
hiatus between ‘value’ and ‘another value’ – and hence,  ultimately,  between value and 
value. We  forget  that the institution of money is the institution of conflicting politics of 
value – i.e. of a confrontation with the Other – and so the struggle between value and value 
– i.e. the battle of man with man – gets dissolved in the standing waters of an illusory 
normality that reads: money is money, and nothing can be done about it. 
But  then,  how can we grasp the historical  specificity  of money if  we are bound to 
experience it as a universal form all along? And how can we distinguish among money-
forms if we are doomed to sameness? This immediately redirects us to the ‘problem of 
universals’,  first  raised  by  Plato  in  his  theory  of  forms,  and  calls  for  the  following 
consideration: provided that we cannot safely assume a universal truth about the ultimate 
social function/purpose of money as an ontological premise without incurring into the risks 
of  a  sterile  universalism  and,  in  the  background,  of  technological  determinism  (and 
institutional  evolutionism),  neither  can we simply dismiss a  priori the fact  of  a  trans-
historical  recurrence  of  money,  as  traceable in  the intellectual  testimonies  of  inherited 
thought.  That  is,  we  cannot  neglect  the  persistence  of  an  identity  of  signification –  a 
significance – behind all monies that seems to cut across history, like a Universal that let us 
connect  in  the  same discourse  and  subsume under  the  common  denominator  ‘money’ 
entities (figures, words, forms) that have existed in different contexts and times. 
After all, says the poet, every coin in the world is a symbol of those famous coins which  
glitter in history and fable. By this I mean that whenever we say ‘money’ we express a 
common sense, a knowledge that tacitly enfolds a constellation of meanings, starting from 
and surrounding the central signification ‘money’, that ramify in interrelated (hi)stories: it 
is a social imaginary, a magmatic fluid capable of holding together texts as different and 
distant in time as nomisma, moneta, argent, but also Charon’s obol, Judas’ thirty shekels, 
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and the inexhaustible penny of Isaac Laquedem – the whole of them convening in one, in  
the name of money. We cannot depart from this common sense. As tacit as it might be, it 
resounds in our conscience, irresistible, whenever we speak the word. 
The singularity of money
What  a  puzzle.  Attempting  an  analytical  identification  of  money’s  unifying  essence  is 
bound to give birth to an essentialist ontology and therefore to a positivist epistemology 
incapable of making sense of how and why money, as an institutional form, changes. And 
yet common sense tells us immediately, that is, in an apparently un-mediated fashion, that 
‘money is money’ – whence we cannot escape from the intuitive truth of this identity that 
bestows universality  to  our  experience  of  it.  Money is  one:  this  is  what  naturally and 
normally  comes to mind at first. However,  at  the same time, apparently imperturbable, 
reality leaves traces  all the time  of the existence and interchange throughout history of 
countless  monies  with  different  shapes,  substances,  purposes.  Contra  common  sense, 
reason tells  us that these monies  are always historically-specific,  always particular and 
particularised.  As  a  result,  though  in  truth  (in  subjectivity)  money  is  one,  in  fact  (in 
objectivity)  money is  manifold.  This tension – in fact,  this  contradictory experience or 
‘dialectic’ – between truth and reality and, in particular, between what is known to be true  
and  what  is  comprehended  as  real,  is  continuous  source  of  alienation.  We  know that 
‘money is money’ and hence ‘the one and only’, plain and simple. Yet we understand that 
the value we assign to money varies from person to person, from context to context, so that 
in the end money appears as manifold and complex a phenomenon. As a result, “in our 
everyday practices, we are capable of grasping money as both universal and particular at  
the very same time” (Konings, 2011b). 
Perhaps a way to make a breach into the enigma of money is to further go ‘down in the 
hole’ and recognise that not only is money ‘historically specific’ but it is also ‘socially 
contextual’: that is, not only does the meaning of money change  diachronically  from a 
historically-specific social  system to another,  but it  also changes  synchronically  from a 
social transaction to another (occurring at the same time in the same social system), and it 
may even change within the same social transaction (as counterparts may be motivated by 
completely different reasons). In this respect writes Zelizer (2011: 89): “people employ 
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money  as  a  means  of  creating,  transforming,  and  differentiating  their  social  relations. 
Instead  of  a  single,  fungible  money  that  reduces  social  relations  to  a  thin  common 
denominator, they show us the integration of differentiated monies into the whole range of 
interpersonal ties. As a consequence, people are constantly creating new monies, and they 
do so by segregating different streams of legal tender into funds for distinct activities and 
relations”. In short, within the same context of social interaction, and even within the same 
transaction, people ‘earmark’ money for different  purposes,  de facto attributing specific 
meanings to it (Zelizer, 2011: 90). As Konings (2011b) sums up, “the meaning of money is 
always and necessarily refracted through the specific configurations of social connections 
in  which  it  is  embedded”,  so  that  “[r]ather  than  a  singular  money,  we  have  multiple 
monies,  each  marked  by  concrete,  localized  patterns  of  social  interactions”  (Konings, 
2011b).
At first, the problem of social contextuality seems to merely suggest that, besides taking 
into account the historical specificity of the social  whole  to which money belongs, and 
therefore the  cosmos  in which money is entangled, we pay greater attention to the very 
context of the social  relation  of which money is the central signification, so as to better 
understand the  chaos40 that money generates in the praxis. But this is only the tip of the 
iceberg. Indeed, the recognition that there is no such a thing as ‘one and the same money’ 
in the very same context but only a chaotic plurality of meanings refracted in its contingent 
(multi)form, far from denying the universal character of money (and hence the possibility 
of  outlining  a  cosmology  of  money),  points  directly  to  the  particularity,  or  universal 
uniqueness, of its ‘being-thus’. Indeed, at the contextual level of the money transaction our 
understanding cannot be said to be split between a ‘universal’ and a ‘particular’ money, for 
here there is no room for consciously reflecting. Instead, in the heat of the moment, that is, 
in  action, money,  like  an  emblem,  “incrosta  nell’uomo un segno…che gli  ricorda  che 
qualcosa lo oltrepassa o lo governa, ma con il quale egli entra in relazione” (Legendre, 
2005:  20).  Eventually,  within  the  money  trans-action  uniformity  and  difference  are 
experienced at once as a unity of value, so that unequal things can be thereby exchanged as 
if  they  were  equivalents  (i.e.  of  equivalent  value):  the  wonder  of  the  exchange  of  
equivalents.
40 Please note, chaos, from the Greek word khaos did not originally stand for ‘disorder’ but referred to the 
‘abyss’, the ‘primeval emptiness of the universe’ (Hesiod), ‘the void at the origin of Creation’ (Genesis), the 
‘hiatus’ (see Legendre, 2005).
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In this respect, it is worth noting that according to Saussure, in linguistics (semiology) 
“as in political economy we are confronted with the notion of  value:  both sciences are 
concerned with a system for equating things of different orders” (quoted in Silverman and 
Torode, 1980: 254). And it is not a coincidence that Zelizer recurs to an analogy with 
language to  explain the absence of contradiction between uniformity and difference as 
reached in the money trans-action. As she writes:
[s]een from the top, economic transactions connect with broad, national symbolic meanings 
and  institutions.  Seen  from  the  bottom,  however,  economic  transactions  are  highly 
differentiated, personalised, and local, meaningful to particular relations. No contradictions 
therefore exists between uniformity and diversity: they are simply two different aspects of 
the same transaction. Just as people speak English in a recognisably grammatical way at the  
same time that they pour individual and personal content into their conversations, economic 
actors  simultaneously  adopt  universalising  modes  and  particularising  markers (Zelizer, 
2011: 130-1, my italic). 
In effect, money appears as performing in exchange like a ‘living language’ whilst spoken: 
it is simultaneously a langue defining a syntax41 (a grammar, a code, a universal norm or 
‘measure  of  exchange’ that  enables  a  social  ordering of  values)  and a  parole defining 
speech (a particular claim-form that activates the potential inherent to such a norm). In 
particular,  as  we  speak  ‘money’ at  the  critical  interval  of  the  money  transaction,  the 
‘universalising  mode’ of  the  money-syntax  is  activated by  (and  incarnated  into) the 
‘particularising  marker’  of  the  money-word,  so  that  the  synchronic  and  diachronic 
moments of the money-language come to finally envelop each other (and the verb is made 
flesh). 
Like  language,  money  thus  denotes  a  system  of  signs  (values)  that  seem  to  be 
immutable (fixed like prices) but which are in fact systematically mutating (variable like 
purchasing power).  Using Castoriadis’ words (1997: 353),  it  could be thus argued that 
money, like a language, “is such only inasmuch as it offers speakers [i.e. the bearers of 
money] the possibility of taking their bearings in and through what they say [i.e. what they 
exchange] in order to move within it, to base themselves on the same [i.e. the exchange of 
equivalents] in order to create the other [i.e. new value]”. For in the same way as language 
41 Notably, the word syntax comes from the Greek compound word suntaksis (sun: ‘with’, ‘together’ + taksis: 
‘arrangement’), meaning ‘an ordering together’.  
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as code-syntax provides the ground for its historical transformation as langue by means of 
parole, so money as a  norm42 provides the ground for the historical transformation of its 
form as money by means of new value (what in political economy goes under the name of 
‘capital’).  And so, in each of its synchronic, that is,  current, instances, a money-form is 
being  insofar  as  it  is  becoming  something  other  than  itself:  it  is  a  value  turning  into 
another value.
Hence,  the  universal particularity  of money corresponds to  its  contextual  ability  to 
account for the creation of the other; put crudely, money is always an undetermined form 
open to radical change. I shall term this peculiarity the singularity of money. The notion of 
‘singularity’ is  partially  borrowed from ‘natural sciences’:  mathematical  singularity,  for 
instance, defines a point at which a given mathematical object is not defined or not well-
behaved,  for  example  infinite  or  not  differentiable.  Similarly,  gravitational  singularity 
defines a location with infinite density and zero volume, a place where ‘space’ and ‘time’ 
cease to exist as we know them. This happens for instance at the core of a black hole where 
space-time  has  infinite  curvature  (i.e.  space  is  time)  and  matter  is  crushed  to  infinite 
density under the pull of infinite gravity. In this context, singularity of course matters with 
time; however this time is not sequential, chronological, identitary time (like calendar time 
or mathematical time) but is a significant time, a “time of doing”, a historical time.  In this 
respect, writes Castoriadis (1997: 212), 
the time of doing would not be a time of doing and would not even be a time at all, if it did 
not contain the critical moment, the singularity (my italic) which does not exist ‘objectively’ 
and which will become so only by means of and for the appropriate doing, its occurrence as 
such and the point of its realisation on the calendar being neither certain nor predictable. […] 
In short, this is what the Hippocratic writings call kairos, in terms of which they define time: 
[…]  ‘time  is  that  in  which  there  is  kairos  (propitious  instant  and  critical  interval,  the 
opportunity to take a decision) and kairos is that in which there is not much time’.
Hence,  in  context,  that  is,  at  the  critical  interval  of  the  money  transaction  (kairos), 
“synchrony  is  intrinsically  diachronized  and  diachronizing,  just  as  diachrony  is 
intrinsically synchronized and synchronizing” (Castoriadis, 1997: 216). This means that 
42 As I will argue in the next chapter, the monetary norm is not one that merely denotes the ‘exchange of  
equivalents’ but  one that  connotes  ‘a  measure to exchange for  an exchange with measure’,  and namely 
equality in exchange.
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when performing in exchange, money, like a black hole, explodes the context by bringing 
together in the rush of the moment space and time, bursting meaning out, opening up the 
context in manifold ways, explicating its relatedness to the whole. In so doing, what money 
ultimately does is to institute a meaningful link between the social relation and the social 
whole, between the one and the many. The singularity of money thus consists in its ability  
to bring historical time and space together in context in unique ways that transcend the  
context itself, de facto enabling the creation of a definite space and a due time, and hence  
the creation not just of a single context, but of a hyper-context, a discourse and, ultimately,  
a history of sociality.
In particular, money transcends the context in a twofold sense. On the one hand money 
breaches through the time of the context by meaningfully connecting present and future in 
a certain way that “lulls our disquietude” (via discounting) whilst reciprocally projecting 
the meaningfulness of the past, as engraved into its emblem and manifested in its ‘mark of 
authority’, into a current existence. In money, past, present and future partake of the same 
course.  We  may  term  this  transcendental  property  ‘diachronicity’,  ‘trans-historical 
specificity’ or simply ‘trans-historicity’. On the other hand, money breaches through the 
space of  the  context  by providing a  connection between the  particular  socio-economic 
transaction and the whole of monetary ‘exchanges’ constituting the social order. We may 
term  this  transcendental  property  ‘synchronicity’,  ‘trans-contextuality’ or  else  ‘hyper-
textuality’.
And so, money cannot be seen as a  material43, a historically-determined  product, but 
ought to be intended as a  transcendens,  a transcendental entity that, if anything,  makes 
history and not vice versa. To be sure, to say that money is all in all transcendental – trans-
historical and hype-textual – is not the same as saying that money is ‘above’ or ‘beyond’ 
history and context.  Trans-historical  does not  mean a-historical,  hyper-textual  does  not 
mean  pre-textual,  and  transcendental  does  not  mean  abstract:  the  transcendent  is  not 
loosened from (or  freed  from)  what  it  transcends,  but  rather  embraces it.  The  veritas 
transcendentalis (Heidegger, 1962: 62) of money lies precisely in its singularity, that is, in 
its capacity to embrace the Universal – the  whatness  or ‘quiddity’ – and Particular – the 
thisness or ‘haecceity’ – in a unity that punches a (w)hole in truth whenever the ‘verb’ of 
money is made ‘flesh’, as in the exchange of equivalents. And so, money is  in truth  a 
43 We must never forget that a material is a measurable matter, and money is not measurable (see chapter 5).
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puzzling ‘what is this’, a (w)hole lying in-between. 
“What is this?” “I dunno man, I didn’t do it, but trust me: it’s all about politics”
When I say that money lies ‘in-between’, I am referring to an epistemological hiatus, and a 
phenomenological  conundrum,  that  the  most  basic  human question  –  ‘what  is  this?’ – 
brings  about  in  the world without  ‘solution  of  continuity’.  ‘What  is  this?’ is  the most 
normal of questions and yet the most absurd, because, as American philosopher Alfred 
Korzybski put it crudely,  whatever we say a thing is, it isn’t. As Bohm (1987: 8) pointed 
out in this respect, 
[f]irst of all, whatever we say is words, and what we want to talk about is generally not 
words. Second, whatever we mean by what we say is not what the thing actually is, though it 
may be similar. For the thing is always more than what we mean and is never exhausted by 
our concepts. And the thing is also different from what we mean, if only because no thought 
can be absolutely correct when it is extended indefinitely. 
Money is an index sui, an idea of money, a thought-relation with the Other crystallised into 
an institutional form, a manner of thinking a thing. But money is not the thing already. And 
so, what is money? What is an eidos? An eidos, it has been suggested before, is not merely 
an instrumentality of man but, most importantly, a finality of social life. Through eidei we 
are able to empower our agency, structure our world, and realise  ourselves. The peculiar 
trait  of  the  eidos  is  precisely  its  purposefulness,  its  ability  to  signify  in  a  sense  our 
experience of the world. Crucially, of all  eidei money is possibly a most purposeful and 
most significant one and, needless to say, it shows strong analogies with another key eidos: 
God.  As  Simmel  (1990:  236)  argued in  this  respect,  money “as  the  unifying  point  of  
innumerable sequences of purposes, possesses a significant relationship to the notion of 
God (my italic)”. 
Insofar as money becomes the absolutely commensurable expression and equivalent of all  
values, it rises to abstract heights way above the whole broad diversity of objects; it becomes 
the centre in which the most opposed, the most estranged and most distant things find their 
common  denominator  and  come  into  contact  with  one  another.  Thus,  money  actually 
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provides an elevated position above the particular and a confidence in its omnipotence, just  
as we have confidence in the omnipotence of a highest principle to grant us the particular  
and the baser at any moment and to be able to transform itself into them (Simmel, 1990: 236-
7).
More specifically, money and God are specular forms: “[w]here God promises eternity, 
money promises the world. Where God offers a delayed reward, money offers a reward in 
advance. Where God offers himself as grace, money offers itself as a loan. Where God 
offers spiritual benefits, money offers tangible benefits. Where God accepts all repentant 
sinners who truly believe, money may be accepted by all who are willing to trust in its 
value” (Goodchild, 2007: 12). Both money and God ‘testify’ that truth can never be told  
so as to be understood, and not be believed44. In money’s case, we have seen, truth is the 
‘being of value’; in God’s case, truth is possibly the ‘value of being’. Either way, the eidei  
of money and God, like emblems, carve a sign into men that reminds them that something 
transcends and governs them, and yet it establishes a relation with them (Legendre, 2005). 
The  terms  of  causation  are  here  inversed  because  this  transcendental  ‘something’ is 
experienced as a fetish: upon questioning the eidos and asking ‘what is this’, men cannot 
but acknowledge that they don’t know, because they didn’t do it! Thus men forgot that all  
deities reside in the human breast. 
To comprehend a truth, we ought to deliver it back to the nothing where it properly 
belongs: stated differently, we only comprehend a truth when we eventually overcome it. 
To this purpose, we must necessarily make a phenomenology of truth, that is, a discourse 
on the edge of the abyss in which truth can finally unfold as a unity of analogy, a metaphor 
of that peculiar reality that we experience as normality. A discourse of the phenomenon, 
however,  is  never  ‘neutral’ but  is  itself  finalised  and  hence  it  necessarily  delineates  a 
politics. Critically, a phenomenology that does not purposefully aim to outline a political 
discourse  is  not  a  proper  phenomenology  but  an  apology  of  the  phenomenon,  and  a 
surrendering to the aesthetics of the phenomenon. This is particularly obvious when we 
confront money. As it has been argued so far in many an occasion, money is able to stand 
for (as a measure and a medium) because it is socially recognised as being worth (for) – 
worth for doing/making in a meaningful, political way – in a way that even those who may 
repudiate the political purposes that it serves cannot but acknowledge its objective power 
44 Again, William Blake, The marriage of Heaven and Hell.
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to serve political purposes. Notably, even if the purpose of money may change from agent 
to agent,  and from context to context (e.g.  serve public rather than private interests or 
certain  private  interests  instead  of  others),  its  purposefulness  nevertheless  remains  a 
universal  trait. Namely, whenever a certain money is used in an economic transaction, a 
unique  political  action  is  brought  to  an  end  and  the  social  order  is  consequently 
transformed.  Money,  in short,  enables the actuation of a plurality of  political projects, 
undeterminable  in  their  scopes,  but  recognisable  as  analogous,  and  therefore  equally  
valid.
And so, in the end money  is  value. This, in a nutshell, is the transcendental truth of 
which money is the emblem. This truth, like a wave of energy, is carried from man to man 
and from situation to situation: it circulates, de facto structuring an identity of signification 
that cuts across social contexts and histories – we may call it the  significance of money. 
Put crudely, whatever we do with money, even if we are prima facie accumulating it for the 
sake  of  it,  we  are  doing  so  in  view  of  something  other  than money  itself,  and  this 
something involves private as well as collective (public) affairs, hence power and politics – 
for money is that peculiar thing that enables the actuation of political projects in a society. 
In the name of money we can convey, juxtapose,  proportion,  alienate,  articulate on the 
same plane – into the same social order/hierarchy – values and, from there, we can produce 
other  values,  new values. And  so,  through  money  not  only  can  we  access  a  shared, 
imaginary dimension for the commensurability and exchangeability of values but, most 
importantly, we are able to provide new reasons for making our political actions worth in 
the manifold contexts of sociality. In other words, money offers its bearers the possibility 
of taking their bearings in and through their daily transactions in order to move within 
them, to  base themselves on a monetary norm – an ‘equality  in  exchange’,  or else  an 
‘exchange with measure’ – in order to monetize their power in new activities of value that 
will transform society. 
But the singularity of money suggests us something even more significant about its 
veritas transcendentalis: as an  eidos  money is trans-historical and trans-contextual but is 
nevertheless always a ‘what is this’; that is to say, it is always this  money, this  form that 
exists  in the present (dis)course that we can only ever interrogate and know. It  is  this  
money that means to us;  this  money that we can exploit to achieve our purposes;  this  
money that we can change. ‘Money’ is in other words a  living signification, and in this 
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respect we must always bear in mind that the Anglo-Saxon term ‘money’ comes with a 
social text, that is, it denotes a context as well as connoting a discourse that is currently 
‘spoken’ predominantly by Anglo-American finance.  And so, a science of this money can 
only develop in  full  awareness as  a  politics,  that  is,  an ontology inseparable from the 
epistemological problematic, because the nature of its subject-matter is a significant nature 
in its becoming; namely, it is a nature that (be)comes ‘with a text’ and which therefore 
requires that we understand the manifold reasons behind its political purposefulness. Our 
motto shall be: to money itself: let’s speak politics!
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CHAPTER 5
Against nature: money out of nothing
A brief phenomenology
Forse l’essenza del  nichilismo consiste  nel  non prendere sul  serio la domanda sul  nulla  (Heidegger,  in 
Amato, 2010: 18)
Nullius in verba (Royal Society’s motto)
…analogy implies an effect on Nature: it constitutes the ‘natural’ as a source of truth; and what adds to the 
curse of analogy is the fact that it is irrepressible: no sooner is a form seen that it must resemble something: 
humanity seems doomed to Analogy, i.e. in the long run to Nature (Barthes, quoted in Silverman and Torode,  
1980: 247)
Money comes from nothing and out of nowhere to institute a peculiar identity of form, a 
norm that gives a certain measure to exchange and hence enables a certain ‘exchange with 
measure’. The institution of this norm is normally resolved in the assumption of a principle 
of conservation in political economy, called exchange of equivalents: in capitalism no thing 
is created, no thing is destroyed, but every thing is exchanged, and this entails change (in 
its romanticised version, progress). The exchange of equivalents is exemplificative of the 
normality of the money phenomenon but, as its has been argued in the previous chapter, 
normality is glowing and makes us blind unless we purposefully wear special glasses – the 
glasses of theory – to see through it and spot the inner ‘hole’ of normativity out of which 
the normal comes out. In money’s case, this normativity is summed by the transcendental 
truth that money is value. This, in turn, means that, put crudely, what gets equalised in the 
monetary exchange are not things but values. In other words, the exchange of equivalents 
is in fact the institution of an ‘equality of value in exchange’, that is, an ‘equality of men in 
exchange’. In what follows I shall refer to this normativity as simply equality in exchange.
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The fact that money possesses a normative character is perfectly epitomised by the notion 
of ‘fiat money’ which today stands as the technical term for describing money’s substance. 
As the story goes, the suspension of the dollar convertibility into gold in 1971 has ratified 
the apparently incontrovertible truth that money is  nothing but  an intrinsically worthless 
token  issued  ‘by  fiat’,  that  is,  created  by  decree  through  the  sanction  of  a  sovereign 
authority – “by the sheer force of a demiurgic word” (Amato and Fantacci, 2012: 88). In 
the concept of ‘fiat money’ are condensed the most enigmatic and paradoxical aspects of 
money’s  normativity,  and  namely:  negativity,  self-referentiality,  and  futurity.  First,  fiat 
money is created ‘out of nothing’, ex nihilo. Second, fiat money is a token that can only be 
converted in…itself: namely, it is a promise of payment in money serving as a means of 
payment, a self-referential promise of the promise  ad infinitum. Finally, fiat money is a 
legal tender, that is, a currency valid for meeting tax obligations, debts and payments due45; 
in other words, fiat money is created with a view to future final settlements and yet it is  
constructed in a way that it ends up procrastinating indefinitely, in the ‘long run’ (when, 
according to Keynes, we are all dead), the mutual remission of debts. 
Fiat money, in other words, is a norm that obeys the norm it itself represents (recall 
Simmel).  What  does  this  imply  for  a  theory  of  money? First  of  all,  a  norm does  not 
‘describe’ but, if anything, it ‘prescribes’. Accordingly, money cannot be said to merely 
provide a ‘nominal’ description of ‘real’ variables, as a neutral veil of commodities and an 
abstract accounting device. This said, can we argue by contrast that money, as a norm, is 
prescriptive? Prescriptions are norms that can be formulated in a deontic vocabulary – 
what John Commons (1924: 6) called ‘working rules’ about “what the individuals must or 
must  not  do (compulsion  or  duty),  what  they  may  do without  interference  from other 
individuals (permission or liberty), what they can do with the aid of the collective power 
(capacity or right) and what they cannot expect the collective power to do in their behalf 
(incapacity or exposure)”. Money, however, is not a bundle of working rules for the simple 
45 It is worth noting in this respect that, according to Commons, the theme of ‘futurity’ was intimately related 
with value and property on the one hand, and with law and hence normativity on the other. As he argued, 
“[f]uturity is common to the sciences of law and economics. […] We have, both in economics and in law, 
many terms indicating this futuristic aspect of Time, such as motive, intent, purpose, wants, desire, security,  
investment,  property,  assets,  liabilities,  interest,  capital  –  in  fact,  the  concept  of  Value  itself,  on  which  
economic theory, as well as legal theory, turns, is a synthesis of all these other concepts of futurity and, as  
such, is always a concept of the present importance of things and persons and classes of persons in view of 
their expected uses and behaviour in the immediate or remote future (Commons, 1996: 331-332).
116
reason that it does not prescribe what we may, can or cannot, must or must not achieve 
with it. Theoretically, regardless of what the law actually prescribes, we can use money to 
pay our taxes or hoard it in offshore heavens, invest it in green-field business activities or 
bet  it  in  financial  markets.  We can pursue  power  or  virtue,  or  both  –  that  is,  we can 
establish our own path to ‘the good and the highest good’, articulate our own dialectic of 
the ‘utilitarian’ and the ‘moral’, construct our own notion of the ‘proper’. Practically, what 
we can do with money only depends on the actual political power we bear, the amount of 
claims that we are in the position to lay against the entire world to vindicate the autonomy 
of our own actions from others, from society and everything else. In short, what we can 
achieve with money only depends on…money.
And so money is neither a description (a neutral denomination) nor a prescription (a 
norm that  regulates  an activity  that  exists  a priori,  independently of  it);  instead,  more 
properly, money is a “constitutive norm” (see Searle, 1995; 2005), a ‘rule of the game’, an 
institution that enables the very actions that it is said to regulate. For without money there 
would be no tax obligation to pay, no financial asset to gamble with, no offshore market, 
no  economy  to  begin  with.  Also,  there  would  be  no  understanding  of  power  in  its 
relatedness with virtue and justice, no sense of the utilitarian in relation to the moral. In 
short, we cannot derive money from a normative ‘framework’ that is logically prior to it, 
because it is in the praxis of money transactions that working rules for socially relating are 
moulded and a (legal-moral)  political economy gets accordingly constructed. Hence,  in 
order to know where the law (jurisprudence) and society are heading we must first of all 
understand money and not vice versa.
Once more, it is important to point out that the ‘rules of the game’ cannot be established 
by  some  logically  prior  Platonic  demiurge,  nor  can  the  dictionary  be  written  by  a 
superimposed authority, as Keynes famously argued in the first pages of his  Treatise on 
Money (see chapter 2). As Frankel reminds us (1977: 43), “[i]t is not true that the State or 
any other authority can either enforce or write a dictionary, even if it wished to do so. A 
dictionary is not created by an author like a novel or a scientific work. A dictionary is a 
collection of words which society has created in the past and is continuously creating and 
re-creating in the present and the future”. As a rule for writing a dictionary called ‘political 
economy’46, money is a norm for socially relating whose content is shaped by the very 
46 Here ‘political economy’ does not stand for the academic discipline but for its object of reflection: the  
political society of a commercial type based on a monetised economy.
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relations that it enables: it is at once the medium and the message, the measure  and the 
value  upon and through which negotiation  can  occur  among  legally equal  parties  (i.e. 
parties that are ligated together as if they were equal). 
I  will  devote  this  chapter  specifically  to  an  understanding  of  money’s  normativity, 
hoping to  shed light  on what  lies  in  the  shadow of  what  mainstream economists  term 
‘exchange  of  equivalents’,  and which  I  here  choose  to  call  ‘equality  in  exchange’.  In 
particular, in order to emphasise the limits of positivism, I will pay special attention to the 
theme of negativity, that is to say, to the topic of money’s emergence ‘out of nothing’. In 
this respect, I will stress the importance of the notion of logos for a thorough understanding 
of  institutional  genesis. To  be  sure,  my  final  aim  is  not  only  epistemological  (qua 
phenomenological per se) but also methodological as I intend to set up with the  logos  a 
peculiar ‘unit of analysis’ capable of overcoming the limits of both agential and structural 
methodologies and, more generally, capable of solving the manifold dichotomies (not only 
the agency-structure one) that fracture our current common sense and which are rooted in 
the positivist mentality.
Of these, one in particular will be regarded as especially relevant. I am talking of the so-
called  Great  Dichotomy  originated  in  the  classical  (empiricist)  tradition  of  political 
economy set by Hume and Smith: namely, the separation between ‘real’ economic analysis 
and ‘nominal’ monetary analysis, paralleling the ancient Platonic distinction between the 
Thing and its Idea. The real-nominal opposition is significant because it mirrors a more 
fundamental  separation  between  ‘politics’ and  ‘economics’ (Nitzan  and  Bichler,  2000; 
2009), which is  in turn indicative not only of a fracture between political  thought and 
economic analysis in the current academic world but, most importantly, of a subordination 
of the former to the latter, reaching a paroxysm with the Pyrrhic victory of mainstream 
economics (including Keynesian economics) in the XX century. Upholding ‘economics’ 
over ‘politics’ means that political agency – that is, social power – gets normally treated as 
an  epiphenomenon  of  economic  imperatives  of  an  either  ‘structural’ or  ‘behavioural’ 
nature. This is true for classical and neo-classical theories but also to a great extent for 
Keynesian  and  post-Keynesian  ones,  though  in  this  case  the  neutralization  (i.e.  de-
politicization) of monetary theory takes on new paths (see part I).  
The  politics-economics  divide  and  the  fragmented  understanding  of  the  political 
economy of which this divide is the most basic expression are the consequence of two 
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related tendencies  in  the  modern science  of  money:  first,  a  neglect  of  the  ontological  
problematic – the question of the significance of the institution, which I have sketched in 
the previous chapter – and the consequent naturalisation of epistemology, i.e. ‘positivism’. 
This ontological neglect is also known as “epistemic fallacy” (Bhaskar, 2008): the belief 
that statements about being are to be interpreted as statements about knowledge. In this 
context, the epistemic fallacy has to do with the fact that critical political questions about 
money are  routinely  translated  by monetary  scholars  into  barren  economic  terms.  The 
second tendency concerns a transversal neglect of the historical problematic – the question 
of institutional and social change, which also has been partially dealt with in the previous 
chapter. This question is of course related to the ontological problematic for a very simple 
reason: a reflection on the being of institutions, to be thorough, must necessarily lead to an 
understanding of their  becoming.  In this  respect, it  must be said that,  critically, though 
modern science has brought about the proliferation of a number of theories of money, most 
of them remain aridly over-generalising, unable to account for historical change and thus 
largely irrelevant for a proper understanding of the institutional phenomena (among which 
money) they claim to investigate and explain (see Hodgson, 2001) – this, in spite of their 
potential performativity (see MacKenzie, 2006). 
As a result of this complex intellectual fracture, much of modern monetary thinking is 
lying, torn apart in the belly of a dormant Leviathan-like47 science – actually, a secularised 
religion with its own priesthood – instrumental to an élite project of social control, subtly  
serving the technocratic purpose to neutralise politics, that is, naturalise economics and  
legitimise  a  certain  capitalist  ethos  and  ethics. The  fracture  between  politics  and 
economics is reproduced in countless domains: not only as a breach between the real and 
the  nominal,  but  also  as  a  disconnection  of  the  descriptive  and  the  prescriptive,  the 
economical-utilitarian and the ethical-moral, the natural and the social, the material and the 
ideal, the actual and the potential, the subjective and the objective, the agential and the 
structural,  and so on. In what follows I will  try to breach through the surface of these 
interrelated dichotomies and descend deep into the multifaceted discursive crack that they 
demarcate in inherited thought: I will thus investigate the very nature of the abyss that 
divides our current understanding of money, explore the Nothing out of which it allegedly 
emerges, and search for its logos, that is, the ‘rationality’ underpinning the normativity and 
47 Leviathan is a biblical sea monster that lives in the Abyss, a “wriggling serpent” of an enormous size that 
will be killed at the end of times.  
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clothing the normality of the money phenomenon. By so doing, I will tackle the so-called 
‘is-ought’ problem in a way that will hopefully overcome both naturalistic and moralistic 
perspectives on money’s normative character  – namely,  positivist  false  dilemmas about 
what  money  is  and does  and what  it  ought  to be and do.  Inspired by a  re-reading of 
Aristotle’s writings on  nomisma (as in  Nicomachean Ethics  and  Politics), I will set the 
ground for establishing a methodology of money that will not impinge upon, but rather 
enhance, a  discussion on the  political  themes  of  ‘the good and the  highest  good’,  the 
‘virtuous’,  and  the  ‘just’  in  their  relatedness  to  money,  its  (virtual)  circulation  and 
(re)distributive justice, aiming for the recovery of a shared unity of understanding.
Positivism, or the belief in the autonomy of the norm
By positivism I refer to an epistemological disposition to downplay altogether the trans-
historical  character  of  institutions  (see  previous  chapter)  and  the  significance  of  their 
changing forms by reducing their phenomena to some a-historical, impenetrable rationality, 
law or  logic.  In so doing, positivism “tends to  split  science and history as if  they are 
different orders of explanation, one being theoretical, the other being descriptive” (Knafo, 
2010: 496)48. Positivism, in other words, involves the crystallisation of reasoning into some 
onto-logical  identity,  a  datum that  freezes  metaphorical  imagination  by  congealing 
relations into objects, de facto preventing an understanding of how, at any level (not only 
at  the social  one),  relations  lead  to  (in  the sense  that  they are bound to  embrace and 
comprehend) radical otherness and thus social and institutional change. In this respect, a 
typical positivist understanding of institutions is one that does not contemplate explaining 
how and why institutions change but is rather preoccupied with  justifying their  current 
existence  –  the  latter  being  normally  fixed  into  some  essence  (existence/being  = 
essence/being) defining the gap between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’ about them. 
Perhaps  it  is  not  a  coincidence  that  a  first  formulation  of  the  ‘is-ought’ problem, 
announcing a nascent separation in modern thought between a materialist type of science 
(a  discourse  of  ‘what  is’ focusing  on  the  descriptive,  the  empirical,  the  rational,  the 
analytical, the utilitarian) and an idealist type of philosophy (a discourse of ‘what ought to 
48 As Knafo (2010: 495) has argued, positivist approaches seek to generalise laws of social development and  
thus tend to reify social reality and present it as a ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ order. As a result, positivism presents  
social “structures in apolitical ways, as if structures transcend power relations” (ibid., 496). 
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be’ focusing on the prescriptive, the metaphysical, the logical, the synthetic, the moral), is 
generally  attributed  to  Scottish  philosopher  and  political  economist  David  Hume,  a 
founding father of classical empiricism and a major advocate of a deeply positivist vision 
of science (see Bhaskar, 2008). Throughout Hume’s writings on the political economy one 
can envision a persistent disarticulation of the real and the nominal – though “not fully 
developed or even fully intended” (Schabas, 2008: 128) – which is particularly evidenced 
in his ambivalent view of money.
Hume’s thinking on the matter is “notoriously protean, frequently escaping our grasp 
and defying our best attempts to articulate it” (Wennerlind, 2008: 105). In effect, taken 
synthetically, his conceptualisation shows an inconstancy between what money is in theory 
(prescriptions about how money  should be  ‘properly’,  that is,  ontologically, understood) 
and  what  money  does  in  practice  (descriptions  of  how  money  is ‘actually’,  that  is, 
phenomenally, experienced). On the one hand, Hume invites us to think of money as a 
neutral veil, the “oil of commerce” as he says; on the other hand, when he analyses money 
in conditions typical of an economy out of equilibrium – that is, in the very much  real 
‘short  term’ – Hume suggests that money may function as a non-neutral,  performative 
value (see Arnon, 2011: 15-17; 25), i.e. a social form capable of autonomously affecting 
the economy. Some regard this ambivalent view as a symptom of logical inconsistency; 
others see it as the genius of a “methodological pluralism” (Wennerlind, 2008: 105) whose 
greatest merit, to be sure, is to be found not so much in the questionable originality of its 
theoretical findings as in its capacity to produce an analysis of “money as a social relation 
embedded in a larger societal and political context” and “his systematic examination of the 
complex roles that money plays in the constitution and dynamics of the modern polity, 
society, and economy” (Wennerlind, 2008: 123). 
It  is  important  to  point  out  that  Hume’s  monetary  thinking  was  part  of  a  political 
reflection that evolved mainly as a critique of Mercantilist policies. Briefly, mercantilism 
promoted the pursuit of a surplus in the balance of payment, and hence the accumulation of 
bullion by the state. Against this idea, Hume argued that surplus was impossible to sustain 
indefinitely  because  international  (market-driven)  counter-forces  would  eventually 
neutralise  the  surplus  nation’s  favourable  unbalance.  Instead  of  focusing  on  the 
accumulation of the money stock, as if money in itself could signify wealth, nations should 
concentrate  on  the  growth  of  industry  and  commerce  with  the  purpose  to  enhance 
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international trade,  because the latter  is  the real locus of a nation’s wealth.  Hence,  for 
Hume what is really at work in the creation of value by a nation – in the valorisation of its 
stock – is not the accumulation of bullion per se, because here more money would simply 
imply  (ceteris  paribus) higher  prices,  but  a  universal  mechanism underpinning  its 
harmonious association with other nations: the price-specie-flow mechanism. Needless to 
say, the price-specie-flow mechanism is assumed to be ‘given’, positive, like a rational and 
objective  force  that  will  always  underpin  international  trade  and  create  wealth  in  an 
apparently autonomous fashion. That is, nations may lever this mechanism to their own 
purposes  but  they  cannot  change the  way it  works:  and so,  sooner  or  later  they  must 
surrender to the mechanism, trust it, and accept the normality of international free trade. 
Crucially,  Hume grants a  degree of  ‘ontological  autonomy’ also to money,  de facto 
recognising  its  normative  character;  in  particular,  he  argues  that  money  is  able  to 
significantly affect capitalist production and commerce, especially in the ‘short’ term and at 
the ‘local’ level. This belief can be clearly evinced from Hume’s ‘hard currency’ argument 
against  paper  money.  Some  may  be  surprised  to  read  that  far  from  being  purely 
philosophic, this argument is in fact practical and inherently political. What is more, this 
argument  reveals  an  understanding  of  money  which,  paradoxically,  is  distant  from 
Metallism  and  intimate  with  Nominalist  doctrines  of  the  time.  Indeed,  for  Hume, 
regardless of its precious metal or paper substance, money remains “chiefly a fictitious 
value” (quoted in Wennerlind, 2008: 108), a social convention and a promise. What makes 
specie more desirable than paper is utterly a political problem: unlike hard precious-metal 
currency, paper tender is potentially destabilising for the economy because of its tendency 
to be issued without limits, hence causing inflation. Thus Hume argues that “money must 
always be  made of  some materials,  which  have  intrinsic  value,  otherwise  it  would  be 
multiplied without end, and would sink to nothing” (quoted in Wennerlind, 2008: 109, my 
italic). 
Hume’s ‘hard currency’ argument ought to be accordingly intended as a critical warning 
about the speculative and usury motives at the basis of paper money, that is, bank credit, 
for the latter “may convey the [self-referential] power of acquiring [more] money” (quoted 
in Wennerlind, 2008: 109). This said, Hume did not despise bank credit per se but only 
thought  that  money  best  worked  when  its  stock  expanded  together  with  industry  and 
commerce and when the creation of paper claims was limited to the discounting of bills of 
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exchange, which he praised for the benefits they could bring to a commercial society (see 
also chapter 3). In fact, Hume believed that as far as the creation of paper money was 
anchored to a hard currency it was bound to conform to the price-specie-flow mechanism 
and therefore required no regulation by the authority. 
Accordingly,  Hume designed his theory of money “to convince legislators to  ignore 
money”  (Wennerlind,  2008:  106),  as  if  money  truly  were  an  insignificant  veneer,  an 
‘artificial  virtue’ and hence a  nominal  quality.  He thus warned against the inflationary 
dangers of an artificial  alteration of the money stock by the government,  and used his 
analyses “to attack those who favoured upholding a trade balance, or who sought to impose 
customs and duties to protect domestic industry” (Schabas, 2008: 131). For Hume money 
was able to adjust to a rightful level “proportionate to the art and industry of each nation” 
(quoted  in  Schabas,  2008:  131),  and  hence  serve  as  a  proper  measure  of  exchange 
relations, only if the money stock, as a real quantity of hard currency, was subject to the 
Logic of international trade. Money’s partial autonomy was only a by-product of the total 
autonomy of the price-specie-flow mechanism.
And so, despite recognising the normative character of money – the partial autonomy of 
its  performance  –  Hume  remitted  the  solution  of  its  enigma  to  another  enigma:  the 
unconditioned desirability of international free trade. In this respect, the type of monetary 
policies that he prescribed may be retrospectively seen as precursors of neoliberal doctrines 
of deregulation. Deregulation, to be sure, is still about regulating, the only difference with 
‘regulation’ being that it neglects the necessary requirement of a political  governance in 
order  to  regulate.  By  deregulating  the  ‘legislator’  merely  surrenders  the  political 
governance  of  money  to  market  agents  –  and  especially  banks.  To  be  sure,  such  an 
endorsement of political inertia in monetary affairs can only be built upon a naturalisation 
of the political constitution and economic performance of money – a naturalisation of the 
norm that, needless to say, is typical of positivism. The positivist fallacy creates a fracture 
in our understanding of the monetary praxis (the ‘what is about’ money) in its relatedness 
with  monetary  theory  and  hence  monetary  governance  (the  ‘what  ought  to  be  about’ 
money). Of course this epistemological crack reverberates at the ontological level where, 
in  the  case  of  Hume’s  theory,  we  know  that  money  arises  “from  the  agreement  and 
convention of men” (quoted in Wennerlind, 2008: 108), and yet the more it is embedded 
into a global free trade, the more it “evolves away from its initial state and becomes subject 
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to forces akin to those in nature” (Schabas, 2008: 131). 
And so, after  reading Hume, we cannot really understand whether money is  real or 
nominal,  performative  or  neutral,  social  or  natural.  Simply,  positivism  engenders 
misunderstanding.  Notably,  Hume’s  ambiguous  reasoning  assumes  the  contours  of  a 
“polite rhetoric” (see Hanvelt, 2012) that  pretends to be science at its finest: empiricism. 
Regrettably,  this  type  of  science  is  built  upon  subjecting  the  most  basic  intellectual 
question about facts – why? – to the knowledge of how things work as a norm. However, 
knowing how a thing works  by norm does not  explain  why it exists but only  justifies  its 
existence  in  the  name  of  an  a-historical  and  pre-political  Rationality.  Regrettably,  by 
obscuring politics with the Scientific Method, positivism – whether under the disguise of 
empiricism or  in  the vest  of  a  philosophy of  history – is  responsible  for  promoting a 
hypocritical – i.e. less-than-critical – understanding of the world, that of technocrats. 
In particular,  Hume’s positivism marks the beginning of a ‘modernity’ in which the 
political question of money, rooted ever since the Scholastics in the themes of the ‘just 
price’ and usury (i.e. the appropriateness of interest-earning lending) will be progressively 
concealed by and dissolved into a ‘science of the legislator’, a growingly technical debate 
on monetary theory and policy (involving especially the Anglo-Saxon world, see Zarlenga, 
2002; Ingham, 2004; 41-47; Arnon, 2011) whose major achievement will be the giving of a 
discipline  to  the  legislator.  In  this  new,  predominant  ‘course  of  ideas’,  the  theme  of 
money’s propriety will be soon reduced to a diatribe about correct criteria of economic 
efficiency (see Amato, 2010: 111) that will implicitly legitimise (naturalise, normalise) the 
capitalist  praxis  of  money-getting  and  money-making.  Money  will  become  the 
insignificant veneer of a  normality made of capitalist relations, commerce, trade, credit, 
finance – a phantasmagorical, illusory, fictitious, nominal entity (a fetish and an idol in the 
Marxian account) incapable of affecting the economy. Money will go offstage to let capital 
make its entrance. The latter will become, first with Smith but especially following Marx, 
money’s ‘real’ counterpart: a material, calculable quantity, a proficient and profitable asset, 
as  protean  and  universally  substitutable  as  money  itself,  capable  of  autonomously 
‘valorising’  and  generating  surplus  value  in  view  of  a  profitable  progress49,  giving 
eventually substance and, especially, ideological legitimacy – in the name of either labour 
or utility – to the phenomenal appearance of money which begets money. 
49 The word ‘profit’ comes from the Latin verb proficere, i.e. ‘to make progress’.
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The myth of regulation
Most of  today’s  scholars  of  money,  especially  among those  who regard  themselves  as 
‘economists’,  have  little  to  say  about  the  politics  of money;  for  instance,  they  do not 
question (not at all, or anyway not enough) the existence of the Euro, what type of power 
relations have underpinned its institution and what type of political projects the Euro in 
turn underpins. That is, they do not seem to recognise the fact that the existence of the Euro 
is  finalised  to the realisation of something that has nothing to do with exchangeability, 
commensurability, redeemability and value per se, but which is related with the possibility 
that  a  certain  way  of  exchanging,  measuring,  redeeming  and  therefore  valuing be 
actualised  with its  full  political  implications.  The Euro  is  value because it  enables the 
creation of new social relations and hence the construction of new political hierarchies: it is 
power that denotes a new (dis)course of power. 
If  money  were  only  an  instrument  of  social  relations  –  if  it  were  merely  about 
measuring and exchanging values – then one single money in the world would have done 
for the purpose. The same could be said of mobile phones, cars, and of any other mass-
produced technology (i.e. any other commodity). After all, they all seem to be doing the 
same. The problem is that behind the mass production of a technology such mobile phones 
or cars are  politics of (re)distribution and control  of those who ultimately produce them 
and socially reproduce themselves through them (see Nitzan and Bichler, 2009). This is 
why it would be very naïve to think that cars are nowadays produced to satisfy the social  
need to drive fast on highways. A critical mind would immediately ask: why cars and why 
not trains, for instance? 
A similar question could be posed with respect to the Euro: why the Euro and why not 
an European system of credits similar to the European Payments Union instituted pro tem 
in 1950 (see Amato and Fantacci, 2012)? Regrettably, most scholars skip the question of 
politics – that is, the question of institutional genesis – and understand money as if it were 
a car that, quite simply, made us go faster. And so, what most scholars do is mainly to tell 
us ‘how to race like a pro’ in any possible environment. That is to say, all their intellectual 
efforts are devoted to persuading ‘the public’ about how money should be best managed, 
governed, ruled. The neutralisation of politics corresponds precisely to the consecration of 
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policies – fiscal, monetary, labour, credit policies.   
But can ‘we’ – the state, the market(s), the central bank – really regulate money, as 
economists confidently sustain? That is, are we in the condition to ‘write’ or ‘edit’ it the 
monetary norm in an arbitrary fashion, ‘by fiat’? As I have suggested before, as a matter of 
fact, writing and editing the norm (or the dictionary) cannot be done by a single agency but 
requires a much more organic process encompassing society as a whole. This is why we 
feel that we enjoy no real power on the money phenomenon, as if money governed us and 
not vice versa; as if it made its performance in an  autonomous  fashion, animated by its 
own logic external to earthly affairs, perhaps generated by some mathematical algorithm at 
the basis of sociality. The idea that we can at best exploit ‘what money does’ to achieve our 
purposes but we can never change the way ‘money is’ is one of the many nihilist visions 
engendered by positivism. Nihilism arises precisely from the positivist refusal to question 
the politics of institutional genesis  ‘out of nothing’,  which is  accordingly justified and 
legitimised but not explained: in money’s case, ‘out of nothing’ becomes ‘by fiat’, but then 
no reflection on the nature of the authority follows, so that a potential discourse on the 
politics of money is reduced to a technocratic formulation of monetary policies.
Significantly, the topic of monetary regulation and governance is particularly dear to the 
proponents (mostly from the heterodox field) of the ontological primacy of the money of 
account.  They  all  share,  in  a  ‘progressive’ spirit,  the  belief  that  money,  insofar  as  a  
measure, cannot be a product of the market but a creature of the authority and therefore an 
object of regulation. For the sake of the argument, it is worth mentioning in this respect the 
work  of  American  political  economist,  historian  and  numismatist  Alexander  Del  Mar 
(1836-1926).  Del  Mar was a  fervid  monetary  reformist  who believed that  money was 
entirely a creature of the law, established by the public authority. Like many others before 
and after him, he often referred to Aristotle to legitimise a somewhat naïve ‘legalist’ view 
against the dominant mercantilist dogma (i.e. the belief that money was a precious-metal-
based commodity originated in the market). 
For  Del  Mar,  the  function  of  money  was  to  measure  value  with  precision.  To  this 
purpose, money’s ‘value’ ought to be artificially fixed by law, so as to ensure its exact 
numerical expression and quantity. Indeed, “the essence of a measure of any kind”, says 
Del Mar (1895: 78), “is limitation”. To properly fulfil its purpose, says Del Mar, money 
ought to be able  to measure and limit  “the whole numbers of money” – in short,  this 
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requires that one calculate with mathematical precision the exact magnitude of the money 
supply.  Regrettably,  no single agency has ever been able to do so. Current estimations 
made by central banks and governments are very much matters of opinions and really go 
off  one’s  head  –  dare  i  numeri,  as  an  Italian  speaker  would  sardonically  declare  – 
especially when one tries to compute in the final count time deposits and financial assets 
redeemable at par on demand. A peculiar ‘indeterminacy principle’ seems to impede our 
attempts to correctly calculate the whole stock/numbers of money: as soon as we try to fix 
their overall magnitude/value we discover that they act as a  flow of highly liquid assets 
constantly transforming into one another. Critically, it can be argued that  liquidity – the 
indefinite  substitutability  of  financial  assets  based  on  their  discounting  on  secondary 
markets – challenges the idea that money could ever serve as a proper measure (see chapter 
3). 
From a neo-classical viewpoint, on the strength of this critique, some even argue that 
the very notion of ‘measure of value’ is  a  misconception stemming from a theoretical 
confusion between the notions of ‘value’ and ‘price’ (Biondi, 2010: 35): for, in truth, not 
only does money not measure value, but it also does not measure at all. Standard bearer of 
this argument was Carl Menger who, contra the classical view, sustained that “valuations 
of goods on a monetary basis are not measures, and such measurement cannot be done 
anyway. Valuations are instead monetary balances, offered or demanded” (Biondi, 2011: 
37). In other words, “exchanges do not require any preliminary measurement” (ibid.) but 
only a scale for ‘weighing’ the content of each transaction on a contingent basis. From this 
perspective,  prices  (or  ‘values’,  for  that  matter)  are  not  logically  anterior  to  market 
exchange,  but  “are  formed  in  the  transacting  process  between  actors”  (ibid.).  As  a 
consequence,  money  cannot  measure  any  value  –  because  value  is  not  available  for  
calculation prior to the money transaction – but only serve as a general means of exchange 
(ibid., 36) and as a comprehensive mode of accounting: namely, a ‘scale of price’ or an 
“imputation  device”  (ibid.,  41)  facilitating  “horizontal  transactions  between  different 
actors” (ibid., 40). 
Leaving aside the fact that such an argument uncritically conflates the notion of ‘value’ 
with  that  of  ‘exchangeability’ (with  ‘price’ being  a  consequence  of  the  latter),  thus 
forgetting that “value is an essential precondition of exchangeability, but can exist without 
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it”  (Anderson,  1917:  401-2)50,  the  Mengerian  counterpoint  does  not  really  provide  an 
alternative  to  the  ontological  primacy  of  the  money  of  account.  In  fact,  it  merely 
reconceptualises the ‘measure of value’ as the ‘scale of price’, an accounting device that 
unlike the former is not governed ex ante by a central agency but is constantly employed 
by private agents to assess dynamical and variable price-ratios via self-regulating market 
mechanisms. Like the ‘measure of value’ argument, however, the ‘scale of price’ argument 
too does not bring into account the fact that money is value, otherwise it would not be able 
to circulate and ‘optimise’ transactions. 
More generally, scholars of money seem to forget that one ought to own money before 
one can use it and, perhaps, attempt to ‘regulate’ it – in fact, regulate/discipline/control 
people through money. This is a simple rule of thumb that a scholar should always keep in 
mind: to be money it must be owned (and hence alienated). As Fox (2008: 22) has pointed 
out, money is first of all a subject of property rights.
 
A person who has property in money does not in any sense have property in a monetary unit  
of account. The unit of the pound or the dollar, for example, can be no more owned by an  
individual than any other abstract unit of measurement such as the metre or the kilogramme. 
Neither does a person have any true property in the stored purchasing power represented by a 
certain number of units of the medium of exchange. Depending on ordinary laws of supply 
and  demand  for  goods  and  services,  and  rates  of  price  inflation,  the  purchasing  power 
represented by the medium will fluctuate over time. His or her only property is in the asset 
which serves as the medium of exchange. That may be a coin, a banknote or an incorporeal 
bank balance (Fox, 2008: 22-23).
To own money means to hold a social power in one’s hand: a power which is measure of 
one’s own value in relation to other persons and, potentially,  to the entire  world.  This 
power  cannot  be  fixed  in  a  quantum – say,  a  one  dollar  unit  expressing  an  invariant 
‘purchasing  power’ –  because  such  a  quantum  will  be  nevertheless  ‘entangled’ with 
manifold markets and political-economic agencies. Accordingly, the power of money must 
50 As the American scholar pointed out, “[v]alue and saleability are not the same thing…exchangeability and 
value are different characteristics of goods. Value is an essential precondition of exchangeability, but can 
exist without it. Value, however, is commonly increased by exchangeability” (Anderson, 1917: 401-2). In 
particular, saleability does never mark a distinction in kind, but only a distinction of degree (ibid., 406).
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be considered in its dynamical relatedness with a contextual whole (in particular, one must 
take  into  account  the  nonlocal  ‘spooky  action  at  distance’  of  securitised  and 
commercialised debts, see chapter 3). 
As Del Mar had recognised, unlike a measure of length, the monetary measure only 
exists  in  a  “social  state”  and varies  “with  the  intellectual  attainments,  the  knowledge, 
information, opportunities, virtues, and the power of men” (Del Mar, 1895: 74). Crucially, 
“[w]hen these advantages and attributes are unequal, the determination of value cannot be 
equitable; one party is certain to obtain an advantage over the other. When they are equal, 
value becomes an equitable relation” (ibid.). That is to say, the end of money is not merely  
to measure and exchange, but to provide an equitable ‘measure to exchange’ and therefore  
an ‘exchange with measure’ , i.e. an exchange within the  limits  of the equitable. This is 
why although money is “not a measure of precision” (because pure equity is impossible to 
achieve in a world of power relations), “yet it ought to be” (ibid., 77). Namely, ‘limitation’ 
and hence lawful regulation ought to be the essence of money – “and such is the origin of 
the word nomisma” (ibid., 78) – because “the more exact the limits of money are defined in 
the law, the more equitable will it become in its operations upon prices and the dealings 
between man and man” (ibid.). 
Like Hume, Del Mar repudiates the power of money but, differently from the Scottish 
philosopher, he emphasises that the government, and not the market, ought to regulate it, 
because no market mechanism can ensure that ‘equality in exchange’ is matched by social 
equity at large. In the wake of Aristotle, Del Mar poses the political question of money in 
relation to the lawful and the equitable; however, like most of his modern colleagues, he 
missed the great lesson that the Greek philosopher left us about money, normativity and the 
possibilities of regulation: “when the thing is indefinite, the rule also is indefinite”. 
A phenomenology of monetary normativity
Aristotle’s intellectual legacy is enormous. His most basic concern was no less than solving 
the problem of institutional change and motion in relation to the immutability of forms 
(Wood, 2008: 85). Institutional change is enigmatic. As the French say  plus ça change, 
plus c’est pareil – the more things change, the more they stay the same. Things are indeed 
constantly  in  motion,  mutating,  making  history,  and  yet  forms  persist,  apparently 
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immutable – and so is the status quo at the basis of the social order. This contrast between, 
and  complementariness  of,  the  universal  and  the  particular  inherent  to  social  reality 
assumed in Aristotle the contours of a dialectic of  physis  and nomos. Notably, the Greek 
philosopher tried to uphold the latter over the former and thus bring the problematic of 
social change & order under the domain of human affairs, after the Platonic ‘hyperuranic’ 
twist.  
The nomos-physis problematic also recurs in Aristotle’s interrogation of nomisma (as in 
Nicomachean Ethics and Politics), where both the universal aspects of Greek coinage and 
the  particular  social  and  institutional  settings  at  its  foundation  are  considered  in  their 
complexity. To be sure,  contra what most economists believe and sustain, Aristotle’s is 
neither a vague, precocious, ‘underdeveloped’ or hesitant sketch of an  economic theory 
hinting at those key-ideas destined to become the verb of mainstream political economy – 
and in particular the notions that money is the representative of exchange value (i.e. utility) 
and  the  market-driven  optimisation  of  barter-like  exchange.  Nor  is  Aristotle’s  a  mere 
philosophical account wherein a ‘subjective’ ethical motive ends up prevailing over the 
‘objective’ economic analysis. Instead, Aristotle’s is a  phenomenological  presentation of 
the constitutive dimension of nomisma, that is, a study of money as entirely an institution 
(Aristotle, Politics, 1257b; see Amato, 2010: 184; 190). 
The Stagirite therefore takes on a radically different path compared to the one taken by 
modern political economists: whereas the latter move their analyses from the datum of an 
‘exchange  of  equivalents’ –  as  if  such  an  exchange  could  ever  be  an  (ontologically) 
isolated  and (epistemologically)  isolable  fact  occurring between ‘empirically  universal’ 
individuals –  the  Greek  philosopher  is  concerned  with  an  understanding  of  monetary 
exchange  as  the  institution  of  equality  in  exchange.  Here  monetary  exchange  is  not 
imagined in a monadic isolation from the rest (in the inertial world of ceteris paribus), but 
as part of a dynamic political whole of an essentially relational nature51. And so, unlike his 
modern  heirs  who  have  usually  moved  their  analyses  from  a  complete  disregard 
(underestimation,  hypocrisy)  of  money’s  performance  as  a  norm,  Aristotle  aimed  to 
precisely make sense of such a performance – elucidate the significance of nomisma. 
51 As Amato points out (2010: 241), “la moneta, infatti, è il garante non tanto del fatto dello scambio, quanto 
della sua significatività. E la significatività, la verità, dello scambio, dell’insieme degli scambi così come di 
ogni scambio, consiste nel fatto che esso possa aver luogo entro un ‘intero relazionale’, ossia non come serie 
di scambi isolati, ma come uno scambio intrinsecamente politico […] semplicemente perché esso ha luogo 
sempre in nome, e in vista, di qualcosa a-venire: in nome di una filiazione”.
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The  focus  on  the  normative  character  of  money  is  especially  evident  in  the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Book V (“On Justice”), where Aristotle discusses the phenomenon of 
nomisma in relation to the polis and the institution of justice. “On Justice” is first of all a 
political inquiry whose end is the ‘human good’, and in particular that which is good for 
the  citizens  of  the  polis –  “the  justice  of  citizens”  (Aristotle,  Ethics,  1134b:  5-10). 
Significantly, says Aristotle, “what we are looking for is not simply what is just without 
qualification but political justice (my italic)” (Ethics, 1134a: 25-30). Political justice is part 
natural – unchangeable, applying “both here and in Persia” and hence universal – and part 
legal – concerned with establishing an arbitrary law whose enactments are to the common 
advantage of ‘those who hold power in the city’ (Ethics,  1129b: 15-20),  that is,  to the 
advantage of the association of equals, and only equals. 
The institution of (political)  justice therefore implies a question of  political equality 
among the powerful which adds on a more general question of equality arising in response 
to what, according to Aristotle, constitutes the fundamental cause of  stasis  (i.e. political 
conflict,  unrest) in the  polis:  natural inequality among men. Equality thus assumes the 
character of two distinct forms of “particular (or partial) justice”: distributive justice – in 
accordance with geometrical proportion, and corresponding to the oligarchic conception of 
equality  –  and  rectifying  justice  –  in  accordance  with  arithmetic  proportion,  and 
corresponding to the democratic conception of equality (see also Wood, 2008: 90). Of the 
two  forms  of  equality,  says  the  Stagirite,  the  former  is  of  primary  importance  for 
understanding nomisma. 
Distributive justice is in fact “manifested in distributions of honour or money or the 
other things that  fall  to be divided among those who have a share (koinonousi)  in  the 
constitution [of the city]” (Ethics, 1130b: 30). Distributive justice in other words defines a 
manner  of  sharing,  and  “to  share  out  is  to  give  by  way  of  exclusion:  sharing  out  is 
allotment/distribution which is exclusive, privative” (Castoriadis, 1984: 290). Clearly, this 
type of justice is expression of an  exclusive  distribution of powers at the foundation of 
private property relations52, and as such it only concerns the ‘association of equals alone’ – 
that is, the oligarchy of proprietors. 
This said, what matters the most to Aristotle is understanding how, and according to 
what criterion, the sharing out and hence the fiction of an ‘equality of proprietors’ are 
52 Distributive justice indeed reflects a ‘natural’ principle of hierarchy that, according to Aristotle, we find  
first within the oikos, the basic ‘unit’ of private property.
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established,  given  the  datum  of  a  natural  inequality  and  hierarchy  among  men.  “The 
question”,  says  Castoriadis  (1984:  293),  “must  have  its  ‘rationality’,  its  logos.  It  is 
important to open at this point a parenthesis on the semantic polysemy of  logos, as the 
word unfolds a number of key-notions, each of them of particular interest for our purposes. 
In its basic signification, logos means ‘discourse’ or, more basically, ‘word’; however, the 
Greek word also gets translated as ‘reason’, ‘judgement’, ‘concept’, ‘definition’, ‘ground’, 
or  ‘relationship’ (Heidegger,  1962:  55).  All  this  notions  are  meaningfully  connected. 
Indeed, says Heidegger, logos as discourse is about ‘letting something be seen’, an action 
that necessarily implies assertion and thus judgement (i.e. esteem, value). Also, as it serves 
the purpose of letting something be seen in its togetherness with something – “letting it be 
seen as something” (Heidegger, 1962: 56) – logos is a synthesis (i.e. a word, a figure of 
speech-thought, a trope, a signification, a form). Finally, precisely because its function lies 
in letting something be seen – that is,  in letting some entity be perceived –  logos  can 
signify  reason,  ratio  (i.e.  measure)  and,  most  importantly,  relation,  since  what  is  seen 
becomes visible as something in its ‘relatedness’ with something (Heidegger, 1962: 58).
The latter meaning of logos – ‘relation’ – constitutes the fulcrum of the phenomenology 
of exchange outlined by Aristotle in  Nicomachean Ethics  (Amato,  2010: 204),  the one 
from which all other meanings of logos unfold as the argument proceeds. To share out is 
indeed to establish the equality of two relations: a relation between two objects, and a 
relation between two men. Stated differently, the institution of private property implies the 
constitution  of  a  inherently  political  analogia –  a  ‘relation  of  relations’,  a  social 
‘proportionality’,  a  ‘geometrical  equality’ –  among  members  of  the  same  collectivity. 
Justice will be achieved whenever the same analogia will exist between the persons and 
between the things concerned, “so that as farmer is to shoemaker, so may the shoemaker’s 
product be to the farmer’s product” (Ethics, 1133a: 30).  Analogia  is in other words the 
rational principle of ‘equality in exchange’ – i.e. the institutional genesis of money as a 
norm. 
Interestingly, as Amato suggests (2010: 205), the preposition ‘ana’ in analogia does not 
denote ‘from above’ but, rather, ‘(looking) up’, ‘towards what is above’: it thus indicates 
the ‘transcendental’ presence of a reference to something which is not of the same plane of 
the relating parties. A proportion, in fact, is not a mere relation, but a “relation of relations” 
(Kant,  quoted  in  Amato,  2010:  214);  accordingly,  monetary  exchange is  never  a  mere 
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dyadic ‘material’ relation but a  ternary phenomenon of a ‘transcendental’ kind, with the 
third party lying on a different ontological level (Amato, 2010). In this respect, however, 
one should not be too hasty to assume, as most scholars do, that the third party is the  
‘authority’, the ‘community’, the ‘state’, the ‘law’, and so on. No such a deus ex machina 
is posited  ad hoc  by Aristotle to justify the institution of equality in exchange; quite the 
contrary, he contends that “rule will show the man, for a ruler is necessarily in relation to 
other men, and a member of society” (Ethics, 1130a: 5-10). That is to say, whether it is 
personified by some individual (the tyrant) or by a collective agency (the assembly), for 
Aristotle a ruling authority is always appendage of a human  author and never purely a 
third party. 
And yet, it is worth noting that according to the Greek philosopher, even though “rule 
will show the man”, in the end man does not rule at all. Indeed Aristotle states at some 
point:  “we  do  not  allow a  man  to  rule,  but  logos”  (Ethics,  1134a:  35).  Interestingly, 
Aristotle does not say, as some might have expected, that ‘we do not allow a man to rule, 
but nomos’ but chooses to specifically employ the term logos, thus suggesting that at the 
foundation of the law is not the individual agency but a ‘rational principle’ unfolding from  
social relations. 
And so, analogia is a ternary phenomenon not because it requires the prior existence of 
a  third-party  authority  that  judges  ‘from  above’ the  equitability  and  justness  of  the 
exchange, but because as a ‘relation of relations’ it takes shape in the ‘in-between’ space 
(chora)53 of logos – the ‘ternary symbolic space’ or the ‘Third symbolic’ (Legendre, 2001: 
18). It is only through and within the discursive-imaginary-symbolic dimension of  logos 
(i.e. through and within  language) that the epistemological hiatus between the order of 
agent-agent  relations  and  the  order  of  object-object  relations  can  be  meaningfully 
overcome.  Analogia  is  the  ground for  judging men and  therefore  values  (propriety  & 
property). I shall accordingly conceive of analogia as a meaningful relation of relations – 
i.e. a ‘unity of value’ insofar as a ‘unity of analogy’ – that ‘looks up’ in the direction of a 
greater whole, i.e. that of koinonia, the association of political human beings possessed of 
logos (and property). Crucially, such a unity of value is not a ‘creature’ of the nomos, i.e. a 
social-historical product, but a ‘creation’ of the logos, an institution that makes the social-
historical in the first instance (see also previous chapter).
53 The Greek word chora means ‘space’, ‘country’, as well as “the space lying between two places or limits”, 
“an empty expanse” – i.e. an abyss.
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Now,  provided  that  analogia  constitutes  the  ground for  that  partial  justice,  called 
‘distributive’, which holds the polis together, there remains a more fundamental question 
of commensurability: namely, upon what criterion can we establish proportional equality, 
that is, institute a unity of value and thus posit an ‘identity of form’ between the things 
exchanged  by  the  propertied  ones?  In  Marx’s  words,  “what  is  that  equal/identical 
something,  that  common  substance  which  the  house  represents  for  the  bed  in  the 
expression  of  the  value  of  the  bed?”  (quoted  in  Castoriadis,  1984:  263)  The  German 
political economist will answer to this point: “simple, abstract, socially necessary labour” 
(ibid.). 
Aristotle,  however,  is  more  ambiguous  and,  arguably,  keen,  “for  when the  thing  is 
indefinite,  the  rule  also  is  indefinite”  (Ethics,  1137b:  25-30).  At  first  he  says  that  the 
criterion for establishing proportionality is given by axia which, according to Castoriadis 
(1984: 296), must be intended as a ‘proto-value’, that is, a sociological value (a principle 
of  conduct)  rather  than  an  economic  value  (a  price).  Axia stands  for  ‘worth’,  ‘merit’, 
‘dignity’ – what today in the financial  world is  reassumed by the word ‘credibility’ or 
‘credit’.  In  order  to  achieve  true  justice,  says  Aristotle,  such  a  proto-value  should  be 
according to merit, so that honours and money could be distributed based on a principle of 
civic  excellence.  Yet  in  practice  axia  is  fundamentally  unidentifiable  once  and for  all, 
because men “do not all specify the same sort of merit, but democrats identify it with the 
status of freeman, supporters of oligarchy with wealth (or with noble birth), and supporters 
of aristocracy with virtue” (Ethics, 1131a: 25). In other words, in the praxis of socially 
relating “each party is obliged to defend the  axia of its [own] ‘value’, to argue that its 
‘merit’ merits  the  role  of  distributive  basis,  that  its  ‘dignity’ deserves  the  dignity  of 
providing the criterion of justice” (Castoriadis, 1984: 297). Which  axia is therefore the 
most valid? “Why this something, why not something else?” (ibid., 298).
Coupling Castoriadis’ thoughts on value,  equality,  justice and politics with Veblen’s 
theory  of  capital,  Cochrane  (2011)  suggests  that  the  essence  of  axia –  at  least  in  the 
contemporary,  capitalist  world,  but  we  may  expand  the  domain  to  include  all  non-
egalitarian  regimes  of  distributive  justice  (in  practice,  all  historical  societies)  –  is  not 
(objective) labour or (subjective) utility, as the contemporary capitalist cosmology would 
posit (see Nitzan and Bichler, 2009), but (relational) control. Put crudely, Cochrane argues 
that the principle of value (axia) is power. 
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Aristotle, however, is more subtle and “suggests two answers to this question; but, in a 
sense, he also says that there is no answer” (Castoriadis, 1984: 299). On the one hand, he 
argues that  axia ‘is’ chreia, that is,  need that holds all things together, “the usefulness of 
individuals both for each other and collectively for the city” (ibid.). On the other hand, 
especially in the  Politics,  he contends that  axia ‘ought to be’ virtue, for virtue is man’s 
telos (ibid., 322); in this respect, he also adds that “the logos and the nous are the natural 
ends for us men” (ibid.),  thus drawing an analogy between  logos,  nous  (intellect),  and 
virtue,  that  altogether seems to suggest  that  knowledge and education (paideia)  should 
constitute the essence of axia, and hence the principle of value.
Many see in the ambivalence of Aristotle’s position the implicit acknowledgement of an 
impossibility to philosophically provide a solution to the problematic of value (for instance 
Theocarakis, 2008); others, in the same vein as Marx, even argue for a failure of the Greek 
philosopher to see what was already there,  given, in the form of either labour or utility: 
again,  (exchange)  value.  However,  I  shall  argue  that  far  from  being  blind,  Aristotle 
understood very well the problematic of value and realised the insignificance of positing an 
identity of value once and for all. The principle of value is neither power nor labour nor 
utility, but the principle itself, that is, institutional genesis. And so, “what, then, was there 
in  truth  to  see?”  asks  Castoriadis  (1984:  278).  His  answer  is  “nothing”:  Aristotle  saw 
Nothing. This, to be sure, should not be taken lightly. Indeed, according to Castoriadis, 
‘nothing’ in this case does not mean abstract nothingness – oblivion in a logical-ontological 
sense –, but a “real phantasmagoria” (ibid.), a socially constructed nothing, an ‘instituted 
absence’: it is a  significant  Nothing of which  chreia  is a metaphorical instance54 and the 
manifest imperative. 
Amato offers  a  powerful  interpretation of  Aristotle’s  notion  of  chreia  in  relation  to 
money.  According  to  the  Italian  scholar  (Amato,  2010:  18)  money  is  the 
performance/making of nothing (“la moneta è la messa in opera del nulla”). The universal 
54 In The imaginary institution of society Castoriadis, moving from the example of the signs O and I, argues 
that an institution (an instituted sign or form) is  not even  Nothing. It is neither a ‘thing’ nor a ‘thought’ (a 
concept). “Nor does it partake of Nothing: it is not a being of reason, not privative nothingness, nor negative  
nothingness; and it is not an imaginary being, ens imaginarium, for such O is an ellipse, not a letter. […] O 
and I are less than Nothing – for O and I are institutions, (‘instituted elements’), historically created figures, 
forms-eide.  Concealment of the social imaginary: the sign qua sign can exist only as an instituted figure, a  
form-norm, a creation of the social imaginary” (Castoriadis, 1997: 252). Imagining Nothing does not involve 
‘imagining what is not’ but rather implies metaphorical thinking, that is, “imagining/figuring one thing by 
means of another thing, being able to ‘see’ in what is what is not there, presenting or presentifying one thing 
by another thing” (ibid.).
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trait of money, accordingly, consists in its disappearance into circulation; this is possible 
only to the extent that money, as a measure of exchange, provides a limit to circulation and, 
in particular, a limit to the (finance-driven) indefinite procrastination of debts. Money, in 
other words, is properly money only if it guarantees the mutual redemption for those who 
are indebted with one another (see also Amato and Fantacci, 2012), and, reciprocally, if it 
serves as a means for an end which ought to be the closure of credit accounts. 
Hence,  adds Amato,  if  a  universal  ontological status  must be accorded to  money, it 
should be that of the ellipsis, the meaningful omission (Amato, 2010: 33): for money, as an 
institution, is the emblematic referent of a transcendental absence in virtue of which men 
(to the extent that they partake of the same constitutive indebtedness with one another) 
become able to meaningfully relate with each other. He thus writes (2010: 184):
 
Prima  di  ogni  soggetto  e  di  ogni  soggettivazione,  l’atto  umano  dell’istituzione  richiede 
l’entrata in rapporto con ciò che, proprio nel rapporto, si rivela come  radicalmente altro 
rispetto all’uomo, e allo stesso tempo come ciò senza cui l’uomo non è propriamente ciò che 
è chiamato ad essere: un essere capace di decisioni libere e creative.
‘Negativity’, it  has been suggested in more an occasion, well  describes the ontological 
locus of modern (fiat) money. In particular, what really strikes about  ex-nihilo  money is 
that it is (still) able to perform its normal functions and not “sink to nothing” (recall Hume) 
even though it is nothing but a promise in exchange for a promise ad infinitum, a reference 
to something hiding what is ‘in truth’ a reference to a constitutive nothing. Money is a 
promise of payment (an I Owe You) serving as a means of payment (an I Don’t Owe You 
Anymore): this is absurd, non-sense – that is to say, it means nothing. Significantly, this is 
precisely  what  the  scholar  normally  sees  before  her  eyes,  often  unconscious,  without 
wondering enough ‘why and how’: money is created ‘out of thin air’, ‘out of nothing’. 
Money is neutral, money is insignificant, money is nothing, money means nothing. 
Eppur si muove. And yet, even though it comes out of nothing to promise nothing in the 
end, money circulates, redistributes, and in this process it is sought after in itself as a value. 
How can it  be?  How can such an illusion  work  so  sweetly?  Discussing  the  theme of 
fetishism  and  how  it  relates  to  social  creativity,  Graeber  (2007:  146)  makes  a  very 
interesting remark in  this  respect,  and says  that  “[a]wareness of the illusion makes no 
difference.  In fact,  one could go further:  this is an illusion that manages to deceive its 
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victims precisely by reassuring them that it is an illusion, that they are not deceived”. In 
effect, to a more or less extent, and especially in times of greater judgement (crisis), we all 
are aware (or, perhaps, we remember) that in the end money is a fetish, an idol, an illusory 
entity, an insignificant phantasmagoria, a tool of a fundamental undesirability. Sensing the 
urgency  of  the  crisis,  we  even  feel  the  eschatological  presentiment  that  money  will 
eventually “sink to nothing”, dragging us and society along, guilty of having submitted to 
its fascination. This, however, does not seem to prevent most of us from fervently desiring 
it, and exploiting its (purchasing) power on a daily basis, whilst damning the heavens for 
its persistent lack. Admittedly, our experience of money – pretty much like our science of 
it, so profoundly positivist – is largely hypocritical. 
“Mancanza” – i.e. lack, absence, indigence; all in all, a ‘significant nothing’ – is the 
word Amato chooses to adopt in reference to Aristotle’s  chreia,  echoing the Scholastic 
tradition that similarly employed the word  indigentia  for it (Theocarakis, 2008). In the 
context or Aristotle’s discourse, argues Amato, the term ‘indigence’ is more appropriate 
than  ‘need’ because  here  chreia  does  not  stand  for  the  practical  need  of  the  utility-
maximising individual in relation to other individuals. Such an individualist conception of 
need, intended as a subjective utility or desire having as object a concrete res and included 
in a social system of  material  needs called (civil) ‘society’,  is at  the basis of much of 
today’s  methodologies  of  social  and economic  sciences  but  is  alien to  the Aristotelian 
reflection.  Instead,  by  chreia the  Greek  philosopher  has  in  mind  the  constitutive 
(institutional) dimension of reciprocal indigence for the citizens of the polis55. Chreia is in 
other words the attestation of a  transcendental need, not a  material  one (in its modern 
acceptation): namely the political need to participate and share, to become part of a greater 
whole, that of the political society (politike koinonia), in order for the citizens to exist and 
fulfil themselves as human beings.  
Accordingly,  Aristotle  relates  chreia  first  with  antipoiein,  that  is,  proportionate 
reciprocity or requital,  [f]or it  is by proportionate requital  that the city holds together” 
(Ethics, 1132b: 30), and, successively, with metadosis (Ethics, 1133a: 5), for “men seek to 
return either evil for evil […] or good for good […] and if they cannot do so there is no 
exchange (metadosis), but it is by exchange (metadosei) that they hold together” (D. Ross’ 
translation). As Castoriadis (1984: 305) points out in this respect, “[t]he city can be held 
55 In this respect, it is worth noting that for Aristotle democracy was a form of class rule by the poor (the  
needy, the indigent) (Wood, 2008: 39). 
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and  kept  together  only  if  exchange  materialises  what  Aristotle  successively  calls 
antipoiesis, metadosis, antapodosis, antidosis”. 
All these notions denotes forms of ‘mutuality’, or ‘reciprocity’ (but only in the broadest 
sense),  wherein “[w]hat  is  equal  on both sides  is  the knowledge that  the other  person 
would do the same for you, not that they necessarily will” (Graeber, 2011: 100). Critically, 
these forms of  mutuality are based neither in exchange nor in reciprocity  sensu stricto,  
except for the recognition of  mutual  expectations and responsibilities and, namely, “the 
understanding that, unless people consider themselves enemies, if the  need is considered 
great  enough,  or  the  cost  considered  reasonable  enough,  the  principle  of  ‘from  each 
according to their abilities, to each according to their needs’ will be assumed to apply (my 
italic)” (Graeber, 2011: 98). That is to say, mutuality is based on a partaking, a principle of  
participation that Graeber calls ‘baseline communism’: “the raw material of sociality, a 
recognition of our ultimate interdependence that is the ultimate substance of social peace” 
(ibid., 100). Crucially, this principle of participation does not apply to the whole of society 
but only constitute a basis for the forming of coalitions within society. Mutuality is in other 
words  a  principle of  sociability  that  concerns  political  association  (the  Aristotelian 
koinonia)  rather  than  an  end of  sociality  describing  society  at  large  (the  Aristotelian 
politeia). 
Significantly, most modern texts, and especially economic ones, tend to annihilate the 
institutional  dimension of  chreia  and its  related  conceptions  of  mutuality  in  favour  of 
materialist,  utilitarian,  overly-economic  notions.  And  so  chreia  in  some  cases  is  even 
translated  as  ‘utility’  or  ‘demand’;  in  a  like  manner,  antipeponthos,  which  means 
‘reciprocation’ and  ‘requital’  but  also  ‘retaliation’ (what  Dante  called  contrappasso), 
becomes  synonym  with  an  ‘equivalent  exchange’  of  a  commercial  orientation  (see 
Theocarakis,  2008).  But  the  most  striking  example  of  misconception  performed by 
mainstream economics is provided by the applications of the term metadosis, erroneously 
rendered as ‘exchange’ or even ‘barter’, but which actually means “giving one’s share” 
(Polanyi, 1980: 110-11). 
As  Fantacci  (2005:  35-6)  argues,  metadosis  is  neither  barter  nor  reciprocity  sensu 
stricto; nor is it to be intended, as Polanyi did, as the concrete act of giving one’s own 
share, in the form of an economic surplus, to a common fund (as a mode of redistribution).  
That  is  to  say,  metadosis  does not  indicate  any economic ‘trans-action’ (in  its  modern 
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sense)  whatsoever  but  connotes  participative ‘inter-action’,  that  is,  participation to  the  
political constitution of society. Crucially, it is a ‘political’ institution because it is a form 
of mutuality/sociability at  the basis of coalition-making  within  society – that is,  it  is  a 
manner of constructing power relations, not a neutral (pre-political and a-historical) basis 
of sociality, i.e. an abstract socialism or communism. 
Metadosis, says Amato (2010: 208), “è il dare che rende” – a ‘giving which yields’, or 
else a ‘participating which gives yield’. From this perspective, metadosis can be interpreted 
as an action that directly denotes an underlying interest (an interest that, assumingly, might 
even indicate the presence of an economic  rent,  see chapter 6). However,  says Amato, 
according to Aristotle such a ‘giving which yields’ ought to be performed in relation to a 
collective dimension of  kharis  (gratuity, grace), and not on the basis of some particular, 
‘private’ interest.  Kharis,  in  particular, connotes  a  religious  co-belonging,  a  ‘holding 
together’ that  is  in  the  interest  of  the  entire  community,  and “this  is  why [men]  give 
prominent place to the temple of the Graces – to promote the requital of services; for this is 
characteristic of grace: we should serve in return one who has shown grace to us, and 
should another time take the initiative in showing it” (Ethics, 1133a: 5). Kharis, to be sure, 
does not mean beneficence for and among the masses; more likely, it is  benevolence  for 
and among the élite – it is aristocratic grace,  noblesse oblige so to speak (we must never 
forget  that  koinonia –  a  “sharing  in  common”  indistinctly  rendered  as  ‘community’, 
‘society’, ‘association’ – is not an abstract collectivity of human beings living together in 
the polis, but an oligarchic association of proprietors, i.e. an élite within society). 
Metadosis  is  therefore  a  participation  in  the  constitution  of  the  polis  based  on  a  
religious co-belonging, an intra-oligarchic sentiment of mutual benevolence. Without such 
an aristocratic principle of sociability, chreia would not materialise as the all-encompassing 
foundation of civic life. But what is chreia anyway? What does the Nothing, the Lack that 
it  symbolises,  actually  signify?  Perhaps,  as  the referent  of  a  constitutive  dimension of 
reciprocal  indigence,  chreia  represents  within  the  polity  a  basic  social  condition:  the-
being-in-debt-with-one-another  (also  known  as  ‘interdependency’).  The  term  chreia  is 
indeed related to  chreos,  meaning ‘debt’,  ‘obligation’,  ‘loan’.  It  is worth noting in this 
respect that, according to Graeber (2011: 121), “debt is strictly a creature of reciprocity”: it  
is an ‘exchange of equivalents’ not brought to completion which is nonetheless based on 
the  premise  of  a  contractual  (legal)  equality  between  the  counterparts.  According  to 
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Graeber (2011: 86), it is precisely the assumption of equality what makes (economic) debts 
different from moral obligations. In other words, economic debts are a  consequence  of 
equality in exchange. But, what is more important, equality in exchange is a consequence 
of the awareness of being in debt with one another, as parts of a greater whole. That is to  
say, chreia precedes equality in exchange. 
Being-in-debt-with-one-another means that we all owe something to one another, and 
this principle of mutuality cannot be exhausted by any payment in cash or kind. Chreia is 
expression of a transcendental ‘demand’ that can only be met by kharis (grace, gratuity), 
that is, by a (moral) mutuality of wills likely to culminate in a symbolic  gratias agimus 
(‘rendere  grazie’,  a  thanksgiving).  For  no  one  has  to  literally  thank  anyone,  or 
economically pay her obligation against the community: indeed, how can we possibly pay 
our debt to the community that made us (made us flourish) and gave us the chance to fulfil 
ourselves as ‘human beings possessed of  logos’? How much should we owe it? Besides, 
the  community  of  whom, or  what?  Our  family?  Our  friends?  Our  tribe?  Our  political 
coalition? Society? The state? The ‘absentee’ owners of everything? The Treasurers of the 
Gods, or God himself? The entire cosmos? Or perhaps just our ego? 
This leads us to the fundamental consideration of this chapter: as a substitute of chreia,  
nomisma  is  not a representative of economic debt, i.e. a measure of indebtedness and a 
debt itself. On the contrary,  nomisma is a monumental reminder (an emblem) of the fact 
that we can ‘redeem’ ourselves and be ‘free’ – equals – only to the extent that we are in 
relation with one another, as members of the same political coalition. In this connection, 
Graeber (2011) also develops Philippe Rospabé’s original argument and argues that money 
was not originally devised to pay debts, but arose as the acknowledgement of the existence 
of a debt that could not be paid. In particular, Graeber (2011: 134) claims that “money is 
first and foremost an acknowledgement that one owes something much more valuable than 
money”, something that matters with the very life and death of man as a member of a 
greater social whole and the subject/object of an instituted violence (which is preserved 
within either the formal canons of the law or some customary code of honour) that is 
camouflaged as a morality of some sort (ibid., 163). He thus writes:
In  a  way,  it’s  all  very  reminiscent  of  primordial-debt  theory:  money  emerges  from the 
recognition of an absolute debt to that which has given you life. The difference is that instead 
of imagining such debts as between an individual and society, or perhaps the cosmos, there 
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they are imagined as a kind of network of dyadic relations: almost everyone in such societies  
was in a relation of absolute debt to someone else. It’s not that we owe “society”. If there is  
any notion of “society” here – and it’s not clear that there is – society is our debts” (Graeber, 
2011: 136).   
Society is our debts (crea), and our debts are the principle (axia) of our power relations 
(analogia) – i.e. chreia is in other words the incommensurable principle of partaking of the 
same indigence,  the illusion of being all equal before death. And so, says Aristotle, as a 
collective participation (in the name of a reciprocal indigence) in the political constitution 
of the polis, chreia constitutes the true unity of society and, conformingly, it should be the 
true measure and criterion for establishing distributive justice and equity – the true unity of  
value – because there is no axia which is more virtuous, fine and just than the well-being, 
happiness, and human flourishing (eudaimonia) of the political society. 
However, we cannot measure things by need – that is to say, we cannot quantify how 
much  we  owe  to  one  another  as  members  of  the  same  collective  enterprise,  as 
partners/shareholders  in  the  same  joint  venture  (koinonia),  or  ‘going  concern’,  called 
society – as we cannot assess which (whose) axia is more worthy because each value is a 
qui  pro  quo, “a  gigantic  loan”  (Castoriadis,  1997:  244)  made  upon  the  pledge  of  the 
“intangible assets of the community” (Veblen, 1908a). Without access to this ‘immaterial 
equipment’ of practical, tacit knowledge – this common sense –  “no individual and no 
fraction of the community [i.e.  no political  coalition] can make a living,  much less an 
advance” (Veblen, 1908a: 519). Hence the axia serving as criterion for proportionality can 
never be the value of a social group or class alone, enclosed in itself,  but ought to be 
recognised as such by everyone, if the polity wants to flourish and respond to the demands 
of its members: it has to become the normative value par excellence.
Nomisma  is  therefore  not  the  materialisation  of  any particular  axia  but  the  abstract 
embodiment of each and every axia: it is not a form of value but the one form of value (or 
uniform  value) that finally enables a reflection on  the manifold values implicated in our 
actions. This is why we can say that  nomisma  is self-referential and self-reflexive and, 
eventually,  that  it  appears  as  an  autonomous  entity  (an  auto-nomos):  because  it  is  an 
emblematic  illusion  (whose  genesis  ought  to  be  sought  in  alienation  and  fetishism) 
reassuring us that it is an illusion, an index sui. Nomisma is in other words a “peculiar non-
sense” (Aristotle, Politics, 1257b), the fiction that a debt that cannot be paid could indeed 
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be paid in some sense,  thus imaginarily freeing us from the tangle of social relations we 
belong, the network of responsibilities we are immersed in and, therefore, giving us moral 
reasons  for  ‘ripping’ others  from their  social  contexts  (Graeber,  2011).  Ironically,  the 
unintended  consequence  of  the  institution  of  nomisma  is  that  one  great  mind  such  as 
Aristotle’s may find herself ‘embedded’ in a sophisticated culture fed upon the degradation 
of human masses turned into chattel slavery, and find it normal (‘of the same kind of the 
norm’), responding to a natural principle of hierarchy. 
And so, says Aristotle, money has become by convention (nomos) a sort of ‘substitute’ 
for chreia, that is, the real (and yet fictitious) unity of all proportions – the unity of analogy 
– at the basis of distributive justice and, thus, at the foundation of political society as a 
(relational) whole; “and this is why it has the name ‘nomisma’: because it exists not by 
nature but by law/custom (nomos) and can be altered and rendered useless at will” (Ethics, 
1133a: 25-30). Nomisma is in other words “the process or the result of lawful distribution” 
(Kurke, 1999: 14), the institution of a political justice for the association of equals and 
equals alone. Indeed, the term nomisma is linguistically related to  nemo (to distribute, to 
deal  out),  nemesis  (distribution  of  what  is  due,  divine  resentment,  assignment  of  due 
anger), nomisdein (to acknowledge by belief or practice) and, of course, nomos (anything 
allotted or assigned, convention, custom, law) (von Reden, 1995: 177; Seaford, 2004: 142). 
According  to  von  Reden  (1995:  177),  it  was  the  absence  of  a  measure  in  social 
retribution – of a ‘just’ means of distribution – that provided the context for the emergence 
of nomisma “as a means of payment to create social peace [appeasement, relief]” (ibid.). 
“Nomisma might, then, have its origins in the political necessity to express ‘measure’ in the 
construction of relationship of power and authority (my italic)” (von Reden, 1995: 177). 
Notably, nomos originally meant ‘order’, and in particular ‘military order’, “implying in a 
strong sense  that  something  is  ‘arranged’,  ‘given’,  ‘distributed’,  ‘measured  out’”  (von 
Reden,  1995:  177).  In  this  respect,  it  is  also  worth  noting  that  the  earliest  surviving 
occurrence of the word nomisma, as in Alcaeus, concerns the military: “truly she [Athena] 
was bringing together a scattered army, inspiring them with nomisma” (quoted in Seaford, 
2004: 143). In this connection, scholars have hypothesises that in an epoch characterised 
by violence and warfare coinage was originally devised by local authorities precisely to 
pay armies of mercenaries (see next chapter). Subsequently, coinage offered a solution to 
debt crises as a form of sovereign redistribution of ‘net worth’ to the indigents, to free the 
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peasantry  from  debt  peonage,  secure  their  agrarian  self-sufficiency  and  hence  their 
exploitation as the basis of an army subject exclusively to the interests of the political 
society as a whole (see next chapter).
Regrettably, Aristotle will never overcome the quantum leap between axia and chreia on 
the one hand and nomisma on the other. In  Nicomachean Ethics  he does not explore the 
actual story of how and why things (chremata) have come to signify nomisma but is only 
preoccupied with understanding the political significance of its institution and, hence, the 
‘transcendental’ truth of its normativity: what it means to be ‘by nomos’. In Politics, on the 
other  hand,  the Greek philosopher  will  discuss  the  telos  of  nomisma,  hence  the social 
consequences of its use, including the commercialisation and degradation of society, thus 
focusing more on the ‘materialistic’ side of its meaning. He will say very little, however, 
about how and why precious metals have actually come to be coined and monetised, apart 
from an appeal to the rationale of inter-polis commercial trade. In other words, his will 
remain a purely phenomenological qua philosophical interest in nomisma, instrumental to a 
broader  political  inquiry  on  the  principles  of  ethics.  For  these  reasons  Aristotle’s 
interrogation cannot be listed as a proper ‘sociology’ of money because, though it provides 
a  basic  ‘semantics’ of  its  sign-form that  will  constitute  the  basis  of  much  of  modern 
thought on the subject, it nevertheless lacks a ‘semiotics’ of its institution – that is, a study 
of the historical origins and development of such a sign-form –  and consequently remits 
the  reader  to  a  rather  dogmatic  acceptance  of  its  veritas  transcendentalis,  an  enigma 
condensed into the word nomos.
And so he  repeats  in  a  tautological  fashion:  by convention  (nomos)  –  that  is,  as  a 
normal thing to do insofar as we are participating in the same polity – we have instituted a 
common measure (that we have accordingly called nomisma), “for it is this that makes all 
things commensurate, since all things are measured by nomisma” (Ethics, 1133b: 20)…
…kai  dia touto  tounoma ekhei  nomisma,  hoti  ou phusei  alla  nomō esti,  kai  eph'  hēmin  
metabalein kai poiēsai akhrēston – …and this is why it has the name nomisma,  because it 
exists not by nature but by  nomos  and it is in our power to change it and make it useless 
(Ethics, 1133b: 30).
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CHAPTER 6
Genealogy of the currency
A history of politics
The clue is in the word. And the word comes with a (social) text. The use of the term 
nomos increases rapidly in texts of the VII century and progressively substitutes the term 
thesmos, previously employed by the Greeks to designate statutory law. This change of 
vocabulary is indicative of a secularisation of Greek law (i.e. a “separation of the norms 
from the judges”, Seaford, 2004: 178) occurring in conjunction with the constitution of the 
polis-form  of  social  organisation,  and  paralleling  altogether  a  written  (alphabetic) 
codification of customary norms. Indeed, “while  thesmos  implies the imposition of law 
from above and has a distinctly religious flavour, nomos […] implies a law to which there 
is common agreement, something that people who are subject to it themselves regard as a 
binding norm” (Wood, 2008: 36). 
The central philosophical significance of the word nomos, however, only emerges when 
its broad meaning is reconfigured in dialectical opposition to the concept of physis, starting 
from the Sophist debates on the ‘naturalness’ versus ‘conventionality’ of language (Adams, 
2011: 20; also Wood, 2008: 53). From the Sophists on, thinking in terms of  physis  and 
nomos will become a privileged manner of discussing about ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to 
be’ in the world – thus a way to ‘philosophically’ legitimise on an onto-logical ground 
political  and  ideological  (op)positions  in  the  name  of  ‘truth’  or  ‘true  knowledge’. 
Following the  ‘idealist’ twist  given by Plato’s  theory  of  forms  underlying  a  failure  to 
confront  the  realities  of  change  and  motion  (Wood,  2008:  85),  Aristotle  seeks  to  re-
integrate these two key-notions under the domain of human praxis and change. Hence, 
contra Plato, he tries to uphold nomos (the social-institutional, the particular, the mutable) 
over  physis (the natural, the universal, the fixed), by championing a notion of man as a 
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political human being possessed of logos (Adams, 2011: 21). 
In the end, however, the many questions that Aristotle poses in his works will converge 
on a phenomenological discourse on the proper ‘order of nature’ and thus lead to teleology. 
Namely, despite his attention to the question of politics at large, he will end up endorsing 
an ontological primacy of physis vis-à-vis nomos: he will accordingly privilege a reflection 
on the ‘nomos of physis’, i.e. the order of nature, “that which is permanent and unchanging 
in a world of change” (Wood, 2008: 85), that will not be sufficiently complemented by a 
converse understanding of the ‘physis of nomos’, i.e. the ‘nature of order’ lying beyond the 
apparent normality of human conventions. In short, Aristotle will miss the relevance of the 
‘sociological’ themes of alienation, reification and fetishism in relation to the genesis, the 
telos and, especially, the normality of institutions.
This  applies  to  his  phenomenology  of  nomisma. As I  have  shown in  the  previous 
chapter,  in  Nicomachean  Ethics, after  having  outlined  (around  the  key-concept  of 
analogia) a phenomenology of justice and equality in exchange, Aristotle re-delivers the 
enigma  of  nomisma  ‘as  it  is’ to  the  reader,  leaving  intact  (i.e.  without  solving)  the 
ambiguous  dialectic of  nomos  and  physis  underpinning his  broad discourse:  in  a  final 
analysis, we are told that the Greek currency is a human convention (of the same kind as 
nomos)  and an institutional  foundation  of  society,  created  by men ‘sufficiently  for  the 
purposes  of  chreia’  (“pros  de  tēn  khreian  endekhetai  hikanōs”,  Ethics,  1133b:  20). 
However, we are also informed that man is by nature a political being possessed of logos, 
which altogether calls for the following consideration: allegedly, as political animals, we 
naturally need a symbolic system to give form to our experience, communicate and survive 
as a species; hence we need institutions, rules and norms, and language above them all, to 
provide a ground for our capacity to meaningfully relate with one another; to  proportion 
our values (ends/purposes) and  ration  our means; to articulate  relations of power with 
fellows as well as forms of control over others (and over the Other); finally, to iterate our 
survival  and prosper  as  political  associations  of  men (possessed of  logos  and property 
altogether).  But  if  so,  on  what  ground  can  one  sustain,  together  with  Aristotle,  that 
nomisma is not by physis but by nomos, given that the two are inherently entangled with 
one another, to the point of even merging into the figure of Homo Politicus? After all, don’t 
men create  nomisma  in the name of a need that  transcends them – a need that in fact 
resembles a natural imperative?
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Not  incidentally,  it  is  worth  noting  that  Aristotle’s  thoughts  on  human  nature  find 
support in a recent hypothesis coming from the field of evolutionary linguistics (Dessalles, 
2007),  according to which language has a  political  origin – that is  to  say,  “before our 
species became Homo Loquens, speaking man, it was  Homo Politicus” (Dessalles, 2007: 
357). It has been argued, in particular, that as groups of primordial hominids grew in size, 
the ‘ability to be relevant’ by linguistic means superseded violence and physical strength 
(there is in fact no intrinsic advantage in being strong and violent if you can be easily 
outnumbered) as the primary criterion for the granting of status, the selection of partners 
and, eventually, the creation of stable coalitions centred on ‘leaders’. Language, in other 
words, was instituted because it was functional to something that transcended language 
itself, i.e. the politics of coalition-making. As a result,
[h]uman beings turn into interlocutors for a fifth of their waking lives because they are in a  
game  which,  when  played  under  nature’s  conditions,  is  essential  to  their  survival  and 
procreation. The aim of the game is to discover whom to choose as allies and to determine 
who will influence collective decisions. It is a game which differs from the other one, the  
game of natural selection, because the winners are not the only ones who get to propagate  
their  difference.  In  the  coalition  game,  any  players  who  try  to  keep  all  the  status  for 
themselves, rather than grant it to others, may end up paying dearly for it. It is better to stand  
second in a coalition that wins than first in one that loses (Dessalles, 2007: 355-6).
The political association of proprietors members of the Greek polis seems to be playing 
this very ‘game’. To avoid stasis, instead of ‘showing off’ all their wealth and competing 
against one another,  they ought to  gratuitously grant each other status (axia)  – that is, 
recognise their common ‘going concern’ – and, upon it, “distribute honours and money” (to 
others) in the name of a reciprocal indigence, so as to achieve political justice. To this 
purpose, nomisma must be introduced, and it ought to be so upon the method of analogia, 
for in the end (even thought Aristotle does not say it explicitly) it is better to stand lower in 
a relation of proportional equality (among oligarchs and aristocratic rentiers) than higher or 
equal  in  a  relation  of  geometrical  equality  (among  democrats,  petty  shopkeepers  and 
bondsmen).
Nomisma, says Aristotle, is “entirely an institution” and “it is in our power to change it  
and  make  it  useless”.  Arguably,  Aristotle’s  choice  to  overemphasise  the  normative 
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character (i.e. the nomos) of Greek coinage vis-à-vis its material and technical properties 
stems from the philosopher’s faith in the  autonomy of  the political  society (and in the 
necessity/rightfulness of  this  auto-nomos).  However,  by merely stressing the  enigmatic 
normality (“the peculiar non-sense”) of the phenomenon Aristotle doesn’t do total justice 
to a thorough understanding of its institution. Using the philosopher’s own typology of 
causality, it could be indeed sustained that by focusing on the ‘final’ and ‘efficient’ causes 
of  nomisma  Aristotle misses the significance of its ‘material’ and, especially, ‘formal’56 
ones:  he  thus  does  not  explain  why  and  how  historically  precious  metals  got  coined 
(material cause) and monetised (formal cause), but only why and how the outcome of such 
a ‘formative’ process, i.e. nomisma, was necessary, ‘sufficiently for the purposes of chreia’ 
(efficient cause), insofar as finalised to the realisation of political justice (final cause). 
The invention of redeemability
The institution  of  coinage  marked  (never  has  the  verb  been more  appropriate)  an  all-
encompassing  conceptual  revolution  that  changed  the  ways  in  which  people  normally  
spoke  and  thought,  as  they  began  for  the  first  time  to  refer  to  both  their  material  
possessions and their personal conduct “in terms of money” (Schaps, 2004: 16). It is not a 
coincidence  that  coinage  emerged  during  the  so-called  Axial  Age,  when  ancient 
mythologies  got  progressively  entangled  into  metaphysical  cosmologies  and  both 
philosophies and religions (that is,  universal principles of reasoned enquiry and human 
conduct) were formulated and written down for the first time in the history of civilisations. 
Arguably,  this  was  the  time  when  people  began  producing  systematic  intellectual 
reflections on the ‘proper’ – hence on ‘property’ as well as ‘propriety’ – both in the natural 
and in the social world. 
According to recent scholarship, coinage should not be intended as merely an outcome 
of this revolutionary conceptual change but ought to be understood as a social form that 
enabled such a social change in the first instance. As a preliminary remark, it must be 
stressed that the introduction of coinage had nothing to do with technical advancement in 
metallurgy per  se;  in  fact,  “the technology for making coins was trivial  and had been 
available for a long time. Technology was not the driving force behind the invention of 
56 ‘Formative’ or ‘forming’, according to Bohm (1980: 15-16).
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coinage” (Schaps, 2004: 16).  No need to say that the myth of technological determinism 
prospers upon an even deeper belief – that technology is a neutral aspect of social change, 
i.e.  a  process  of  discovery  that  is  not  vitiated  by  power  relations.  Society,  from  this 
perspective, simply adapts to technological change. However, as pointed out by Cox (1987: 
20-21), “technology is the means of solving the practical problems of societies, but what 
problems are to be solved and which kinds of solutions are acceptable are determined by 
those who hold social power”57 (see also chapter 4). 
Coinage was certainly a human invention but it must be kept in mind that it was not a 
sudden discovery that marked a sharp discontinuity with the past; instead, it was a gradual 
historical development coming “at the end of a long process of the monetization of Near 
Eastern  society”  (Schaps,  2004:  16)58.  Behind  the  ‘invention’  and  its  subsequent 
institutionalisation was a political problem and, possibly, a number of them. In this respect, 
it  is  significant that the first  ‘Greek’ coins were actually struck in Lydia,  western Asia 
Minor, probably in the seventh century BC (and certainly no later than ca. 600 BC). Lydian 
coins were not made of gold or silver, as one might expect, but of electrum, a natural alloy 
of gold and silver (present in large quantities in the region). The peculiarity of electrum 
coinage  offers  an important  clue about  the type  of  political  problem that  coinage was 
meant  to  ‘solve’.  Wallace (1987) enumerates  a  number of hypotheses  on the origin of 
electrum coinage, but only a few try to make sense of its specificity, that is, the naturally 
variable consistence of electrum. 
A  first  hypothesis,  consonant  with  the  classical  orthodoxy  of  commodity-money, 
suggests that coinage arose as a response to the economic imperative to rationalize trade 
relations through a uniform and reliable means of payment.  Here coinage appears as a 
historically  necessary  development,  a  medium entailing  a  more  effective  and  efficient 
market exchange. This hypothesis however finds little support in the historical evidences; 
first of all, early electrum coins were too valuable to be used as means of payment in small 
transactions  and  retail  trade  (i.e.  market  transaction  on  the  spot  and  internal  trade); 
secondly, it seems that electrum coins did not circulate far from their place of issue, thus 
casting  a  shadow on the  belief  (also  shared  by Aristotle  in  Politics)  that  coinage  was 
invented  to  ‘smooth’  external trade.  Moreover,  the  idea  that  coinage  entailed  an 
57 In a similar vein, Castoriadis (1984: 241) argued that “[i]t is true that there are ‘obligatory solutions’; but it  
is no less essential to bear in mind that, for man, there are no obligatory problems”.
58 Seaford (2004: 125) even sustains that “Greek coinage represents a synthesis of Near-Eastern and Greek 
practice”.
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optimisation/rationalisation (Kroll speaks of “transactional efficiency”) of economic and 
social transactions cannot explain why coinage was not invented much earlier since the 
technical means for its metallurgical production had been available for centuries (see also 
Schaps, 2004: 97). If, according to Kroll (2008: 18), coinage substituted bullion because of 
reasons of practical convenience (on the one hand, lower transaction costs as electrum 
coins were no longer weighed out but counted; on the other hand, seigneurage gains for the 
issuing authority), why did other great trading states such as Carthage and Phoenicia  not 
adopt coinage straight away (Kurke, 1999: 12)?
Contra the ‘market hypothesis’, Cook (1958) and others have argued that coinage was 
originally devised by the state in order to standardize the payment of mercenaries. In its 
generalised,  chartalist,  version,  the  ‘state  hypothesis’  suggests  that  coinage  was  for 
practical reasons a legal tender introduced by the central authority for all payments both by 
and to the state (see Kraay, 1964). Like the market hypothesis, this argument too is unable 
to make sense of the specificity of electrum, and namely why the first coins struck were 
made not of gold or silver, but of a natural alloy of both. In this respect, Wallace (1987: 
338) points out that “if the intention was to produce ‘standard units for uniform payments’, 
electrum  was  precisely  the  wrong  metal  to  use”  because  of  its  variable  metallic 
consistence. More specifically, this hypothesis does not explain why only electrum was 
struck  despite  the  fact  that  silver  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  gold  too  were  available  for 
minting.  Secondly,  the  state  hypothesis  does  not  take  into  account  the  possibility  that 
electrum coins might have not been accepted at their face value by mercenaries based on a 
mere state guarantee. In fact, the variety of standards adopted in the early coin series, the 
irregularities of shape, the high value of the coins and, above all, the complete absence of 
clipping seem to suggest that at first electrum coins were not negotiable at face value and, 
thus,  were  not  counted  (and  trusted  upon)  as  a  ‘legal  tender’ (as  the  ‘transactional 
efficiency’ argument  would  have  it  too)  but  were  still  weighed  at  each  transaction 
(Wallace, 1987). 
As a variant of the state hypothesis, Price (1983) has argued that early coinage was at 
first a “means by which political, military and juridical office was rewarded; it combined 
the traditions of seals and personal badges as symbols of authority on the one hand and 
gifts of precious metal for political and juridical office on the other” (von Reden, 1997: 
156). In other words, electrum coins were designed as ‘bonus’ payments to state employees 
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and, perhaps, as gifts to mercenary soldiers, though in the latter case coins should have 
spread more widely than they did (see Schaps, 2004: 98). To be sure, both the ‘gift’ and the 
‘state’  hypotheses  are  very  attractive  (and  certainly  more  consistent  with  historical 
evidences than the ‘market efficiency’ hypothesis) as they provide a plausible explanation 
for the process of monetisation that followed the invention of coinage (see for instance 
Graeber, 2011). However, they still do not provide a convincing reason for why electrum 
and only electrum was coined at first.
According to another original argument, the initial issue of coins was meant to be a 
financial strategy elaborated by the state authority to profit from minting (Bolin, 1958). 
Unlike the above-mentioned explanations, the ‘seigneurage hypothesis’ has the merit to 
directly address the question of the specificity of electrum coinage, as it holds that the state 
initially chose to mint exclusively electrum because, unlike gold and silver, the dilution of 
electrum was difficult to detect, de facto making debasement more easily practicable. This 
theory, however, is based on two assumptions proven to be wrong by Wallace (1987: 388-
89):  first,  that  the  metallic  composition  of  electrum  was  naturally  consistent  (i.e.  all 
electrum naturally enjoyed a similar gold-silver ratio) and hence the variability of electrum 
coinage  was  deliberately produced  through  dilution;  second,  that  at  the  time  electrum 
coinage was introduced, techniques were already available for establishing an objective 
value-relation  between electrum on the  one  hand and gold  and silver  on  the  other.  In 
addition,  this  hypothesis  clashes  with a  more credited hypothesis:  electrum coins  were 
initially weighed rather than counted. Indeed in a context wherein weighing was still the 
norm, a deceptive manipulation of the alloy would have quickly discredited the diluted 
coinage and drastically shrunk the possibility of seigneurage gains.
More recently, Holloway (1978) has argued that the variability of the electrum alloy 
“lessened the trust that could be placed in an electrum coin” (quoted in Wallace, 1987: 
387); as a result, unlike gold and silver, electrum could not circulate without a “stamp of 
ownership”  guaranteeing  the  coin’s  value  (i.e.  redeemability)  to  the  issuer.  Therefore 
Holloway put forward the hypothesis that electrum was initially coined by a numbers of 
private issuers who imprinted a ‘mark of redeemability’ on it in order to make it more 
fungible  and  stabilise  its  market  value.  Wallace  basically  takes  on  this  ‘redeemability 
hypothesis’, though he contests that electrum was struck by public agencies, not by private 
issuers (actually without providing much support to this claim). According to Wallace, the 
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seventh-century owner  of  electrum faced the  problem of  having a  potentially  valuable 
merchandise and a store of value whose worth, however, could not be easily quantified in 
objective terms because of the inherently variable substance of the alloy in relation to both 
gold and silver (consequence of a combination of natural variability and susceptibility to 
artificial  dilution).  Because  of  such  unreliability,  it  must  have  been  impossible  to  use 
electrum bullion as a means of exchange and a store of value (as it was normally done with 
gold and silver); quite the contrary, it is plausible that its market value would have tended 
to fall (Wallace, 1987: 392). To overcome the problem of the uncertain value of electrum it 
would have been necessary to determine its content once and for all by separating its gold 
and silver components through a heating process called cementation. Regrettably, such a 
process was yet  to be discovered in 600 BC – and so,  “[b]efore the discovery of that 
process, the solution was coinage” (Wallace, 1987: 392). 
As Wallace convincingly argues, the standardization of electrum coin series cannot be 
explained by considerations of convenience (that is, to obviate the problem of weighing 
bullion at each transactions), because electrum coins were probably not negotiable at face 
value without being weighed. Instead,  “coinage served to stabilize the market value of 
electrum” (Wallace, 1987: 392) by impressing a seal on the obverse of the coin.
The obverse stamp might have been an identifying mark, but this cannot have guaranteed the 
alloy (which varied); it cannot have guaranteed weight (which varied and could be altered);  
and (pace Price) it cannot have served to represent the “authority” of the issuer (which per  
se is meaningless). Rather, since the issuer of electrum coins must in the first instance have 
spent his coins at the value declared for them, that value must have been established by the  
promise  that  he  would  accept  back  or  redeem  his  coins  at  the  same  rate.  Ultimately,  
therefore, the stamp identified the issuer and guaranteed redeemability (Wallace, 1987: 393, 
my italic).
The  redeemable  character  of  early  coinage  was  the  effect  of  a  promise  of future 
acceptability, a “surety” for future exchange (Aristotle, Ethics, 1133b: 10) made by the 
issuer.  Namely,  the  mark  imprinted  upon the  metal  (after  its  standardisation  into  coin 
pieces) was guarantee of the stability of the (market) value of its natural substance when in 
the coin-form, because only in such a form the metal was accepted back by the issuer at the 
same rate. In this way, electrum was eventually able to serve as a store of value and, upon 
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the issuer’s security, as a fiduciary transactional means: it was to all intents and purposes 
an abstract  fungible  asset.  To be sure,  the conjoint use of the adjectives ‘abstract’ and 
‘fungible’ is here an abuse of language since the former is always already implied in the 
latter:  namely,  fungibility is never  naturally given  but is always  technically developed,  
based on institutional arrangements about the ways and means of standardising the asset in 
question (and making it a potential commodity), and is consequently ‘abstract’ to an extent. 
Now, provided that redeemability was ensued upon the issuer’s security, “[t]his artificial 
or fiduciary quality meant that coins could circulate at their full, guaranteed values only 
within the area of  economic or political  influence of the issuer,  or in  areas where the 
reputation of particular issues had spread” (Wallace, 1987: 393). Most likely, Lydian kings 
started to relinquish some of their massive surplus of electrum to Greek merchants and 
mercenaries in exchange for goods and services. In particular, “[p]ayment of mercenaries 
would require numerous pieces of standard weight, but also, given the varying intrinsic 
value of pieces of electrum of the same weight, marks on the pieces to guarantee a standard 
value. It is even conceivable that it was Greek mercenaries who insisted on such a mark” 
(Seaford, 2004: 128). We must not forget that the archaic Greek world was one of constant 
warfare, violence, and plunder, witnessing the rise of a new kind of army, made up not of 
Homer’s heroic warriors but of trained professionals, such as the hoplite soldiers, who 
needed to be rewarded in some meaningful way. 
Seaford thus outlines the hypothetical story of electrum coinage (2004: 121-2):
A Lydian potentate wishes to use the military skills of Greeks who are outside his political 
control.  But  these  Greeks  are  not  the  subjects  of  a  redistributive  monarchy;  they  are 
relatively free individuals, who must be given gifts. Fortunately, our potentate has enough 
electrum to give each of them a piece. Every piece is stamped with his own device (e.g. the 
royal lion of Lydia) – for two reasons, both stemming from the novelty of mass distribution 
of prestigious gifts: firstly, in order to impress a crucial reminder of its source on what would 
otherwise be a strangely impersonal gift, and secondly in order to neutralise, by his authority, 
the  variety in  the  proportions  of  gold and silver  in  the  electrum.  The first  motive  is  to 
preserve, in new conditions, the traditional personal association of gift with donor.  But the 
material  needs  of  the  numerous  Greek  soldiers  are  more  important  to  them  than  the  
contrived personal link with the potentate. And so the authoritative typicality of the mark  
survives as an impersonal guarantee of future acceptability (my italic).
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Perhaps we can never know for sure the exact story of the concrete political problems that 
coinage was meant  to  solve but  it  appears  that  at  any rate  the solution was to ensure 
redeemability. Notably, the redeemability hypothesis is not only compatible with the state 
hypothesis,  but it  can also be applied to  make sense of all  other  hypotheses discussed 
above, including the market hypothesis. The institution of coinage in fact does not merely 
involve the articulation of a sovereign space for the “distribution of honours and money” 
(therefore a ‘state’ and a ‘state of affairs’ of some sort),  but also the construction of a 
network of relationships in the face of an absence of mutual trust among men (thus akin to 
a modern ‘market’). Arguably, this can only be possible to the extent that coinage is itself 
the vessel of a faith capable of replacing concrete trust among men. 
It goes without saying that redeemability implies the cultivation of a religious sentiment 
of salvation. Yet, what type of faith? Arguably, an electrum coin offers the possibility of 
redemption precisely because it  acts  as  a  liberating  power:  it  enables  one to  make an 
exchange and be free to ‘turn her back’ and walk away because this would not preclude the 
possibility to perform the same type of inter-action in the future. The liberation that the 
coin concedes,  however,  is  never absolute but always dependent on the surety that the 
‘promise of redemption’ made by the issuer will be honoured and, hence, that the coin will 
be accepted by a third party and eventually back by the issuer. Such a partial, conditional 
freedom in the hands of the original coin bearer adds on to the total, absolute freedom – or 
autonomy – of the original coin issuer. No need to say that the counterparts to this germinal 
monetary transaction are not ‘arithmetically’ equal: of the two, the issuer of coinage is the 
more credible, honourable, and powerful party. Issuing coinage per se does not alter the 
configuration of this pre-existing power asymmetry between the counterparts (I am here 
using  the  term ‘asymmetry’ instead  of  ‘hierarchy’ since  it  has  been  assumed  that  the 
original  counterparts  do not  belong to the  same ‘structure’ of  political  power,  e.g.  the 
Lydian king is not the overlord or patron of the merchants and soldiers whom he pays in  
cash); however by serving as a ratio – a principle of equivalence – upon which they can 
negotiate  their  own terms  for  appeasement, coinage  introduces  the  counterparts  to  an 
imaginary dimension in which they can be ‘geometrically’ equal, commensurable with one 
another,  and  move  their  claims  from  a  condition  of  reciprocal  indigence  (i.e. 
interdependency). 
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The granting of status (i.e. the cession of a partial/conditional autonomy) by a superior 
via coinage, however, comes with a price for the inferior, who is now morally obliged to 
pledge faith to the fiduciary value of the coin, de facto becoming “more realist than the 
king” (più realista del re): from now on she is bound to defend the conventional value of 
the coin with even more fierceness and obstinacy than the original issuer itself, since the 
burden is now on her. To be relieved she must act as a militant believer and help spreading 
the credo, find a potential third party who is willing to find appeasement in the same token 
and equally trust its value. The circulation of coinage thus requires the social construction 
of a secularised form of faith in the coin’s own liberating power, a sharing of the burden 
that  binds  individuals  together  at  any  level,  both  within  and  between  social  groups, 
coalitions, thus cutting transversally through the hierarchies of a political order (with a 
disruptive potential for the status quo). We may conceive of the coin’s liberating power as a 
magnitude of what Seaford has termed ‘fiduciarity’: “the excess of the fixed conventional 
value of pieces of money over  their  intrinsic  value” (Seaford,  2004: 7).  Allegedly,  the 
stamp on the coin is not guarantee of its metallic quality or quantity, but is indicative of the 
amount of liberating (purchasing) power conferred by convention to the coin (Seaford, 
2004: 136).   
Faith  in  the  conventional  value  of  coinage  demarcates  a  growing attitude  to  moral 
indifference towards inherited status (especially among the ‘middle classes’ of merchants 
and mercenaries who were likely to be the original coin bearers) insofar as redeemability is 
non-discriminating, assignable to potentially everyone and, as a matter of fact, demanded 
especially  by  the  ‘poor’ and  ‘indigents’ as  a  concession  of  partial  autonomy  by  the 
powerful.  This  is  because,  of  course,  aristocrats  and  well-born  do  not  really  see  the 
necessity  of  a  surety  against  their  potential  enslavement  or  debt-bondage;  quite  the 
contrary, they have a ‘surplus’ of surety – ‘own capital’ in modern banking jargon – which 
is in their interest to mobilise (capitalise) in the form of coinage, as a sort of  permanent  
lease, to pacify the demos (and share the burden of ‘debt adjustments’ with it), establish a 
new form of communitarian solidarity and gain a ‘differential’ control vis-à-vis aristocratic 
competitors. As it has been extensively documented, the circulation of coinage caused the 
erosion of traditional hierarchies and the subversion of ‘transactional orders’ and ‘spheres 
of exchange’ (i.e. the Homeric distinction between prestige and non-prestige goods). In 
particular, coinage was disruptive of hereditary rights, including ties of dependency and 
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debt-bondage,  hence primarily responsible for the transformation of patronage relations 
into debt relations (von Reden, 1995; 2010; Schaps, 2004; Graeber, 2011). 
However, coinage did not caused the dissolution of hierarchies, nor did it abolish rent  
gains by the wealthy. This is because coinage was not the token of some absolute ‘liberty’  
for its owners but, if anything, the emblem of their conditional co-belonging to a political  
coalition of ‘equals’. That is to say, what coinage actually did was to turn into normality 
the  fiction/illusion  of  an  equality  in  exchange –  the  revolutionary  idea  in  a  world  of 
patronage and vassal-like relationships that one could make an exchange and be free to 
walk away without showing disrespect or fearing a retaliation, conscious that in the future 
the same type of interaction could be repeated indefinitely. As a matter of fact, it was this 
new ‘rule of the game’ what assured in time the social reproduction of a class of ‘freemen’ 
and the crystallisation of social bonds of interdependency of an utilitarian type (i.e. not 
based on personal loyalty or solidarity): in short, the institution of a complex division of 
labour  based  on  the  presence  of  an  internal  market  (the  agora)  for  the  exchange  of 
previously incommensurable ‘use values’, now turned into negotiable ‘exchange values’. 
On the other hand, whilst weakening traditional bonds and breeding moral confusion 
(see Graeber, 2011), the circulation of coinage caused the progressive consolidation of a 
religious respect for the (issuing) authority: confidence in the fiduciary value of coins was 
at once symptomatic of a legitimacy of the body politick that issued them. Eventually, as 
the polis took over the mint and became the monopoly issuer of coinage, faith in coinage 
assumed the contours of a civic trust in the polis and, correspondingly, coinage became a 
symbol  of  the  political  autonomy  of  “those  who  hold  power  in  the  city”  and  the 
embodiment of the polis’ identity (see Martin, 1996; Howgego, 1995). It must be noted in 
this respect that the coins issued by the Greek poleis were made not of electrum but silver:  
electrum coinage was in effect a local innovation of Asia Minor due to the presence of 
mixed  gold  and  silver  lodes  in  the  region.  As  Schaps  points  out  (2004:  104),  the 
widespread  adoption  of  silver  coinage  that  followed  the  invention  of  (electrum)  coins 
“indicates that coins, even if they had begun as a solution to the problem of the variability 
of electrum, had come to be appreciated as what they now were: a countable unit of value” 
– in fact, a fiduciary instrument, measure and medium of a conventional value (in excess of 
the intrinsic bullion value) guaranteed by law. 
This  said,  there remains  a  crucial  question to  address,  one  which  the  redeemability 
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thesis alone cannot disembroil: how did faith in coinage originally arise? More specifically, 
assuming that early coins were a liberating power for their original bearers, what made 
them appetible to a third party, thus alimenting a collective sentiment of trust in their value 
and  turned  them  into  fiduciary  instruments?  According  to  the  chartalist  position,  the 
currency is by norm accepted because the issuer (e.g. the Lydian king) is already in the 
position to enforce a tax obligation (payable in coins) on the general population, de facto 
stimulating  a  demand for  it.  In  other  words,  state  taxation  drives  the  currency (Wray, 
1998). Visibly, this theory is based on the unproved assumption that the original issuer is in 
the ex-ante condition to enforce a debt upon others (e.g. the community). Also, the theory 
holds that the value qua validity of the currency is established by fiat and “is not bound to 
any material. It can occur with the most precious or the basest metals” (Knapp, 1924: 30). 
In  short,  according to  chartalism’s  general  propositions,  the  currency is  essentially  the 
product of a ‘deficit spending’ by the central authority and is therefore nothing but a debt 
that ought to be paid in the end to the issuer via tax settlement. 
I shall dispel doubts away beforehand: the chartalist thesis does not apply to the context 
of archaic Greece where, if anything, the currency drove the ‘state’ and not vice versa. 
Also, as I will argue later in the chapter, the high intrinsic (market) value of coins’ metal 
did matter for the construction of a faith in their circulation. But most importantly, I will 
show that  early  Greek coins  did not  constitute  a  liability for  their  bearers  but,  on the 
contrary, they resembled a form of equity: i.e. shares in the sovereignty of the polis, tokens 
qua ‘pieces’ of autonomy, conceivable in modern terms as a highly liquid portable asset or 
stock (what today banks accumulate as  reserves).  As a matter  of fact,  owners of large 
quantities of coins were not ‘subject’ of the polis, as the chartalist position would want; 
quite  the  contrary,  it  was  the  polis  to  be  subject  to  their  collective  interest,  as  they 
represented the strongest political coalition in the city: that of the ‘equals’. Regrettably, 
despite its important intuitions about the normative character of the currency, chartalism 
cannot really explain why Greek coinage circulated, as it remits the solution of such an 
enigma  to  an  external  force/violence  that  would  allegedly  ‘drive’ it  from  above: the 
authority. Here sovereignty is taken in a positivist fashion as a dogmatic departure point to 
justify the existence of the currency, whereas what is truly at stake is to understand how a 
currency,  and  the  faith  it  builds  upon,  articulates  sovereignty and  makes  communities 
autonomous. 
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Cultic participation, or else stakes in the autonomy of the emerging polis
Equality in exchange may be sanctified by fiat but before its legal codification can take 
place and be ‘written down’, it ought to be first ‘spoken’, that is, constructed, as from the 
relations, and relations of relations (analogia), that articulate the monetary ratio (logos) in 
the praxis. And so, if some violence is to be responsible for the value of the currency, it 
will  not  be  a  heteronomous force  exerted  from  without  (from  above)  by  an  ex  ante 
authority but a power that from within aliments the faith that the currency carries in an 
apparently autonomous fashion. It will be a violence with a reason (logos) to exist within 
the relation of exchange, not external it (although this reason will necessarily ‘look up’ in 
the direction of the greater, contextual whole of the polity).
Perhaps we can get a better sense of this ‘implicated’ violence in Money and the early  
Greek mind (2004) by Richard Seaford. In this book the author argues that ritual violence, 
and in particular animal sacrifice and the subsequent distribution of meat performed in 
early Greek temples and sanctuaries, was a precondition for the emergence of a collective 
confidence in the abstract  value  – the “impersonal all-powerful substance” – of Greek 
coinage.  As  I  have  already  suggested,  fiduciarity  denotes  an  enormous  conceptual 
transformation  introduced  by  coinage  in  the  early  Greek  mind:  within  the  political 
boundaries of the polis, precious metal was more valuable in the coin form vis-à-vis its 
bullion form – and the difference between these two physical states was utterly symbolic, 
i.e.  entirely  by  nomos,  as  an  Aristotle’s  scholar  would  say.  Coinage  blended  together, 
allegedly  for  the  first  time  in  history,  economic  (material)  wealth  with  political 
(transcendental)  power  in  an  institutional  form,  a  ‘value’ alimented  by  a  generalised, 
fetishist faith. 
To be sure, fiduciarity was only the tip of the iceberg of this conceptual revolution. In 
fact,  according to  Seaford,  the  “power  bestowed by this  communal  confidence  on the 
abstract substance of money was in turn a precondition for the genesis and subsequent 
form  of  presocratic  metaphysics”  (Seaford,  2004:  11).  In  particular,  the  metaphysical 
aspects of the coin-form might have provided to early Greek philosophers the “counter-
intuitive idea of a single substance underlying the plurality of things manifested to the 
senses” (Seaford, 2004: 175), de facto spurring the reflection on the problematic of the One 
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and the Many. Needless to say, Seaford’s discussion of the subject is very fascinating, as it 
encompasses not only the institution of coinage and the emergence of Greek philosophical 
cosmology, but also the genesis of individualism – the idea of the individual mind or soul 
(psuche) as a unitary site of consciousness – and the ‘tragic’ dialectic of individualism and 
communality that resulted from the tension between faith (the sacred) and violence (the 
profane)  as  carried  by  the  currency.  For  obvious  reasons  we  cannot  engage  in  an 
appropriate manner with Seaford’s complex argumentation in this session but only provide 
a brief discussion of its major points, especially for what concerns the social construction 
of fiduciarity in the Archaic age.
As a preliminary note,  it  must pointed out that the institution of coinage in Archaic 
Greece coincided with the rise of ‘sacred finance’ (see von Reden, 2010):  namely,  the 
performance of temples and sanctuaries as early agencies of monetisation and, hence, as 
treasuries of the nascent poleis. The construction of temples and sanctuaries is attested by 
the  eight  century  BC.  We  can  speak  in  this  respect  of  a  monumentalisation  of  cultic 
activities  –  sacrifices,  dedications  and votive  offerings  to  deity  – that  were previously 
conducted either in the open or at the house of a chieftain, and which now find an objective 
continuity (and memory) in the architectural structures of temples (Seaford, 2004: 63). As 
in the ancient societies of the Near East, Greek temples and sanctuaries initially served as 
the place for the storage of dedicated wealth, yet with an enormous difference as regards 
their purpose. In the ancient societies of the Near East as well as in the Mycenaean palatial  
societies, says Seaford, the practice of dedication was an economic act generally enforced 
upon the social base in order to directly sustain the power of an élite. The ancient temple 
functioned as a centre for gathering and storing (for future consumption) the food required 
to feed the gods – in fact, to feed the élite and the numerous temple’s personnel. In these 
ancient societies the motor of the economy was divine demand (Seaford, 2004: 74) and 
‘direct  producers’ surrendered  much  of  their  agricultural  product  to  the  authority  in  a 
process of redistribution of wealth to the top. 
By contrast, dedications to early Greek temples and sanctuaries were overwhelmingly 
symbolic since,  in  strictly  economic  terms,  the  Greeks  surrendered  very  little  to  the 
‘authority’: insubstantial smoke to the gods and certain small parts of the animal to the 
priests.  What’s  more  important,  part  of  the  wealth  they  offered  was  returned  to  the 
community  via  banquets  and sacrificial  feasts.  In  contrast  to  the  ancient  Near  Eastern 
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temple,  direct  source  of  rentier  gains  and  embodiment  of  the  exclusion of  the  great 
unwashed from the institutional privileges of god’s representatives, the Greek temple acted 
as an institution of political inclusiveness among the aristocratic families that were soon to 
hold power in the constitution of the polis. 
Seaford’s  basic  thesis  is  that  the  ritual  of  sacrificial  distribution  was  meant  to 
reconstitute at  a symbolic level a mechanism of heroic reciprocity that had meanwhile 
failed in the practice. The Homeric epic, in this regard, provides a mythical attestation of 
the crisis of the heroic social order. Notably, ‘heroes’ were not merely fictional characters 
but represented the highest officials that the Greeks knew in the Dark Ages (or Homeric 
age, 1200-750 BC circa) that followed the collapse of the Mycenaean civilisation: they 
were  essentially  local  ‘big  men’ or  ‘great  men’ (basileis),  heads  of  large  households 
analogous  to  medieval  ‘banal  lords’ (see  Teschke,  2003)  that  had  come  to  dominate 
villages via political alliances with other big men and by recruiting followers-companions 
to form warrior brotherhoods and bands (phula) (Donlan, 1985). In a sense, heroes were a 
warrior élite akin to the lower nobility of the medieval knightly class (see Teschke, 2003). 
Notably, heroes did not derive their authority from any ‘office’ held but achieved and 
maintained their  status  through martial  prowess and violence (Hall,  2007:  125),  which 
altogether alimented the myth of their heroic deed. Theirs was a warrior culture based on 
what Veblen (2007) termed “predatory habits of life”, as exemplified by an aesthetics of 
excellence and violence that saw in the taking of life – in particular, the killing of other 
warriors – the most honourable action. Such a “bellicose frame of mind” (Veblen, 2007: 
18)  reflected  the  substantial  investments  in  the  means  of  violence  and  the  military 
innovations that marked this epoch. To mention the most illustrative, the new technology 
‘iron’ displaced bronze in the production of tools and weapons,  since it  was relatively 
easier to procure and less expensive (Martin, 1996: 40). 
The Homeric age was accordingly a time of random violence, a political interregnum 
where a central,  palatial  administration of justice no longer existed so that each ‘hero’ 
constituted  de  facto a  ‘state’ (see  Schaps,  2004:  129):  a  quasi-independent  ‘unit  of 
sovereignty’ committed to establish and maintain a network of ‘diplomatic’ relations with 
other  heroes  and  with  his  own  direct  subordinates,  members  of  his  clan-family,  and 
followers-companions  recruited  for  campaigning.  Seaford  provides  a  categorisation  of 
heroic transactions, articulating a continuum that goes from allocation by naked violence to 
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barter-like exchange of things. Between these two poles are: prizes, gifts, the sharing of the 
booty  (and of  the  meat),  reward,  compensation,  ransom,  bride-price,  slavery  (Seaford, 
2004: 23-5). Of these ‘economic transactions’ two are especially important: gift-giving, 
promoting inter-heroic solidarity (i.e. solidarity among hero-lords via bonds of loyalty and 
obligation), and distribution of the booty, promoting intra-heroic solidarity (i.e. solidarity 
between the hero-lord and his companions)59. 
According to Seaford, both the Iliad and the Odyssey are organized around a crisis of 
heroic  reciprocity,  as  epitomized  in  the  Iliad by  the  conflict  between  the  leader 
Agamemnon and the warrior-companion Achilles (Seaford, 2004). Central to the narration 
is the failure to distribute the booty because of Agamemnon’s unjust control of the process. 
In particular, Achilles complains that his leader has shown no gratitude (kharis) for his 
fighting,  de  facto  posing  a  problem  of  equivalence  between  the  value  of  his 
reward/compensation on the one hand, and his actual worth in battle and, more generally, 
his  soul  or  life  (psuche),  on  the  other  (Seaford,  2004:  36-7).  The  paradox  of  this 
equivalence problem lies in the fact that heroic psuche is incommensurable and yet it ought 
to be somehow proportionate to a material reward, or else Achilles’ honourableness (timē) 
– which is measure of his life’s worth – would be seriously compromised. 
It is worth noting that the noun timē in Homer’s poetry could mean ‘honour’, ‘esteem’, 
‘worship’, ‘reverence’ as well as a ‘penalty’ or ‘compensation’; in later Greek it will also 
mean ‘price’ (Seaford, 2004: 33). Homeric timē reminds of the Medieval Irish concept of 
‘honour price’, a notion of incommensurable worth not to be confused with the concept of 
wergild, which instead refers to the  actual price of a compensation (see Graeber, 2011: 
176). By contrast  timē is, like Aristotelian  axia (see previous chapter), a ‘proto-value’: a 
principle of conduct rather than the end of an action (‘end’ is here employed in a double 
sense  as  a  transcendental  and subjective  finality  on  the  one  hand,  and a  material  and 
objective conclusion to an action via pecuniary settlement on the other). The two, however, 
embodies rather opposing morals. In fact, whereas axia is a sort of human dignitas at the 
foundation of ‘civil society’ (see previous chapter),  timē is earned upon naked violence 
and, says Graeber (2011: 170),  could be conceived at  best  as  surplus dignity:  “[a]t  its 
simplest,  honour is that excess dignity that must be defended with the knife or sword” 
(ibid.). The foundation of honour, adds the American anthropologist, is precisely the ability 
59 Notably, heroic gifts can be seen as proto-debt relations. They indeed created alliances and obligations 
between individuals or groups who might otherwise have nothing to do with one another (Graeber, 2001: 27).
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to strip others of their dignity, to the point of turning them into slaves, social dead ripped 
off their contexts (ibid.). As a result, paradoxically, heroic honour, to be thoroughly met, 
ought to lead to the commodification of others’ life (i.e.  slave labour) and thus to the 
progressive institutionalisation of private property. 
In effect, what we witness in the Homeric epic is precisely a breakdown of intra-heroic 
hierarchies due to an excessive, privatistic appropriation by the leader and, in more general 
terms,  in  consequence  of  an  encroachment  of  distributive  privileges  by  the  ‘political 
association’ of heroic nobles (Seaford, 2004: 44-5). For reasons that we cannot properly 
eviscerate in this  session,  towards the end of the Dark Ages, heroes had indeed begun 
acting as a proper leisure class that no longer pursued honour and martial prowess as a 
measure of one’s esteem, but sought power and ‘appropriateness’ in material wealth and 
property (see Veblen, 2007). As a matter of fact, this warrior élite was becoming to all 
intents  and purposes  a  rent-seeking hereditary aristocracy,  pursuing strategies  of  social 
reproduction similar to those conceived by medieval lords (see Teschke, 2003: 59-60), and 
involving among other things: rent maximization via intensification of bonded labour and 
slavery; ‘internal’ colonisation of land through land reclamation (this will be accomplished 
also via the temple enterprise); ‘external’ colonisation of land, usually in connection with 
warfare and conquest (see Braudel,  2002). We may assume in this respect that,  among 
other  things,  successful  cycles  of  campaigning  and  the  consequent  rise  of  domestic 
serfdom60 had turned the best of warriors into powerful agrarian lords. As a result, both 
inter-  and intra-heroic  solidarity  broke down and the  complementary  practices  of  gift-
giving  and  distribution  of  the  booty  assumed  a  ‘symbolic’  significance,  providing 
altogether  a  representation  of  heroic  solidarity  that  served  the  purpose  of  communal 
inclusiveness in a world of feudal anarchy.
And so,  sponsored by dominant  aristocratic  households,  early poleis  started to erect 
temples and sanctuaries in memory of a heroic past of solidarity and reciprocity. These 
monumental  architectures  served as  places  for  the  display  of  signs  (semata)  of  heroic 
might and formidableness and, thus, as loci of noble class consciousness. Having lost their 
character  of  economic  transactions  among  heroes,  gift-giving  and  distribution  of  the 
booty/meat turned into a cultic practice of dedications and ritual sacrifices in honour of the 
deities from which the aristocracy claimed to descend. Early dedications to sanctuaries 
60 According to Cartledge (2002: 159), from Homer to Aristotle slave or unfree labour was a constant of 
Greek economic practices. 
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were in fact “the kind of objects that in Homer are [heroic] interpersonal gifts” (Seaford, 
2004:  59):  bronze tripods and cauldrons,  armours,  but  also utensils  such as iron spits, 
jewellery, animal skin (the  aegis), human and animal figurines, and other durable items 
usually made of (precious) metal – everything that was instrumental to the conspicuous 
consumption by the aristocracy. 
To  be  sure,  here  the  term ‘consumption’ may  be  quite  misleading:  indeed,  though 
dedications may be seen as a form of ‘spending’ (some might be tempted to say: ‘deficit 
spending’) that members of the aristocracy sustained with the purpose of ‘showing off’ 
their wealth in a game of ostentation/competition, the maintenance of the cult as a whole 
required an investment (rather than a mere expense) of an intangible nature that, quite the 
contrary, was meant to foster affiliation and cooperation (koinonia) among aristocrats. If 
you let me the analogy with modern financial practice, the aristocratic sponsorship of the 
cult was like a collective  participation in a joint venture – i.e. the temple cult’s ‘sacred’ 
going concern – that involved the capitalisation of aristocratic honour (and credibility), 
now no longer relying on naked violence but based on the substantial  surety (or ‘own 
capital’) of hereditary lordship (or ‘real estate’).
But if so, what was then the economic purpose of such a financial-like joint venture? 
Regrettably,  to  properly  answer  to  these  questions  one  should  first  investigate  the 
conflicting  strategies  of  social  reproduction  –  involving  redistribution  and,  therefore, 
finance  – among Greek social  groups  and coalitions  and,  hence,  explain  the  changing 
nature of Greek social property relations in the time that went from the end the Mycenaean 
civilisation to the emergence of the polis life – which is clearly beyond the intents and 
possibilities of this work. However, drawing on what has been said in the previous chapter, 
I shall risk the following conjecture. 
Aristocratic sponsorship of the cult was not a means to a material end; though the cult 
might have been source of ‘private interests’ in the form of prebends, venal offices and 
privileged grants of communal land, it was not a strictly economic motive (an egotistic 
expectation  of  material  return/profit)  what  actually  drove  the  cult  sponsorship.  On the 
contrary, it  was a shared sense of  reciprocal indigence.  Participation in the cult was in 
other words a transcendental end materialising the political  need of metadosis: namely, a 
‘giving which yielded’ to local aristocracies no less than intangible power over the growing 
urban population and vis-à-vis neighbouring and foreign élites. Translated in a financial 
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jargon,  such  a  participation  was  in  effect  meant  to  set  up  a  collegial,  wasteful61 
capitalisation of rent gains  stemming from prior appropriation of land and slave labour. 
This capitalisation consisted in a portfolio investment (metadosis) a fondo perduto (gratis), 
i.e.  based  on  a  gratuity  (kharis),  and  hence  non-repayable,  carried  out  in  view of  an 
affiliation/association (koinonia) for (political) purposes of social redistribution and control 
(what today often goes under the labels of ‘public interest’, ‘national security’, ‘welfare’ 
and so on) that might today appear ‘unproductive’ from a strictly economic point of view, 
but which were at the time very meaningful and effective from a political perspective. 
Crucially,  such a  capitalisation  of  rent  gains  by  big  aristocratic  landowners  via  the 
sponsorship of the temple’s cult constituted the beginning of what Seaford and others (see 
for instance von Reden, 2010) have called the ‘monetisation of the cult’ and, thus, the 
beginning  of  a  political  economy  tout  court.  This  historical  process  appears  as  a 
progressive  substitution of perishable offerings (dedicated food) for durable ones and, in 
turn, the progressive standardisation and transformation of such cult utensils into monetary 
fees. This change is evidenced also in the semantic shift that occurred to words related to 
the sacrificial ritual throughout the Archaic age. The spit obelos became the coin obol; the 
word  drachma  that originally meant ‘a handful of (six) spits’ became the term used to 
define the principal unit of the currency in the Greek world (Seaford, 2004: 102); pelanos, 
round cakes burnt on the altar, came to denote a monetary fee to be paid at the sanctuary; 
eranos,  the communal meal,  became a cash loan (ibidem, 78-9). Significantly, of these 
original dedications, iron spits “may have been prized simultaneously for their sacrificial 
use, as prestige objects, and for their monetary function or functions” (Seaford, 2004: 108). 
In  particular,  if  we exclude  cauldrons,  which  seem to  have  functioned as  a  means  of 
payment among the wealthiest citizens of the eighth-century Cretan polis of Gortyn, iron 
spits are the only other cultic item that has been found “in contexts that strongly suggest a 
use as currency” (Schaps, 2004: 83). 
To be sure, the original and primary use of iron spits was non-monetary: in addition to 
being a form of dedication to sanctuaries, spits were used as ceremonial utensils on which 
the sacrificial meat was roasted, distributed and consumed in communality. However, as 
they  circulated  in  sacrificial  meals,  ceremonial  dedications,  banquets  and  burials  (von 
61 I here use the term ‘wasteful’ in the sense given by Sweezy and Baran (1966) to the type of institutional 
expenditure/capitalisation of wealth by monopoly capital, in order to highlight the non-strictly  productive 
nature of the collective investment made by the Greek élites with their temple sponsorship.
163
Reden,  1997:  160),  their  ‘religious’  significance  alimented  a  communal  confidence 
(Seaford, 2004: 106) in their value that went beyond their original ritual purpose. And so, 
spits  might  have served as  a  stable store of  value  and,  on occasion,  as  a  local  proto-
currency. As a matter of fact, iron spits enjoyed those technical characteristics of (partial) 
portability, countability, durability and, especially, fungibility (since they were products of 
standard shape and size, so as to ensure the traditional ‘right’ to an equal  share of the 
communal meal during the sacrificial feast) that are typical of a currency. 
It thus comes as no surprise that obeloi might have served within the community of the 
nascent polis as a universal form of exchangeable portable wealth, based on the surety of 
their political value as equity (i.e. stakes, stocks) in the temple cult. Spits, however, could 
never properly serve the purpose of monetary exchangeability and were thus destined to no 
more than local circulation for two interrelated reasons, pointing altogether to the modest  
market value of their metallic substance: first of all, a technical difficulty in transporting 
large quantities of iron due to their weight and physical encumbrance and, therefore, their 
commercial  inappropriateness  for  substantial  long-distance  inter-polis  transactions 
(Schaps, 2004: 85). 
Now, there might have been a conscious governmental decision to replace spits with 
coins in sixth-century Argos (Schaps,  2004: 102-3) but,  as a general case,  we have no 
evidence to sustain with certainty that there was a direct transition,  promoted by some 
‘authority’, from iron spits (utensil proto-currency) to coinage. In fact, it appears that, if 
anything, the transition was a rather turbulent one since the emergence of coinage was 
connected to the rise of tyrants and autocrats and the consequent dethronement of those 
ancestral hereditary nobilities that originally stood behind the temple’s cult and the parallel 
constitution of the polis. 
Though we cannot ascertain a continuity between the monetisation of the cult and the 
institution of coinage, it nonetheless appears evident that the temple’s going concern was 
responsible for the social construction of an intra-élite fiduciarity as well as a fidelisation 
of bonded labour, tenant farmers and poor peasants of early urban settlements. In other 
words, the cult worked to promoting a confidence/faith among the general population that 
was indispensable for the constitution of the polis and the institution of coinage. To be 
sure, much is yet to be done to unravel the connections and, perhaps, the mechanisms of 
causations, occurring between temple enterprise, institution of coinage and constitution of 
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the  polis  in  Archaic  Greece.  However,  we  can  draw  from  this  short  account  some 
pragmatic thoughts on the Greek currency that will hopefully prove to be useful for our 
general understanding of money. 
First, the fiduciary and redeemable character of Greek coinage was deeply rooted in a 
religious cultic dimension providing altogether the ground for a secularised, fetishist faith 
in  its  value;  in  particular,  the  sacrificial  distribution  of  the  meat  was  responsible  for 
‘sublimating’ violence and ritualising (i.e. institutionalising) a sense of religious ‘equality’ 
among (affiliated) men before the divine authority. Second, at the roots of the monetisation 
of temple-related activities and the subsequent institutionalisation of coinage was not a 
strictly economic form of exchange (barter; permutation) but a financial-like participation 
where each heroic noble contributed part of his own property (von Reden, 2010: 159) for 
political purposes of social redistribution and control. Finally, the participation/investment 
in the corporate lordship of the temple laid the foundations – and possibly provided the 
funds – for a stable financial infrastructure capable of interfacing the ‘public good’ and the 
‘private interests’, the sacred and the profane, in a way as to “hold the city together” in 
autonomy. 
In this respect, it is worth noting that temple’s sacred finance did not merely involve the 
‘wasteful’ expenditure of rent  gains  (via  festivals,  banquets,  sacrificial  rituals)  but  also 
‘productive’ investments  in  construction  works,  management  of  public  landed domains 
and, later,  public credit  (see von Reden, 2010),  providing altogether a stable source of 
income.  Also,  the  temple  extracted  fees  and  taxes  for  the  financing  of  its  operations. 
However, fees paid to the temple were not a form of ‘chartal’ taxation imposed upon the 
subjects by  some  temple  state-like authority,  but  a  form  of  self-taxation  by  the  rich 
analogous, for instance, to that afforded in modern times by the English landed aristocracy 
that, via self-taxation, was able to negotiate its  stakes in the public affairs of the English 
parliamentary  monarchy.  One  should  not  indulge  too  much  in  analogies  with  modern 
financial  institutions,  but  the  temptation  to  see  in  the  Greek  temple  (especially  in  the 
Classical and Hellenistic periods) a ‘sacred’ corporate fund, that is, a  reserve of (liquid) 
capital (see Davies, 2001) serving as current base for the capitalisation of power (honour, 
credit/credibility,  property)  and,  consequently,  the  monetisation  of  social  relations,  is 
strong. 
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The institution of the currency, the rise of the polity
In this chapter I have tried to get to the ‘root’ of nomisma by exploring the genesis of its 
nomos. I have thus traced the genealogy of equality in exchange set by nomisma back to 
the ritual violence and the sacrificial redistribution performed by the Archaic Greek cult. 
Drawing  on  Seaford’s  argument,  I  have  put  forward  the  hypothesis  that  communal 
confidence and acknowledgement of the symbols of power – of which coinage was to 
become the most emblematic representative – by the early urban populations of Archaic 
Greece were promoted/patronised by the temple’s politics of redistributive inclusiveness. 
Accordingly, I have suggested that it was political participation (in the form of a metadosis  
akin  to  an  investment  fund  or  trust), rather  than  economic  exchange,  what  actually 
alimented  a  generalised  trust  in  the  value  of  cultic  tokens  (such  as  iron  spits)  and, 
subsequently,  in  the  currency.  Iron  spits,  in  particular,  enabled  ‘equality’ in  the  ritual 
redistribution of the meat because, in virtue of their characteristics, they were recognised 
as stakes (or stocks) in the cult – i.e.  shareholders’ equity, so to speak. In an analogous 
way,  nomisma  was  to  become  the  “object  of  acknowledgment”  (from  nomisdein,  ‘to 
acknowledge’) of a participated sovereignty for the political coalition of proprietors that 
held power in the polis. 
In this regard I wish to stress once more that the type of autonomy conferred by the 
ownership of coinage was never total or absolute, but always  partial. Not even the coin 
issuer was truly autonomous and therefore sovereign because, by (con)ceding the coin in 
what may be termed an ‘original sharing of autonomy’, he renounced to the absoluteness 
and,  hence,  to  the  incommensurability,  of  his  sovereignty,  de  facto  opening  to  the 
possibility of a ‘civil’ negotiation of powers. Significantly, following the (con)cession of 
autonomy, the liberating power carried by  nomisma  remained still  conditional  upon the 
issuer’s security so that the sorts of the coin bearers became intimately connected to the 
fate of the coin issuer: as a result the autonomy of the coin bearers was enhanced upon the 
sovereignty of the coin issuer, and vice versa. Notably, ‘sharing autonomy’ via the currency 
did  not  diminish  in  any  meaningful  sense  the  power  of  the  issuer  but  only  made  it  
legitimately commensurable to that of those who now owned the currency and were thus in 
the condition to negotiate its value (and validity). 
And  so,  thanks  to  the  institution  of  coinage,  a  concertation  of  sovereignty  among 
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different classes of property-owners was eventually set up. This is why we can confidently 
sustain that,  though it  was bound to become the primary medium of circulation in the 
ancient Greek world, nomisma did not originate in an economic exchange but in a political 
participation: a (con)division, or (con)cession, of autonomy which de facto fragmented and 
hence  diffused  power62 among  the  collectivity  of  property-owners  in  ways  that  were 
universally  acknowledged  as  legitimate.  In  short,  nomisma  was  the  institution  of  a 
collective criterion of distribution of power, and therefore ‘the making of’ sovereignty. 
By the same token, nomisma was also ‘the making of’ justice. In this respect the reader 
will recall that for Aristotle the type of justice that nomisma brings about, similarly to the 
type of autonomy that it enables, is not total but partial, for it entails a commensuration of 
man with man that only applies to the citizens of the polis (the minority of proprietors) and 
which is based neither on criteria of human dignity and civic excellence (axia), nor on 
virtue, knowledge and education, but on what has been (already)  divided  and distributed 
among those who hold power in the city – i.e. it is based on private property. As such, 
nomisma does not directly give rise to  equity  but only establishes a  proportionality –  an 
equality in exchange – among proprietors. However, it is precisely because nomisma gets 
instituted as the object of a reciprocal acknowledgement of private property (i.e. a sort of 
private equity of ‘what falls to be divided’) that a higher equity of a juridical kind (i.e. a 
common law or public legislation) can be eventually achieved. In fact, says Aristotle (see 
also Castoriadis, 1984), the type of distributive justice performed by  nomisma  must be 
necessarily  complemented  by  a  corrective  (or  rectifying)  justice  and,  thus,  by  the 
institution of a compensatory system based on the law (nomos) capable of upholding both 
equity and the equitable for the entire community of proprietors/shareholders of the polis. 
In  this  respect,  it  is  worth  noting  that  early  Greek  written  law was  predominantly 
concerned with the regulation of concrete offences to one’s property rather than with the 
establishment of legal principles of justice; in that, it “betrays an attempt to fix rules and 
thus also to fix the amount of penalties to be paid” (von Reden, 1997: 161). To be sure,  
these compensatory, self-disciplining mechanisms were designed by the proprietors for the 
proprietors (among whom priests, high magistrates, and judges). Indeed, “[d]espite the fact 
that  in principle  monetary penalties could accrue to any citizen,  the surviving body of 
evidence suggests that it was above all the élite holding political and religious office who 
62 In this respect, Graeber (2011: 190) says that coinage brought about a democratisation of desire.
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had to be able to afford substantial monetary penalties” (von Reden, 1997: 163). To be 
sure,  we have  no  ground to  sustain  that  early  codified  law was  a  consequence of  the 
institution of coinage. However, it can be fairly sustained that nomisma and nomos partook 
of the same process of norm formation – the same normativity – which was at the basis of 
the construction of the sovereign-legal space of the Greek political (civil) society. 
Finally, a consideration on the subtle relation between nomos and physis, as discernible 
in coinage: the fiduciarity of nomisma, it’s been argued, is intimately connected with the 
possibility of  redeemability, that is, with the  surety of prospective acceptability given by 
the issuer of coinage when he promises to accept its token back for future payments. It is 
only upon the issuer’s security that  nomisma  can circulate at its full value as a  positive 
equity: outside the sphere of sovereignty of the issuer, where the stamp of the authority no 
longer  counts, the value of  nomisma, is destined to decrease and might even turn into a 
negative equity (a worthless token, a liability, especially if the metallic content of coinage 
is no longer recognised as a valuable asset in itself). This is, quite simply, why nomisma is 
said to  be not by  physis  but  of  the same kind as  nomos: because it  enjoys within the 
jurisdiction  of  the  polis  a  nominal/fiduciary  (conventional)  value  in  excess  of  the 
real/commodity (natural) value of the precious metal of which it is made. However, it is 
quite significant that the conventional value of Greek silver coins was only slightly higher 
than their market value as bullion. In other words, though it was fiduciary, Greek coinage 
never was a ‘fiat currency’ with no ‘intrinsic’ value. As Seaford himself points out, “the 
Greeks did not develop token money” (Seaford, 2004: 144). 
Quite the contrary, evidences suggest that the ‘hardware’ of coinage did matter a great 
deal, as the generally high levels of purity of coins in the Archaic and Classical periods 
corroborate (Seaford, 2004: 137). This is puzzling; in fact, if it’s true that coins at some 
point  were  no  longer  weighed  but  counted  because  citizens  trusted  their  conventional 
value, why bother with the purity of their metallic physis and not mint instead base metal 
coinage?  According to  Schaps  (2004:  30),  coins’ purity  was  not  due to  ideological  or 
religious (or some would say ‘irrational’) reasons but to practical ones: “it was not virtue 
but economics that prevented Greek statesmen from debasing their coins:  since no one 
state controlled the Greek world, a debased coinage, with no value outside the boundaries 
of the issuing state, would have made it difficult or impossible for the citizens of that state 
to import the things they wanted”. In addition to this ‘international’ explanation, however, 
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there is also a ‘domestic’ reason: since the Greek poleis were essentially agrarian societies 
governed  by  big  landlords,  a  ‘sound’ monetary  policy  against  coin  debasement  was 
desirable because it protected the value of rent gains from pro-debtor inflation (crucial in 
this respect was the change of land-tenure regime and thus the shift from sharecropping to 
cash-cropping,  responsible  for  the  monetisation  of  agrarian  rental  obligations,  see  von 
Reden, 2010: 38-9). 
Significantly,  the  conventional  value  of  nomisma was  enhanced upon the  ‘intrinsic’ 
desirability of its substance and thus leaned on a subterranean physis, in virtue of which it 
was recognised as  universally  valuable (though in varying degrees) also ‘abroad’, where 
the citizens of the polis could enjoy its power in their exchanges with  others. Crucially, 
here by physis we should not immediately think of the “first natural stratum” (Castoriadis, 
1997)  of  coinage,  i.e.  the  brute  datum  of  its  metallic  substance.  There  is  nothing 
‘intrinsically’ worth  about  silver  or  gold.  What  is  ‘natural’ about  coinage  is  not  its 
substance per se (which simply is) but the fact that this substance is universally recognised 
as prestigious, sought-after, despite its visible uselessness. Far from being a natural datum, 
the  physis  of the Greek currency is, like its  nomos, the product of a  reification, a social 
factum originating in alienation that goes back to an ancient time that far predates the cultic 
practices of the Archaic age. Regrettably, exploring the subterranean physis of nomisma – 
and namely why precious metals were indeed precious in the ancient world – far exceeds 
the possibilities of this work. In the conclusions I will nonetheless spend a few more words 
on the elusive relation between physis and nomos occurring in the Greek currency. 
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Conclusions?
In the closing of the last chapter I have pointed out that the fiduciarity of nomisma, i.e. its 
nomos, was enhanced upon the ‘intrinsic’ desirability of its precious-metal substance, and 
thus leaned on a  subterranean  physis.  Put simply,  Greek coinage was a conventionally 
accepted measure and a fiduciary means of payment and exchange only because it was also 
a universally recognised store of value, that is, a highly valuable asset – precious metal – 
good for internal market exchange as well as external trade. Significantly, as a store of 
value, coinage embodied not only the capacity to settle debts in the present but also the 
certainty of settling them in the future: it was a ‘surety for future exchange’, in Aristotle’s 
words (Ethics,  1133b: 10),  or,  as Seaford put  it  (2004:  16),  “the power to  meet  social 
obligations” (Seaford, 2004: 16). 
In the Greek coinage the symbolic means (of payment) coincided with a material  end, 
that is, the sought-after power to redeem oneself from the grip of patronage and aristocratic 
lordship.  Coinage  was  thus  emblematic  of  a  peculiar  value  –  a  surety that  in  modern 
financial jargon goes under the name of  equity  (modern equities, that is, common stocks 
are in effect traded as financial  securities). That is to say, ontologically,  nomisma  was a 
stake/stock in the autonomy/sovereignty of the polis, a primordial financial asset that was 
neither ‘nominal’ nor ‘real’; instead, it was “both material and symbol, both matter and 
trope […] the merging of precious metal and civil stamp” (Kurke, 1999: 300). In this vein, 
Seaford (2004: 136) has argued that Greek coinage entailed “the combination of, and the 
antithesis between, sign (or form) and substance”, but he also pointed out that it was “an 
antithesis in which, although the substance must have some intrinsic value, decisive is the  
sign, which implies a homogeneous ideal substance distinct from the metal in which the 
sign is expressed”. 
The sign of nomisma, that is, its coin-form (eidos), is decisive because it brings identity  
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into the nature of metals.  In virtue of the sign, the metal is made uniform, fungible and 
universal, homogenous as well as homogenising, impersonal as well as depersonalising, 
potentially unlimited, capable of uniting the opposites (Seaford, 2004). For these reasons 
the  physis  of  nomisma  possesses  the  character  of  a  transcendental  nature  and  can  be 
accordingly defined as a  meta-physis, i.e. ‘a  physis  in transcendence of  physis’. Notably, 
the Greek preposition meta (μετά) means ‘after’, ‘beyond’, ‘adjacent’, ‘self’: nomisma is a 
metaphysical entity – in fact, a virtual entity: a piece of metal that is nearly a lump of metal 
but which is  not  really just  metal/bullion – that is  adjacent to (associable to)  all  other 
things, but which at the same time is other than all things, including itself. In other words, 
nomisma is a self-referential form (the prefix meta also means ‘about itself’) that, like all 
eidei, contains in itself the possibility to ‘transcend’ itself, that is, change (see chapter 4). 
Notably, as an eidos, nomisma seems to come ‘out of nothing’: it has no provenance but, 
as Castoriadis put it, is an advent. The nothing out of which nomisma is created, however, 
is not oblivion in an ontological sense but a significant nothing that ought to be instituted 
like  any  thing  else:  it  is  the  virtual  place  of  intangibles (see  chapter  3),  where  “the 
immaterial equipment, or, by a license of speech, the intangible assets of the community” 
(Veblen, 1908: 518) are stored. And so, only apparently does nomisma’s eidos come out of 
nothing, for the eidos, as a social imaginary signification, is, to quote Veblen, “necessarily 
a product of the community, the immaterial residue of the community’s experience, past 
and  present,  which  has  no  existence  apart  from  the  community’s  life,  and  can  be 
transmitted only in the keeping of the community at large” (Veblen, 1908: 539-40). This 
does not mean that something like ‘society’ can create institutional forms such as money, 
but, more significantly, that whatever we create ‘out of nothing’ does not spring ultimately 
from our subjectivity (or imagination) but more  pragmatically  from the social relations 
through  which  we  are  able  to  relate  (physically  and  imaginarily)  with  the  Other  and 
construct at once our subjectivity and the world. In short, institutional genesis is in social  
relations.
Through  social  relations,  men  realise/activate  ‘indefinite  skeins  of  interminable 
referrals’ to forms, ideas, figures, and words that glitter in history and fable (see chapter 4). 
In effect, history, so neglected and forgotten by ‘men possessed of logos’, is nothing but a 
monumental presence of “the knowledge of ways and means” (Veblen,  1908: 518), the 
intangible assets of the collectivity sprouted from past social relations and crystallised into 
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institutional forms. And so, if eidos is ‘in theory’ a creation out of nothing, ‘in practice’ it 
is a creation out of history (to be sure, a history that is taken for granted, given as a datum, 
and which is  thus  forgotten and eventually  neglected/negated).  Crucially,  this  does  not 
mean that an institutional form is a product of History, or Historical Necessity; quite the 
contrary, the institutional form enables social and institutional change: it is the making of  
historical change. 
And so, if men create  eidos  in the praxis of socially relating, the resulting historical 
process of creating eidos is techne. Of course, in nomisma’s case (but the same is true for 
all other eidei), techne does not simply refer to the technology to make coins out of metal 
(i.e.  metallurgy,  minting)  but  corresponds  to  the  much  broader  historical  process  of 
producing them ‘out of nothing’ – that is, the process of transforming pieces of metal into 
an  institution  of  equality  in  exchange.  We  call  this  ‘technical’ process  monetisation. 
Significantly,  “monetisation”,  writes  von  Reden  (2007:  3),  “means  not  just  the 
establishment of a coinage, but involves the more complex process of re-placing existing 
forms  of  money  and  transforming  very  diverse  institutions  of  payment  into  cash 
transactions”. This means that although it is of course intertwined with the development of 
coinage,  monetisation  is  a  much  more  encompassing  process  that  also  involves  the 
formation of prices (i.e. the transformation of things and human beings into sellable assets) 
and  the  commercialisation  (commodification)  of  social  relations,  based  on  cash 
transactions as well  as credit  (von Reden, 2010).  More generally,  techne is the  social-
historical process by means of which nature, including the nature of men, is transformed, 
that  is,  produced  (and  reproduced)  as  a  form.  Hence  techne is  always  practically a 
production of new landscapes, new architectures and, especially, new figures (such as the 
eidei of ‘lord’ and ‘slave’) out of the old ones. This is why, historically, coinage was not an 
‘invention’ but  a  gradual  ‘development’ (coming  at  the  end  of  a  historical  process  of 
monetisation  of  the  ancient  Near  Eastern  world),  even  though  it  coincided  with  an 
institutional (cultural, social) revolution (chapter 6). 
Of course, such a social-historical process of producing and reproducing forms – in 
Marxian jargon, the process by which men exploit nature and produce the means of their 
social and institutional reproduction – cannot  begin unless men are held together in the 
name of a reciprocal indigence, that is, unless they acknowledge their ‘being in debt with 
one another’ as a principle of inter-action (axia) (chapter 5). It is only upon granting status 
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to  each  other  that  men  can  eventually  establish  politike koinonia  and  start  altogether 
‘amassing’ their intangibles and ‘drawing’ on them to achieve their purposes (in Archaic 
Greece this amassment of intangible wealth was literally performed via the temple’s cult, 
see  chapter  6).  Yet,  by  setting  up  a  ‘going  concern’,  or  a  collective  enterprise,  what 
political coalitions can eventually achieve might completely negate the original reasons 
that  brought  them together  in  the first  instance.  In  fact,  although coinage arose as the 
emblem of a political participation in the constitution of the polis, according to Graeber 
(2011: 229; see also Ingham, 2004: 99), the politics of its production and distribution were 
responsible for giving rise in classical antiquity, starting from the second half of the first 
millennium  BC,  to  a  “military-coinage-slavery  complex”  that  reorganised  the  broad 
Mediterranean  geopolitics  in  an  imperial fashion,  that  is,  in  ways  that  destroyed  the 
political autonomy of poleis and alike local political organisations. 
In this respect, I wish to emphasise a peculiar development in the production of coinage 
that took place in the Hellenistic world, that is, in the epoch marked by the imperial rule of 
Alexander the Great and the Macedonian kings that followed. Under these circumstances 
we witness “an increasing distinction between the large denomination ‘Hellenic’ coinage 
for international use and smaller denomination coinage for local use” (Howgego, 1995: 
49). This monetary development, in short, consisted in the emergence of ‘closed-currency’ 
systems, as for instance in the case of Ptolemaic coinage (see von Reden, 2007: 43), based 
on  an  institutional  separation  between  precious-metal  coins  with  high  intrinsic  value, 
adopted by the élites for ‘international’ transactions, and base-metal, or debased precious-
metal, coins for local transactions. The imperial drift thus coincided with a loss of intrinsic 
value for local coins, compared to the high intrinsic value of early Greek coin series. 
This loss of intrinsic value of Hellenistic local coinage, put crudely, meant that whereas 
coinage arose as a form of  equity  qua stake in the sovereignty of the polis – a liberating 
power and an emancipating technology –, in conjunction with the imperial turn it lost at the 
local level much of its equitability, its capacity to properly express distributive justice, and 
became similar to a fiat money, a negative equity or a liability issued via ‘deficit spending’ 
(a subtle taxation) by local kings. This altogether calls for the following consideration: the 
more the physis of nomisma transcended its physis, i.e. the more coinage was debased and 
came  to  rely  exclusively  on  its  fiduciary  value,  the  more  the  nomos  of  nomisma 
transcended its  nomos,  i.e. the more coinage broke away from distributive justice – or, 
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more precisely, the more it broke away from the type of distributive justice current in the 
polis to become expression of the type of distributive justice current in the empire. This is 
why it has been argued extensively in the last two chapters that  nomisma was from the 
beginning a political phenomenon: because its institution did not merely provide a solution 
to,  but rather  brought into being,  the problem of distributive justice.  That is,  nomisma 
politicised the question of private property in relation to sovereignty and law, and, more 
generally, it set the standard for debating the question of the ‘nomos qua nomos’: namely 
which nomos is the best, the most equitable, the most natural – on the background, which 
nomisma most properly expresses distributive justice, and, reciprocally, which distributive 
justice is the most appropriate to a regime of private property relations.
And so, nomisma’s meta-physis entailed at once the possibility for transcending also its 
nomos, that is, for establishing another type of distributive justice that might even negate 
prior notions of distributive justice. This is why we can conceptualise nomisma not only as 
a meta-physis but also and most importantly as a meta-nomos. I am here coining this new 
term,  meta-nomos,  to  emphasise  an  important  question:  throughout  this  work  I  have 
pointed out on many an occasion that positivism entails the belief in the autonomy of the  
norm, therefore the misunderstanding that an institution such as money might consist in an 
entity granted with a rationality of its own against which men have no power  but trust. 
However, as Aristotle reminds us,  nomisma is of the same kind as  nomos, that is, a self-
referential and transcendental form, but this does not mean that nomisma is an auto-nomos; 
on the contrary, “it is in our power to change it and make it useless”. Indeed  nomisma 
stands side by side with all other figures of the  nomos, but like all other figures of the 
nomos, it is not a creature of the nomos, i.e. given by the Law, but, on the contrary, it is a 
creation of the logos, a rationality that sparkles with social relations. 
This is why the ancient Greek currency does not merely  denote  a proportion (a price 
ratio)  but  connotes/signifies  a  proportionality  (a  value  relation)  among  men.  That  is, 
nomisma is not simply a unit of value (i.e. scale of price) but a unity of value insofar as a 
unity of analogy, an indefinite skein of interminable referrals to something other than what 
it apparently expresses (chapters 4 and 5). Indeed, prima facie, nomisma is expression of a 
peculiar value, equity, but as a matter of fact nomisma is the reference to something other 
than equity, something inexpressible, lying ‘in-between’: power. Nomisma is the power to 
meet social obligations, according to Seaford (2004), but also the power to rip off others 
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from their  context,  i.e.  to turn human beings into slaves,  according to  Graeber  (2011). 
Nomisma, in other words, let an unspeakable course of power begin, which is expressible 
only as a  discourse of value (and hence a discourse of participation, political autonomy, 
sovereignty,  distributive justice).  With  nomisma  not only metals,  but also ‘citizens’ and 
‘civil societies’ are coined (see also Kurke, 1999).
***
The reader may have noticed that, curiously, I have argued in chapter 4 that money is not 
the same as  nomisma and yet I have spent the last two chapters of a work on money to 
elucidate  the  significance  of  something  which  I  defined  as  being  other  than money. 
Hopefully, the reason why I did it is now easier to guess: historically, the institution of 
nomisma corresponds to the emergence of the currency (what today goes under the name 
of ‘fiat money’) and even though the latter is not the same as money, it is intimately related 
to it and, today, subsumed under its larger semantic domain. That is to say, we can only 
understand  money  if  we  consider  its  phenomenon  in  its  intrinsic  relatedness  with  the 
currency, for without the currency money cannot exist.  
What is, then, a currency? I contend that the currency is a token (symbolon) of political 
autonomy, that is, the foremost emblem of sovereignty. This sovereignty is never absolute 
or total because the currency is by definition shared by those who hold power, fragmented 
into stocks, stakes – forms of equity that are to all intents and purposes titles of private 
property – each of which embodying a portion of sovereignty and, thus, a partial autonomy 
that can be alienated, negotiated, transferred, circulated within the sovereign jurisdiction 
but also, to an extent, ‘abroad’. What is current, that is, circulating, about the currency is 
precisely the title of property in the sovereignty of the polity (or state). The currency is 
therefore intimately related to the polity to which it  belongs (tautologically, it  belongs  to 
those who hold power in the polity), and in the same way as polities may become part of a 
more extensive (transnational) order of an imperial type, so may currencies be arranged in 
a hierarchy of value that reflects the actual sovereignty of the polities they connotes. 
Contemporary currencies are normally conceptualised as ‘fiat money’, that is, money 
issued by decree, ‘at the stroke of a pen’. This seems to suggest that they are somehow 
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created at will by governments, but this is not the case, for governments (Treasuries) do not 
normally  issue  currencies:  central  banks  do.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  national  currencies 
consists in bank reserves, or else bank credits to the central bank (see chapter 2). Notably, 
the creation of fiat money by central banks is a by-product of the creation of money by 
banks or, more precisely, it is a by-product of the politics of monetary governance by banks 
(see chapter 3): that is, the currency is created via central bank credit operations in order to 
sustain the liquidity illusion of banks’ balances. However, even though today causation 
seems to go from bank money to central bank currency, historically as well as logically the 
currency is prior to money.  That is, without readily negotiable, current capital, there can be 
no equity to leverage, and hence no production of net worth called ‘money’ (see chapter 
3).
Crucially, a currency is equity value which only apparently is created out of thin air, ex 
nihilo, for in reality in thin air lies property (see chapter 3). In particular, the currency is 
created out of a ‘gratuitous’ participation of pre-existing capital, gathered on purpose in a 
corporate investment fund, or trust (prototype of modern central banks), by some political 
coalition of ‘equals’ (shareholders) who, by instituting their currency, lay the foundations 
for vindicating their  autonomy and independency – in fact,  their  partial  autonomy and 
inter-dependency – and exerting their sovereign power – in fact, their diffused government, 
or  else  financial  governance,  of  the polity.  The establishment  of  the Bank of  England 
provides an archetypical example of how modern currencies are instituted (see chapter 3). 
In the world of currencies, authority is exerted through a form of governance, rather than a 
proper  government,  precisely  because  sovereignty  is  partially  (con)ceded,  diffused, 
circulated.  I  say ‘partially’ also because  as  a  matter  of  fact  modern  currencies  do not 
circulate extensively throughout the economy but are stored as bank reserves and only 
circulate into inter-bank circuits (markets for reserves and so on). 
Significantly, a currency is essential to the creation of bank money ‘out of nothing’ – in 
fact, out of history – because it carries with it a history of politics. Indeed, like the stock of 
a  corporation,  the  currency  of  a  polity  is  coined  out  of  past  property:  that  is,  it  is  a  
capitalisation of the past. Those who possess the currency accordingly own a right against  
what is already in the world to own. For these reasons the currency is the most secure of all 
assets. Modern national currencies, in particular, are securitised on the pledge/collateral of 
the power to tax – in fact, the power to unilaterally impose a debt on others – formally held 
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by states, but substantially exploited by banks to  enhance their credit, that is,  monetise  
their claims  (see chapters 2 and 3). And so, it  goes without saying that as soon as the 
currency is instituted, credit arrangements can flourish on the basis of its universal security. 
For instance, as Cohen (1992) has convincingly shown, in ancient Athens complex credit 
and bank arrangements became a highly institutionalised practice as early as the fourth 
century BC, that is, following the consolidation of the Athenian currency. To be sure, this 
does not imply that the currency is a precondition to credit; rather it means that faith in the 
currency (chapters  4  and 6)  enhances  credit,  makes  it  more  easily  to  grant,  negotiate, 
market.   
It  is  worth  noting  in  this  respect  that,  historically,  before  the  institution  of  modern 
money, currency and credit remained separate entities (see Amato, 2008): in other words, 
before the modern era it was not possible for debtors to indefinitely procrastinate the time 
of  final  settlement  in  cash  by  rolling  over  their  debts.  Stated  differently,  unlike  the 
currency, credit never was a means of  final  payment but only a means of payment  pro 
tempore. By contrast, with the advent of modern money, that is, this money (see chapter 4), 
pro tem bank credit has become a right to demand and sue for payment of a debt “for the 
time being” – allegedly for ever – as long as the illusion of liquidity is kept alive. The 
credo  of  capitalism  has  been  accordingly  preached  on  the  systematic  deferral  of  the 
rendering of bank accounts, an annihilation of the time of redemption that has condemned 
us to a Keynesian long run, when we are all dead (chapter 3). National debts have been 
thus erected in monumental memory of redeemability, and nowadays stand impenetrable, 
incomprehensible,  frightening,  like  totemic  monoliths  of  a  metaphysical  empire  (see 
Amato and Fantacci, 2012), spreading an existential nihilism that reads “paying the debt is 
meaningless and yet we shall keep paying”. 
Now, unlike the currency, money is not a ‘piece’ or a ‘token’ of sovereignty; as Mitchell 
Innes (2004 [1914]: 56) wrote: “the eye has never seen, nor the hand touched a dollar. All 
that we can touch or see is a promise to pay or satisfy a debt due for an amount called a 
dollar”. Instead, money is a political  project of autonomy, a promise of sovereignty: it is 
future  control over  people  and  things.  This  project  ‘stretches  out’  or,  better,  ‘leans 
forward’,  connecting  present  and future values  on the basis  of  current  distributions  of 
power.  Differently  from  the  currency,  money  is  anonymous,  knows  no  history  and 
apparently has no history: it is a  projection of the future political economy based on a 
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complete disregard of its past. Money can be volatile, as in capital flights, and be hidden in 
opaque financial heavens – in fact, purgatories where money can be recycled, purified and 
eventually given a new face value. 
And yet, however it may disregard history, money cannot prescind from it in the end; 
that is to say,  money always ought to build up on the currency, which in fact is often 
labelled ‘monetary base’. In other words, the monetary illusion – that is, the illusion of 
liquidity – can only be carried out on the basis of the legal fiction of equality in exchange, 
as instituted by the currency. More generally, money needs the sovereign boundaries of the 
law in order to exploit and exceed its jurisdictional limits. Conformingly, money appears as 
an oceanic (transnational) flow of liquid power whose boundaries are shored by the solid 
lighthouses of currencies and national stocks. However, because of its ‘overflowing’ nature 
(a product of leverage), if triggered by the ‘perfect storms’ of financial bubbles (which are 
coordinated  strategies  of  power  redistribution,  see  chapter  3),  money  may  turn  into  a 
tsunami sweeping away sovereign boundaries and showing, with its backwash, the true 
miserable face of modern currencies as negative equities, i.e. liabilities.
Crucially, the basic difference between currency and money is not one of respectively 
equity and liability, but one of value and value. The value of the currency arises from a 
gratuitous (a fondo perduto) participation – a participatio of powers (privileges and proto-
rights by the élite of property-owners) that ‘yields’ sovereignty. By contrast, the value of 
money is constructed out of a profitable exchange – a permutatio of obligations, a promise 
for  a  promise,  and therefore  a  mutuum,  an  interest-earning debt  relation.  In  particular, 
money is created in what Heinsohn and Steiger (2000; 2006, 2009) have termed in their 
‘property theory of interest and money’ a  collateralized credit contract.  At the basis of 
Heinsohn  and  Steiger’s  theory  is  a  fundamental  distinction  between  ‘possession’ and 
‘property’, as epitomised by the Roman dictum  proprietas in iure, possessio in fact est  
(Heinsohn and Steiger, 2006: 491). 
As they explain, “rules of possession, individual and/or collective, determine who, in 
what manner, at what time and place, to what extent, and by exclusion of whom, may 
physically use a good or resource and change its substance and form” (ibid., 490). In short, 
possession  is  about  holding  things  (including  people)  for  one’s  own  use;  as  such,  it 
practically denotes any tangible thing (use value) that is physically owned. Property, on the 
other hand, “is not, in its modern sense, confined to that which may be touched by the 
178
hand,  or  seen  by  the  eye”  (quoted  in  Commons,  1924:  18),  for  property,  explains 
Commons, “means any of the expected activities implied with regard to the thing owned” 
(ibid.). Property, in other words, is  exchange value, “the power to withhold from others 
what they need […] protected by the physical power of the sovereign” (ibid., 52). 
Property is therefore ‘business as usual’ for those who hold power in the constitutional 
state,  and  “business  operations”,  argue  Heinsohn  and  Steiger  (2000:  70),  “are  not 
performed  with  the  soil,  but  with  the  fence  around  the  field”  –  that  is,  by  enforcing 
property claims on what is in the world to be controlled. As soon as a claim is enforced ex 
nihilo, it carries what Heinsohn and Steiger (2000: 81) have termed an “unearned property 
premium”, or, simply, a rent: an intangible yield that accrues to the property title. In virtue 
of this unearned immaterial rent, the property title is born with the innate character of a 
security. Crucially, this security, or property premium, “allows proprietors to enter credit 
contracts, and is a measure of the potential of individuals to become creditors and debtors” 
(Heinsohn and Steiger,  2000: 82).  More specifically,  it  entails  the right  to  “(i)  burden 
property titles in issuing money against interest; (ii) to encumber these titles as collateral  
for obtaining money; (iii) to alienate or  exchange,  including sale and lease; and (iv) to 
enforce” (Heinsohn and Steiger, 2006: 490). 
Put crudely, this means that money can only be created in a credit contract where both 
parties are legally equal proprietors. Indeed, in the credit contract both creditor and debtor 
ought  to  ‘block’ (either  burden  or  encumber)  the  property  premium  attached  to  their 
property.  In  particular,  the  creditor  ought  to  burden  her  own  capital  (e.g.  readily 
transferable current stock, or else currency) while the debtor ought to pledge, or encumber, 
property as collateral (notably, this property, unlike the creditor’s own capital, is not readily 
transferable, that is, current). By blocking their respective property in the credit contract, 
creditor  and  debtor  are  able  to  produce  two  different  documents,  which  they  thus 
exchange:  one  document  is  the  interest-bearing  obligation  secured  by  the  debtor’s 
collateral,  which  becomes  an  asset  for  the  creditor  (a  right  to  sue  and  demand  for 
payment); the other document is the non-interest-bearing claim (in fact, an IOU) backed by 
the creditor’s own capital. “The first document is the credit contract by which the second 
document is uno actu issued and loaned as money proper. Therefore, money is created in a  
credit contract but is not itself a credit [or debt]” (Heinsohn and Steiger, 2000: 86).
Now,  the  interest-earning  document  issued  by  the  debtor,  i.e.  the  obligation, is  a 
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“contract between a specified creditor and a specified debtor. It binds the named debtor to 
refund to the named creditor the money proper loaned, to pay interest, and to collateralize 
property for the creditor” (ibid.). Crucially, this obligation is “a tradable asset”, meaning 
that “the identity of the creditor can change, while the bond and the name of the debtor is 
always the same” (ibid.). Put simply, the creditor can always get out of the contract by 
selling the obligation to a third party, but this will not cancel the debt, nor will it unblock 
the debtor’s collateral. The obligation, in other words, is always a liability for the debtor 
and an asset for the creditor. 
By contrast, the non-interest-earning document issued by the creditor is “an anonymized 
title in so far as only the issuer of this document is named, but no debtor. This means that 
everybody who holds this claim does so without interest, because it is paid by the debtor 
named in the credit contract” (ibid.). This anonymized title is  net worth to the holder, or 
else  purchasing power denominated in the creditor’s monetary standard. Crucially, “[t]he 
creditor cannot help but establish his own standard at the very moment he issues the claims 
to property we call money in a credit contract” (Heinsohn and Steiger, 2000: 84, my italic),  
meaning that the measure is constructed in exchange, not prior to it (as Ingham argues, see 
chapter 1). 
Notably,  money’s  “net  worth  is  not  eliminated  again  when  the  loan  is  paid  back” 
(Heinsohn and Steiger, 2007: 498). On the contrary, once put in circulation, money serves 
as a bearer of investment options, and only one of these options is “to present it to the 
creditor-issuer  and have it  redeemed” (Heinsohn and Steiger:  2000:  86).  Notably,  in  a 
capitalist economy redemption is normally the least profitable option in the short run for 
money-holders, who might want to obtain a higher return by investing it in interest-earning 
financial titles. But what is more important, redemption is a viable option only for very big 
investors, and ultimately for banks themselves in competition with each other at the global 
level. By contrast, no redeemability option is really available for the peoples. 
Indeed redemption  can be  indefinitely  procrastinated at  the  systemic level  as  far  as 
aggregate creditors are able to engage in a coordinated fashion in the creation of secondary 
markets for interest-earning IOUs. Needless to say, these peculiar financial commodities 
are systematically supplied by their aggregate debtors when they enter a credit contract 
(see chapter 3).  To be sure,  this  vicious spiral  of debt ‘relations of relations’ is  hardly 
sustainable unless creditors find a ‘pledgor of last  instance’ that is  willing to routinely 
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borrow on the basis of a stable security that can be readily sold (via market) to third parties 
by  means  of  bank  discounting.  This  pledgor,  the  reader  will  recall,  is  the  modern 
constitutional state.  The state’s government borrows money from banks by pledging as 
collateral  a  security  that  essentially  consists  in  its  fiscal  power  to  tax.  Hence,  upon 
borrowing money, the government issues a bond and ‘blocks’ part of the its sovereignty, 
which  is  thus  mortgaged  to  banks  (via  the  central  bank)  until  the  government  will 
extinguish its debt (plus interest). To be sure, no government will ever extinguish its debts 
to banks, but only roll them over whilst servicing the interest, unless it decides to walk 
through the perilous path of debt default. 
To be sure, the modern story of state deficit finance is one of a routinely renegotiation 
of debts,  and, reciprocally, of a systematic bank securitisation of the public debt, which is 
capitalised  and  marketed  by  banks  upon  lending.  Put  crudely,  this  means  that,  contra 
Heinsohn and Steiger’s theory, when the banking system as a whole, through the mediation 
of the central bank, ‘lends’ money to the government, it does not block any capital on its 
side (except for an una tantum participation in the common investment fund called central 
bank) but automatically  capitalises  the government security as a bank asset. The same is 
true when the single bank grants credit to a private agent (a household or a firm): whereas 
the debtor ought to pledge a collateral  on her side to get the money (even though the 
collateral might be largely unspecific when the debtor is largely trustworthy), the bank 
needs to burden  nothing  of its own when it issues money. This is because the banking 
system as a whole has learned how to avoid burdening its  own capital  by sustaining the 
illusion  of  the  liquidity  of  its  monetary  claims  through an  infrastructure  of  secondary 
markets (see chapter 3). 
As a result, the more bank balances are securitised, the less banks are responsible for 
guaranteeing the redemption of their promises – and the less they will ensure equity in the 
end. Securitisation, in particular, engenders the dangerous idea that one can borrow from 
the future without ever having to pay for it and, especially, without ever coming to terms  
with the past. But as much as ‘those who make money’ will exorcise history by turning 
debts relations into tradable commodities ‘no question asked’, they will never dispel the 
people’s demand for equity. For today equity is ensured for banks and banks alone, and this 
is true nearly everywhere in the world. Transnational banks are “the rulers and regulators 
of commerce and they almost control the fortunes of states” through a global infrastructure 
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of financial governance. They hold stakes in nearly everything, but their equity is all in all 
a negative equity, as their stakes are leveraged not in view of a progressive emancipation 
of the peoples but on the calculus of a profitable redistribution of powers over everything 
that  is  and will be  to own. The value of contemporary central bank currencies is near to 
zero,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  we  pay  an  enormous  price  for  keeping  them  current; 
fortunately, people are finally coming to see through the glowing reality of money, helped 
by  the  progressive  dissolution  (via  debt  deflation,  see  Hudson,  2012)  of  the  liquidity 
illusion. The emperor is naked and its money, this money, is bound to be comprehended in 
the end, and redelivered to the nothing where it properly belongs. 
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